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ABSTRACT 
Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) bear the great potential of supplementing , 
sometimes even replacing , the human tutors with unbound availability in time as weil 
as in place. Setter constructivist tutoring requires taking into account a greater num-
ber of contextual information sources. However, tutoring becomes increasingly 
harder when an ITS designer wishes to take into account many factors . Doing great 
tutoring calls for many integrated skills, and not only demonstrating an obvious mas-
tery of the subject matter. The more various types of information an agent senses, 
the more apt it may be. But the variety and volume puts pressure over the process-
ing of ali that is sensed, along with ali the information already possessed by the tu-
toring agent. Expert human tutors usually show this capability. However, recreating it 
in an artificial agent by combining successfully ali the information pieces in a com-
puter search algorithm can overwhelm even the most powerful computer; trying to 
achieve this in a rule-based system will discourage most rules creator. 
Hu mans have evolved ali sorts of tricks to tackle complexity. Baars ( 1988, 
1997b ), and Sloman and Chrisley (2003) entertain the idea that attention and con-
sciousness are major mechanisms allowing humans to consider various sources of 
information, even concepts regarding past experiences, create abstract concepts , 
and not easily get bogged down or overflowed. ln my research, 1 propose that con-
sciousness can be an asset for artificial agents, even if not "complete" or "real ", by 
human standards. 1 mean to uncover the possibilities consciousness might bring, 
and explore whether (and how) it can be implemented. Many models of conscious-
ness exist, and some agents already have been built on some conscious ideas. Of 
particular interest, Baars has laid down a theory, the Global Workspace Theory 
(Baars, 1988, 1997), which gives a nice account of consciousness phenomena and 
roles. 1 propose hereby a tutoring agent architecture based on Franklin 's IDA "con-
scious" agent architecture, with some modifications and extensions. Scenarios dem-
onstrate the viability of the architecture for real-time interactions when coaching an 
astronaut during his learning of Canadarm2 manipulation. Whilst being founded on 
Baars' theory, this architecture shows many commonalities with ACT-R and BDI 
theories. The resulting prototype has been validated against expert analysis, work-
through analysis, and field observation . 
The proposed research offers a new architecture for ITS that bears much po-
tential , and opens up a number of further projects and researches in the fields of ITS 
and cognitive sciences . 
Keywords: artificial consciousness, general intelligence, cognitive modeling, cogni-
tive agent, Global Workspace theory, Baars, CTS, tutoring agent, IDA, LIDA. 
RÉSUMÉ DE LA RECHERCHE 
Les systèmes tutoriaux intelligents (STI) portent un remarquable potentiel pour 
soutenir, parfois remplacer, les tuteurs humains grâce à leur disponibilité sans borne 
quant au temps et au lieu. Tout comme l'humain , l'agent artificiel doit coordonner de 
nombreuses habiletés et savoir faire usage d'informations contextuelles excédant les 
seules connaissances liées au domaine. Toutefois , cela créé une pression impor-
tante sur le traitement perceptuel , et augmente les possibilités de combinaisons 
avec tout ce que l'agent possède déjà . La création d'agents augmente en complexité 
au fur et à mesure où les concepteurs cherchent à intégrer un plus grand nombre de 
facteurs dans les processus décisionnels. Toutes les capacités et tous les savoirs 
doivent opérer d'une manière intégrée. Les tuteurs humains experts y parviennent 
habituellement, mais la reproduction de ces règles dans un système à base de rè-
gles peut décourager la majorité des concepteurs de systèmes à base de règles, ou 
sinon excéder les capacités computationnelles du plus puissant des ordinateurs. 
Les humains se sont dotés, au cours de l'évolution, de toutes sortes d'astuces 
permettant de gérer la complexité et dépasser les contraintes de l'immédiateté. 
Ba ars ( 1988), et Sloman et Chrisley (2003), soutiennent que l'attention et la cons-
cience sont deux exemples éminents de mécanismes complémentaires permettant 
aux humains de considérer un grand nombre de sources d'information, incluant des 
concepts d'expériences passées, tout en demeurant hautement réactifs . 
Ma recherche soutient l'hypothèse que la conscience peut enrichir significati-
vement des agents artificiels, même si cette "conscience" n'atteint pas encore la 
complexité , la complétude, les modes et la réalité de la conscience humaine. La 
première étape consiste à déterminer les possibilités ouvertes par des mécanismes 
de conscience artificielle, et d'explorer s'il est techniquement envisageable d'y par-
venir, et par quels moyens. Tout particulièrement, la théorie psychologique de Baars, 
l'atelier global, retient mon attention . Elle se fonde sur la modularité de l'esprit et sur 
les rôles partagés entre mécanismes conscients et inconscients. Je propose ici une 
architecture d'agent tutoriel fondée sur l'architecture de l'agent "conscient" IDA éla-
borée et enrichie par le professeur Franklin et son équipe depuis 1996. Le prototype 
de CTS (Conscious Tutoring System) que j'ai développé avec l'aide de plusieurs 
collaborateurs contient des modifications par rapport à son modèle source, ainsi que 
les extensions nécessaires au tutorat. Quoique fondé sur la théorie de Baars, on 
peut y découvrir de multiples parallèles aux théories BOl et ACT-R. CTS a été sou-
mis à deux scénarios inspirés de la réalité . Il y démontre sa capacité à gérer la com-
plexité en temps réel pour assurer l'encadrement d'un astronaute en entraînement 
sur le télémanipulateur Canadarm2. 
Mots clés : conscience artificielle, intelligence générale, modélisation cognitive, 
agent cognitif, théorie de l'atelier global, Baars, CTS, agent tutoriel, IDA, LIDA. 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) bear the great potential of supplementing , 
sometimes even replacing , human tutors with unbound availability in time as weil as 
in place. Apart from occasional maintenance, failures and operating system instabil-
ity, artificial tutors show a very stable personality, they do not require rest and will 
never balk at starting a lesson at midnight. ln the same vein , under the assistance of 
an artificial "teacher" running on a computer connected to the Internet, a learner may 
happily take lessons from home, or get his training by a quiet river. 
ITS are already helping learners in various ways. They help learn subject mat-
ter, acquire procedural knowledge, improve reasoning abilities through interactive 
simulations, and train manipulation skills . Sorne popular systems are Andes 
(Vanlehn, Lynch, et al. , 2005) in the field of physics , Autotutor (Graesser, 2005) in 
the field of Newtonian physics and computer literacy, Adele (Shaw, Johnson, et al. , 
1999) in the field of medical diagnostic skill development, CIRCSIM-Tutor (Evens et 
al. , 2001) in the field of cardiovascular physiology, and SHERLOCK (Lesgold, Lajoie 
et al. , 1992; Sherlock2: Katz, Lesgold , et al., 1998) in the field of avionics trouble-
shooting skills. According to Graesser, Jackson, Mathews et al., (2003), many ITS 
have been shown to facilitate learning, with learning gains going from 0.3 to 1.0 
standard deviations units compared with students learning the same content in a 
classroom. 
Tutoring becomes increasingly harder when an ITS designer wishes to take 
into account many factors : to the subject matter (level of difficulty, familiarity) , con-
siderations about learner's learning style and interaction preferences, appropriate 
didactical strategies, pedagogical theories, learner's past history (successes, failures 
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and patterns), learner's actual physical and affective state, and even cultural aspects. 
Even for human teachers, it remains difficult to determine the right amount of subject 
matter, the right time to intervene, and the proper way to offer guidance. lntervening 
tao saon does not allow the learner the time to realize he is experiencing a difficulty 
(or it does not leave him enough ti me to forge an idea about the nature of the prob-
lem); tao late, and he might get angry or discouraged. Offering tao much of new mat-
ter makes him confused of even lost; tao far away from what he already knows, 
demotivation may drive him away. Empathy may be perceived as childish to some, 
straight talk will be received as rude by others. Many researches are ongoing, trying 
to find proper ways to madel the various aspects of tutoring , and to coordinate them 
within artificial agents. Some have met some measure of success, as the given ex-
amples testify. But they have ali been dealing with a subset of ali of the parameters 
that would be of interest, for instance, leaving aside the emotional aspect of tutoring 
(learner's feelings and emotions, and tutor's emotions). 
The re currently exists quite a few architectures that qualify as cognitive 1 , that is, 
that madel their internai processing of information upon the human mind's functions . 
However, to my knowledge , the only cognitive frameworks currently offered to the 
AIED (Artificial Intelligence in EDucation) community, ones that are fundamentally 
thought from the ground up for taking many aspects into consideration , are the pro-
duction rules-based SOAR, suggested by Newell (1990), and ACT-R, from Anderson 
(Anderson, 1993). SOAR, among other applications, drives STEVE, the animated 
pedagogical agent developed at the CARTE (Center for Advanced Research in 
1 The word cognitive is understood variably by different discipl ines. Al generally sticks 
to the psychology's understanding of the ward as modeling the methods by which human 
solve problems; it refers to an information processing view of an individual's psychological 
functions. Architectures may be "cognitive" at varying levels of validity, sometimes making no 
assertion about the plausibility of their parts, only integrating an eclectic group of Al tech-
niques. Then, "cognitive" may encompass a surprising long list of agent's and architectures, 
including, along with SOAR and ACT-R, CS/SAS (Norman and Shall ice, 1980), TETON 
(VanLehn and Bali , 1991 ), PRODIGY (Carbonell et al. , 1990), HOMER (Ei inas, Hoey and 
Little, 2005), ICARUS (Langley et al., 1991 ; Langley and Chai, 2006), and others . 
~----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------, 
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Technology for Education) of the University of Southern California. ACT-R is a well-
known theory of mind in the psychology world , and it came to be applied to artificial 
tutoring agents. Other approaches to the mind of a tutor might bring new perspec-
tives on how to tackle the challenges of tutoring students; they might bring new tools 
and new possibilities. 
When one aims at taking on ali aspects of a situation , and incorporate the 
"human touch" on top of it for the feedback (that is, grant the artificial agent personal-
ity and emotions), applying simplifying assumptions may not offer a viable avenue. 
The system becomes highly complex, hard to grow and maintain with a centrally-
managed rule-based system. 
ln th is research, 1 propose an original approach to manage the complexity of 
tutoring : human consciousness mechanisms as the core of a highly decentralized 
and modular architecture. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT: HOW COULD AN ARTIFICIAL AGENT BE-
COME CONSCIOUS AND WHY WOULD IT WANT TO ANYWAY? 
lnteracting with humans in general, and with students in specifie, requires an 
awful lot of subtlety if one is to be perceived as a great tutor and a pleasant fellow. 
That is, doing great tutoring calls for many integrated skills, and not only demonstrat-
ing an obvious mastery of the subject matter. What seems to produce results is 
about being able to track knowledge and misconceptions of the student and adap-
tively respond to these deficits at a fine-grained level. This happens by scaffolding 
upon learner's previous knowledge acquisition , help him co-construct his knowledge 
by answering his questions (Graesser, Person , et al. 2005), and teach him to act at a 
metacognitive level (du Boulay and Luckin, 2001 ). According to Piaget's constructiv-
ism (1 970), since learning is strongly related to the learner, to what makes him 
unique, being sensitive to the various dimensions that shape his specificity takes on 
much importance. lt encompasses more than just learner's actual knowledge, it in-
volves taking into account "soft" aspects such as preferences and fears , personality, 
4 
actual mood and emotions, actual physical state (tired, sick, excited , etc.) and so on . 
On that basis, the more various types of information an agent senses, the more apt it 
may be at adapting its behavior and interact specifically. This is what most of us in 
the ITS field would like to see: artificial tutoring agents reaching (or exceeding!) hu-
man-level tutoring. 
Then comes the burden of processing ali that is sensed , along with ali the in-
formation already possessed by the tutoring agent and relevant to the situation, add-
ing in ali the factors proper to the tutor (personality, professional goals, agenda, etc.). 
Expert human tutors doit ali the time (although not always skillfully .. . ), but it is not as 
easy as it may seem, generally requiring many years of study and hands-on practice. 
Combining ali the aspects in a computer search algorithm can overwhelm even the 
most powerful computer, and will discourage any rule creator. Humans have evolved 
ali sorts of tricks to tackle that complexity, cheating as often as possible, selecting 
parts and aspects, simplifying and "chunking" ali they can, and processing the re-
mainder. The visual apparatus contains many remarkable examples of such elever 
and efficient mechanisms, requiring a detailed account of what is visually perceptible 
for only about 6 degrees of the field of view. Attention and consciousness are other 
examples of those tricks. Ba ars ( 1988, 1997b ), and Sloman and Chrisley (2003) en-
tertain the idea that they are major mechanisms allowing humans to consider various 
sources of information and not easily get bogged down. More specifically, they are 
what makes them able to take into account the many aspects that everyday situa-
tions involve, and lets them adapt efficiently to unforeseen situations, sometimes in 
subtle ways. Consciousness does its magic here by first making possible to abstract 
reality, create concepts that can be manipulated in reasoning . Those allow consider-
ing alternatives, especially when first results do not meet expectations. Conscious-
ness and attention evolved to permit intentionality, volition, existence of a self that 
guides adaptation . 
"Adapting" to a learner is complex and cannot ali be prepared in advance. lt of-
ten means creating new plans or modifying the existing ones. A tutor has to make 
minor modifications to the general plan he had made about a lesson because the 
5 
learner does not possess the knowledge he thought he had, or completely change 
the plan because learner's reactions are indicative of physical fatigue or mental in-
disposition. The tutor has to be attentive to certain aspects present in his perception 
and not to others, filtering out what is "noise" (with respect to what he has decided as 
being his immediate goal, for instance assessing his pupil 's disposition for the les-
son). He has to set a new goal, be it of starting the lesson, selecting a proper way to 
do so, modifying the lessons plan, or of rather going after a way to stimulate the stu-
dent. Ali these mental activities require the ability to manipulate concepts, concrete 
as weil as abstract ones, such as "attitude", "mental fatigue", "goals", "steps" and 
"priority". They involve getting access to resources upon which one has little direct 
control : recalling memories about previous sessions and facts about the type of 
learner he is tutoring, giving interpretation to fuzzy impressions about the learner's 
mood or the general situation , relating these to goals of various natures, associating 
relevant words and facts together and organizing them towards a modified plan and 
an appropriate reaction, sometimes at an affective level. That sort of adaptation 
makes use of voluntary actions, of making choices with respect to various criteria . lt 
cannat be reached by applying a single standard pattern of organization, but rather 
involves the manipulation of abstract notions gathered through experiences and 
learning from them 
Sloman ( 1999) has hypothesized that it is through environ mental pressures 
that humans have evolved the capacity of taking a distance with respect to the im-
mediate reality, conceptualizing the physical world and becoming able to manipulate 
a non existent world, exploring and analyzing new configurations and alternatives. 
Consciousness is the means to those mental manipulations. lts most prominent 
manifestation is something we do ali the time: talking to ourselves, forming sen-
tences that we pronounce "in our heads" to do analyses, translate impressions into 
words, giving life to those words and images that popped from nowhere when we 
spoke these words about our impressions, and so on. From there follows the un-
avoidable, albeit unusual, question in the ITS (Al) field: what is consciousness? 
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1.2 FIRST IDEAS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS 
The deceptively simple question about the nature of consciousness throws us 
in muddy waters. lt may take quite a few more years before we can give the right 
answer, even though it has come again to be of central interest, with new research 
tools , only in the recent years. As Baars puts it: 
«Y ou are conscious, and so am 1. This much we can tell pretty easily, 
since when we are not conscious, our bodies wilt , our eyes roll up in their orbits , 
our brain waves become large, slow, and regular, and we cannot read a sen-
tence like this one» (Baars, 1997, p.3). 
And that's about ali most of us can say about consciousness. But, in fact , even 
the "You are conscious" part of Baars statement can be doubted: «You say you are 
conscious? Prove it!» ... The debate has been joined very recently by researchers 
from ali fields: psychologists, neuroscientists, physicists , mathematicians, and Al 
researchers. The growing number of interested qualified researchers has made of a 
fascinating subject a central concern. With the help of new technological means, we 
are getting new insights by the month. 
1 will avoid as much as possible exposing myself to the black hole 's attraction, 
as Taylor puts it (Taylor, 2000), of debating consciousness' nature. That is a re-
search field on its own. The width and depth it encompasses illustrates that point 
pretty weil , as demonstrated for instance by David Chalmer's website2. lt is not a 
necessary concern for the goal 1 set for my research. 1 only mean to identify con-
sciousness' roles , explore possibilities it brings to artificial agents, and determine 
whether and how it could be implemented. Looking at consciousness from the neu-
roscientific and psychological points of views, Baars has laid down a theory, the 
Global Workspace Theory (Baars 1988, 1997), that gives a nice account of those 
roles , and how consciousness serves the purpose of letting humans adapt to their 
2 http://consc.net/biblio/6.html 
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complex environment. This theory is a foundation of my project, and we will go 
through its major propositions in Chapter 2. 
If the subject has now become an overheated boiler, the train it now hauls took 
some time to gain its momentum. For instance, the Al and computer hardware com-
munities have not initially been paying much attention to it, at least not at a con-
scious level (!) , busy as they were trying to figure out how they could have a robot 
perceive and reason about simplified worlds, looking for efficient algorithms that 
would eventually surpass human performances. On the hardware side, you may be 
surprised by the idea that computers pretty saon incorporated mechanisms that were 
inspired by, and reflect, mind's processing , even consciousness' selectivity and seri-
ality. For example, various aspects of the inputs (mouse movements and clicks, 
keypresses, network packets, and so on) are processed by a collection of special-
ized processors that bring only their conclusions or problems to the "general pur-
pose" central processing unit. This corresponds weil to unconscious and 
automatized processing in humans. Explicit and purposeful consideration of the 
mind's architecture, and of consciousness, happened only when it became apparent 
that sheer computer power would not allow a machine to equal human's perform-
ances. John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky brought Al's attention to the field. They 
were precursors with ideas about giving a robot the capacities to do self-observation 
(McCarthy 1959; Minsky, 1961 ). Their idea was that robots would need human intel-
ligence if they were to cape weil with the task we would like to give them, and that 
included consciousness in their view. Few will abject to recognizing the existence 
and role of consciousness in human intelligence, but they really have been visionar-
ies in the Al world . Taylor offered a remarkable insight to consciousness with his 
Relational Mind Madel in 1973, but most contributions came later, in the early 80's, 
for instance with Johnson-Laird 's computational analysis of consciousness ( 1983), 
Baars' Global Workspace Theory of mi nd and consciousness ( 1988), and Edelman's 
Biological Theory of Consciousness ( 1989). Although McCarthy offered ideas for a 
reflexive computer language, implementations of anything referring to consciousness 
for an agent appeared only in the 90's, with examples in Hexmoor, Lammens and 
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Shapiro's GLAIR ( 1993), Cazenave's lntrospect ( 1998), and Franklin's Conscious 
Mattie (Ramamurthy, Bogner and Franklin , 1998). 
If we applied ideas about consciousness ta tutoring agents, what are the spe-
cifie benefits we can expect? What goals would we be pursuing? These are ali fun-
damental questions that 1 will address when 1 present the architecture of our 
"conscious" tutoring agent, called CTS (Conscious Tutoring System), and its instan-
tiation in Canadarm Tutor. 1 give here an implicit answer by offering a glimpse at 
CTS' architecture. Our3 cognitive agent complements Roman Tutor, a non-cognitive 
tutor integrated in the International Space Station simulator our lab has developed. 
The original tutor was meant ta monitor progress and coach astronauts learning how 
ta manipulate the Canadian robotic Arm , Canadarm2. CTS implements a cognitive 
architecture based on Baars' Global Workspace (GW) theory, which describes how 
consciousness allows the various parts of the brain ta collaborate when each indi-
vidual process is not enough ta cape with a situation. Franklin and his team have 
realized a functional computer adaptation of that theory into Conscious Mattie, IDA 
and LIDA. "Functional" means that the functions of the brain are reproduced by 
whatever means is convenient. Biological plausibility is not sought for at that level, 
although, in the case of these agents, the functional plausibility is maintained ta 
some level. Our CTS agent has its roots in IDA, LIDA's predecessor (LI DA stands for 
Learning IDA). Specialized modules reproducing high-level brain functions (percep-
tion , working memory, long-term memory, knowledge about the user and about the 
domain , action selection mechanisms), are loosely interconnected through mecha-
nisms that implement working memory, attentional mechanism, and "access con-
sciousness" (Ned Block's term for one of the many "types" we may identify under 
the single ward of "consciousness"). Without these mechanisms, modules are limited 
in the collaboration they can conduct ta accomplish agent's adaptation; they can 
3 When talking about CTS, 1 purposely use "we" most of the times , as the agent is the 
result of a team effort, not just mine. 
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communicate only within "unconscious", preprogrammed routines. Another funda-
mental idea about these agents is that they pervasively use Baars' idea of the mind's 
elementary and autonomous processes as a foundation of much of the processing ; 
thereof, consciousness is required for sophisticated adaptation . These are special-
ized processes (or processors, representing neuronal groups, implemented as 
codelets in Franklin's agents and in our own CTS) that can accomplish a simple task 
very fast, but are devoid of the capability to adapt. Just as unconscious processes 
accomplish very fast processing and require little of mind's energy resources, 
codelets are very efficient, compared to "heavy" , "conscious", iterative collaborative 
processes. They allow a fast processing of standard information and familiar patterns, 
allowing an agent to react fast in many common situations. They make possible for 
an agent to do more than one thing at a time, do parallel processing , eventually on 
the same information. More than that, they allow a tutoring agent to consider a situa-
tion from multiple points of view. Just as do ali the modules of the agent, they work 
independently of each other, but are however listening to the Access Consciousness' 
"publications" (or "broadcastings") , reacting to what they recognize , lending a helping 
hand when they can. They bring their information, the result of their manipulations, 
into Working Memory, where ali information codelets either cooperate as coalitions 
or compete to come to Consciousness. "Coming to consciousness" is the result of 
being selected by the Attention mechanism to be broadcast throughout the agent. An 
example of that would be the processing of the stimuli we cali "a written sentence", 
each portion of it being processed at a physical level by a multitude of simple pree-
esses specialized in recognizing lines, circles , and so on , to make out letters, with 
other processes taking their resulting output, letters, and organizing them into words 
(with the help of the perceptual memory), then words into semantic structures (with 
the collaboration of the semantic memory). These automatic unconscious operations 
allow a tutor to interact verbally in real time. Making ali that processing through vol-
untary (conscious) operations would take minutes instead of fractions of seconds, 
and a lot of mental energy. Consciousness is needed to tackle new information, or 
unexpected situations, for which no automatic routine exists, but such examination 
takes time and is heavy on resources. lt came to exist through evolutionary pres-
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sures for stronger adaptation means. A tutor needs both: fast unconscious (but lim-
ited) reactive capabilities, and powerful (but slow) conscious analysis. 
How does CTS' cognitive architecture compare? There are various aspects 
under which CTS may be studied . ln Chapter 6, we will have a look at CTS' architec-
ture with respect to a popular agent architecture, BOl, and to a theory of mind com-
putationally implemented: ACT-R. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The proposed research aims chiefly at extending Franklin's agent IDA to create 
an artificial tutoring agent endowed with many mechanisms proper to human con-
sciousness. At the same time, 1 set the constraint of respecting Baars' Global Work-
space theory as much as possible for the core of the architecture, and finding 
inspiration from cognitive sciences for aspects that get segregated inside "peripheral 
modules". Tutoring offers to this research a field of application , with real life situa-
tions demonstrating how consciousness may allow better interactions, flexible adap-
tation to the learner. 
A secondary objective is about offering a new architecture for intelligent tutor-
ing systems, one that will be considered because of its richness, its extensibility, and 
its potential for reproducing humanly behaviors. 
A ternary objective, almost a side effect arising from the necessities of this re-
search , proposes to build some tools that will be the foundation for a complete 
framework of development for future cognitive agents. A Behavior Network editer is a 
major step in this direction. 
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The following steps give a summary of my research: 
• Clarification of the concept of consciousness and related concepts 
• Hunting for conscious models, architectures and agents, in order to find ex-
amples of how consciousness could be brought into agents 
• Selection of a starting point (a theory, a model, an existing architectures, etc.) 
• Adaptation of the architecture to the domain 
• Iterative implementation of the architecture, looping as often as needed to 
bring improvements when cognitive aspects are better understood, and to try 
and solve theoretical and implementation difficulties 
• Elaboration of life-like scenarios to test the agent 
• Evaluation of the results 
1 found early on that complexity is the beast to tame towards fruitful tutoring . 
Complexity also exists in every aspect of the research, with many competing con-
cepts , points of views, and propositions for solutions. So, 1 found that sticking to a 
global theory that seems pretty weil supported was a prudent line of conduct for such 
an ambitious project ("ambitious" in the sense that it encompasses a great number of 
fields , each with its own richness and peculiarities, and that tries to bring them to 
work together) . Getting a clear view of what is generally understood as conscious-
ness seemed a necessary first step. That in itself is a major undertaking, and a good 
example of each field being a complex world in its own right. So, 1 will propose an 
integrated overview of the ideas surrounding consciousness (awareness, intelligence, 
metacognition and reflection), but will steer clear of the sophisticated philosophical 
discussions. Then, 1 review the literature to find whether consciousness has already 
been modeled, maybe implemented or even demonstrated in actual agents, and if so, 
how, with what benefits, under what limitations. That brings me to selecting the most 
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promising approach towards my goal of effectively constructing a conscious tutoring 
agent. 1 have elected IDA as the best foundation for my project and established con-
tacts with Professer Franklin, who allowed our lab to use as much of their code as 
was relevant. From this starting point, building an architecture entails examining the 
code and see how we can add missing features for a tutoring system. We used the 
code as a source of inspiration and rebuilt the agent from scratch . As our project has 
a specifie application with tutoring astronauts, 1 was immensely grateful that the Ca-
nadian Space Agency would permit me to go observing the astronaut's training . lt 
allowed me to see the activities first hand, noting the human tutor's techniques, atti-
tudes, behaviors and reactions. Then , 1 was better positioned to adapt the architec-
ture and construct the features 1 wished to add . Evaluating how weil my colleagues 
and 1 have implemented the theory and how much the resulting agent performs as 
expected are the final steps of this research 
The structure of the document is the following: 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, presents the concept of consciousness and offers 
Baars' point of view, that is, his Global Workspace theory. Having an understanding 
of consciousness and of Baars' theory equips us with some perspective before ex-
amining consciousness-related works in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the field of conscious agents and con-
sciousness models. 1 present a sampling of what is available: a computer science 
approach with McCarthy's reflexive language; functional approaches to conscious-
ness with Hexmoor, Lammens and Shapiro's GLAIR, and Cazenave's lntrospect; 
and biologically-motivated approaches with Cotterill's Cyberchild and Grossberg's 
ART. 
Chapter 4 presents CTS, our "conscious" tutoring agent's architecture. 1 high-
light some interesting features of the global architecture, then say a few words on the 
implementation and on the Behavior Network editor. 
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Chapter 5 describes the tutoring context and activities expected when training 
astronauts to the manipulation of Canadarm2. 1 explain services offered by the tutor-
ing agent, and give insights on its internai operations through two example scenarios. 
Chapter 6 discusses how CTS compares to a popular agent architecture , BDI , 
and to a just as popular cognitive architecture, ACT-R. 
Chapter 7 presents the validation methods adopted and evaluates the proto-
type . 
Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the next steps for a continuation of this research. 
Chapter 2 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY 
Before restricting our attention to one hypothesis about consciousness, 1 would 
like in this chapter to lay sorne ideas about fundamental notions 1 am going to use for 
building CTS. First, 1 offer an overview of the concept of consciousness, what this 
mysterious word covers , and whether a machine can ever be said to possess it. 
Then, for a deeper understanding, 1 refine the concept sorne more by distinguishing 
consciousness from very close ones: awareness, reflection, metacognition and intel-
ligence. This will give us a much better perspective when we examine Baars' theory 
of mind and consciousness in the third and last section of the chapter. 
2.1 WHAT THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS REFERS TO 
Much can be said about consciousness, and little can be said. These words 
may summarize the traditional debate about consciousness. Trying to seize con-
sciousness, trying to understand what is asserted about it, one may easily be forced 
to dig deeper and deeper in subtle discriminations, and may find himself attempting 
to grasp the ever wider horizon of the immense variety of diverging opinions. 1 cer-
tainly got confused at some point and had to backtrack quite a few times and even 
hire a guide. For the intent and purposes of my actual research, 1 will offer here a 
rather tangential approach on the subject, that is, 1 will do a touch-and-go on the 
debate, trying to avoid running deep into a region full of quicksand. My interest in this 
thesis is not to debate the existence of consciousness, to discern its nature, or even 
to establish the "truthfulness" (or reality) of the consciousness 1 create in a software 
15 
agent. 1 take consciousness existence as a given, then 1 only intend to show its use-
fulness for an artificial agent, and present a way to recreate its mechanisms. 
Recent works in cognitive sciences keep adding new insights, offering a richer, 
more detailed view of consciousness and of how it may function . But more is not 
always better. Much of the debate may be due to inconsistencies in the language 
and misunderstandings. There are so many ways to look at the subject, beginning 
with the popular understanding of "being conscious" ( «She came back to conscious-
ness a while after hearing the great news. »). There is the scientific approach , advo-
cated by Chalmers as beyond our current scientific means (we have no measuring 
counter for consciousness, it does not register on our instruments). There is the new 
mysterians approach of McGinn that proposes that consciousness simply is out of 
the reach of our minds, so there is no way, scientific or otherwise humanly possible, 
to investigate it. The eliminativist standpoint claims that consciousness as an 
autonomous entity does not exist, it is just a by-product of biological processes; so, 
Chalmer's hard problem of consciousness ( explaining the experiences we live and 
feel ; Chalmers, 1995) is an illusion that philosophers love to lean on (Dennett's posi-
tion ; Dennett, 1991 ). Other scientific personalities do not care about consciousness 
nature and focus on trying to find its neural correlates, that is, to identify the neuro-
biological processes that support it; for instance, two scientific teams, Crick with 
Koch , and Dehaene with Naccache are about to uncover them, with pretty convinc-
ing evidence. The theological point of view suggests that consciousness is what 
gives Man his superiority over Nature; some see it as what allows him to talk with 
God, joining the metaphysical stance (the universe is based on a non-physical inde-
pendent reality: consciousness; it is akin to soul), and the esoteric interest (the goal 
of meditating is to reach Pure Consciousness and rejoin our common essence). 
Each stream shows a variety of hypotheses, and some authors propose hy-
bridization or an eclectic assembly of proposais. With reasons , in 1995 Ned Block 
claimed that "consciousness" is a mongrel concept, and that we won't be able to hold 
an appropriate discussion on its nature if we do not recognize that the word encom-
passes many phenomena and mechanisms. Minsky asserted the same idea in 1998 
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when he said that "consciousness" is a suitcase-word, like intuition , learning , mem-
ory, a word that ali of us use to encapsulate our jumbled ideas about our minds. 
Block ( 1995) attempted to make the debate more focused by declaring four "types" 
of consciousness: the access consciousness (the phenomenon that temporarily con-
nects an unconscious resource to other unconscious resources in our brain so that 
they can interact), the phenomenal consciousness (that holds the properties of the 
experience , the ineffable qualities of the phenomenon), the monitoring conscious-
ness (the processes that monitor our senses and our internai states and make them 
known), and the se/f-consciousness (our knowing of being an individual with his own, 
separate existence). 
Chal mers ( 1995) offered a similar account, and a Iso isolated the easy prob-
lems of consciousness from what he coined the hard problem of consciousness. The 
easy problems of consciousness are those that are directly susceptible to the stan-
dard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of 
computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that resist those 
methods. 
The easy problems of consciousness include the following phenomena: 
• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli ; 
• the integration of information by a cognitive system; 
• the reportability of mental states; 
• the ability of a system to access its own internai states; 
• the focus of attention ; 
• the deliberate control of behavior; 
• the difference between wakefulness and sleep. 
As Chalmers describes it, «Ali of [these phenomena] are straightforwardly vul-
nerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms». Although 
one should not exaggerate the "easiness" of theses questions, one must recognize 
that computer science has long been using these concepts (an idea sustained in 
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Bechtel , 1 995), albeit maybe sometimes at a sub-conscious level (!). Johnson-Laird , 
for one, has made a very voluntary, very conscious effort at discovering conscious-
ness' raies, with the explicit goal of later implementing them in computers (see for 
instance Johnson-Laird , 1 988). The simple fact of ma king an explicit use of a piece 
of information and being able to report on it, is made possible by its becoming con-
scious; this is how it becomes available to other processes, among them language 
analysis and generation. Such accounts from a psychologist (Johnson-Laird) and a 
philosopher (see below description from Chalmers) could easily be thought of com-
ing from an Al proponent. 
Sometimes a system is said to be conscious of some information when it has 
the ability to react on the basis of that information, or, more strongly, when it at-
tends to that information , or when it can integrate that information and exploit it 
in the sophisticated control of behavior (Chal mers, 1 995). 
One can recognize access consciousness and monitoring consciousness in 
the way the central processor (CPU) and collections of sub-processors collaborate. 
The CPU acknowledges inputs from keyboard and mouse and processes them along 
with requests from everywhere in the system, but does so one at a time4 , serially , in 
the same fashion that attention selects one information at a time. The CPU sends 
requests to sub-processors, which contain compiled processes, very efficient at deal-
ing with information within known boundaries; they have commonalities with our un-
conscious processes. Many requests and tasks are processed in parallel by theses 
sub-processors (unconscious processes). They either return the result of their "si-
lent" (unconscious) work, or raise problems they encounter and cannat settle , to the 
attention of the CPU (for a "conscious, slow but adaptive, reparation process ). 
4 This parallel is getting more and more imperfect as CPUs became capable of proc-
essing more than one operation in a single cycle by taking in-board co-processors , even 
another CPU (for instance, lntel's Core2 Duo processors). 
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Exposing the kinship of these ideas with computers is drawing us on a slippery 
slope towards a difficult debate about machine consciousness and zombies. But the 
ascription of "consciousness" onto my agent is in jeopardy, even turning illegal if not 
settled here! 1 must confront objections now. 
Searle has taken a strong position against the possibility of real consciousness 
in a machine. He posits that simulating a process is not that process. Creating a 
simulation of digestion does not make the software digest; simulating comprehension 
does not produce comprehension . A famous image Searle offered to illustrate his 
opposition to the fact that computer do, or even just can think , is the Chinese room 
experiment (Searle, 1980). lt tells of a persan sitting in a room one could cali a proc-
essing chamber. Only two openings on opposite sides allow documents to flow in 
and out. The persan , who knows nothing of the Chinese language, has to read Chi-
nese symbols that come in , consult a lexicon and a set of rules written in his native 
language, and write on another paper the appropriate symbols. If the rules are prop-
erly written, then , to an external observer, this closed , opaque room, a black-box, 
manifests an understanding of the sentences given to it since it is able to process 
them and respond as appropriately as a native Chinese speaker. However, in this 
example, no understanding is necessary, as it suffices for the internai process to 
connect words together through rules . The simulation of comprehension fools an 
external observer into thinking there is real understanding. Similarly, simulating con-
sciousness does not produce real consciousness. Searle is positive that conscious-
ness is entirely caused by neurobiological processes and is realized in brain 
structures. Now, since consciousness is caused by biological processes, combining 
artificial processes that simulate them will never produce consciousness in a ma-
chine that does not have the same biological substrate. 
One could reply that, whether artificial or biological , information processing has 
a causal effect; of either nature, it causes appropriate results by a chain of effects, 
and they both have real impacts. That is the position that Harnad (2003) defends, 
saying that if an engineered being is able to fool us about its true nature (that is, its 
being artificial) during its whole life, it deserves to be considered as possessing con-
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sciousness, not just existing as a philosopher's zombie . ln agreement with Harnad 
and Minsky, Kurzweil ( 1999) posits that there exists no test or criterion absolutely 
trustworthy that can establish the presence of consciousness in an entity (human or 
otherwise). Neuroscientific imagery only shows correlations of brain activity with ver-
bal reports from the human subject; it does not prove consciousness per se. There 
are only the behaviors, the introspection reporting by the subjects, and contrastive 
phenomenology 5 that offer tangible facts which can be analyzed with scientific 
means (Baars, 1997b). 
1 choose to take Al's stance in thinking that, real consciousness or not, a simu-
lation can produce in an artificial being effects similar to those in a human . On that 
basis, computational mechanisms can give an agent most of the same advantages 
that we can see in natural beings, especially human. But let's be careful here. 1 em-
phasize th at 1 use the words "effects similar to", and not "phenomenon of the sa me 
nature as" . Similarly, the fact that 1 will be using "consciousness" and "conscious" 
without the quotation marks throughout the document when talking about my agent 
should never be interpreted as an affirmation of "true" consciousness. Dropping the 
quotation marks is only for easier reading. 1 am in no way stating that 1 posit CTS' 
consciousness mechanisms as producing "real" or "true" consciousness. ln fact, 1 
doubt that the recreation of a process at a mere functional level can produce the 
same phenomenon in its essence. 1 nevertheless believe the mechanisms can ac-
count for many of the "easy" problems Chalmers talks about, and that this can help 
us think about the phenomenon and go further. 
To understand what features of consciousness 1 believe our functional-level 
mechanisms are not reproducing, here is a description of one of the four types Block 
5 According to Baars (1997b, p.12), phenomenology is the study of consciousness 
based on subjective reports; in scientific practice, we always supplement subjective reports 
with objectively verifiable methods. Contrastive phenomenology compares results of opera-
tions where people can report accurately, to ones that can be inferred and studied indirectly. 
Examples are normal versus subliminal perception, attended versus nonattended speech, 
explicit versus implicit memory, etc. 
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suggested : phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness refers to the 
feeling we experience about a state, the qualitative aspect of that experience, one 
that we cannat easily communicate to other people because it cames from a per-
sona!, internai reality. We have no way to really compare it to other people's. Exam-
ples are the felt quality of red (the redness of that physical stimulus), the experience 
of dark and light, the feeling created by the sound of a big bell, the bodily sensation 
of pain, the internai reactions we cali emotions, the experience of a stream of con-
scious thoughts - seme of the examples a gave come from Chalmers. They can ali 
be referred to as "what it is like to be in that state" (Nagel, 197 4 ). What does underlie 
these felt experiences? ls it a matter of mechanism, structure , complexity of organi-
zation, or of substrate? We still do not know, or there is no strong consensus on this 
point. 1, as a conservative researcher (and a prudent doctoral candidate) would not 
posit CTS as having this kind (or leve!) of experience; 1 would offer the idea (not hy-
pothesis) that this will not happen at least until CTS implementation reaches a rich-
ness capable of sustaining general intelligence and true grounding (so that its 
experiences stop being tied to single-ward descriptions. But, again, 1 do not want to 
get involved in the debate here, and lean on that aspect for the realization of the 
initial prototype of CTS6 . As a first step, 1 adopt the "engineering" stance of using 
what seems like promising means for attaining the goal of a well-performing, adap-
tive agent. Access consciousness seems sufficient to this end7 . 
6 So, 1 will not address questions such as "What role does phenomenal consciousness 
play in adaptation?", "How does if influence reasoning?", "ls the phenomenal consciousness 
dependant of the "more functiona/" access consciousness?", "What is their relation?" "Gan 
they be separated?" These are ali fascinating issues, and 1 foresee that they will have to be 
taken under consideration at some point in the future evolution of CTS. lndeed, some hard-
to-describe-in-words states, the phenomenal content of an experience, certainly can play a 
role as motivator to take action . Pain certainly can. lt can even become part of reasoning 
when its content cames to be abstracted into propositional knowledge. Phenomenal con-
sciousness must eventually be considered in CTS, having, at least potentially, a causal role . 
7 Black (2002) tries to clarify further the differences between phenomenal conscious-
ness and access consciousness. One of the elements he suggests is that only representa-
tional content (as opposed to phenomenal) can play a role in reasoning. Whereas the status 
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As we will see in the next chapter, there are many ways to recreate conscious-
ness. But first, and before 1 take you on a tour that will help better understand what 
consciousness might be, 1 feel it necessary to clarify a few concepts that are often 
used interchangeably with consciousness: awareness, reflection, metacognition and 
intelligence. Then, 1 will go on describing in some detail one specifie madel of con-
sciousness , one that will become the foundation of our agent: Baars' Global Work-
space theory. 
2.2 A FEW WORDS ON RELATED CONCEPTS: AWARENESS, REFLEC-
TION, METACOGNITION AND INTELLIGENCE 
Talking about consciousness without having a clear understanding of its dis-
tinction with close concepts makes it difficult to stay on track. lt even poses problems 
to philosophers. He re is a quick overview of these near cousins ( sometimes twins) of 
consciousness. 
2.2.1 Awareness 
Awareness is the term closest to consciousness. ln fa ct, Chalmers ( 1995) rec-
ommended that we use "awareness" to refer to the "easy" phenomena of conscious-
ness, and that we reserve "consciousness" to phenomena that refer to the 
experience (the aspect quite weil described by Nagel's (1974) famous circumlocution 
What it is fike to be a bat). lt is not to be confused with "sentience" , the ability to have 
of phenomenal consciousness content is less certain , access consciousness content is es-
sentially representational. He adds that "what makes a state A-conscious is what a represen-
tation of its content does in a system". Therefore, 1 inter that access consciousness, a 
functional notion, offers a natural platform for causality and may be minimally sufficient alone 
in this role for an artificial agent. 
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sensations8 , a concept very close to phenomenal consciousness, to which it is a 
precondition. Awareness depends on sentience to exist. lt is also sometimes con-
fused with sapience, which adds a level of knowledge to the stimulus (from the per-
ceptual processing). We usually try to restrict "awareness" to refer to what sentience 
directly permits, that is, to have a sensed stimulus create a reaction in our internai 
system. But 1 would gladly see Chalmers proposition be widely adopted, as 1 con-
stantly find myself struggling with the difficulty of keeping "consciousness" and 
"awareness" in their designated realms! 
2.2.2 Reflection and metacognition 
These two concepts are intimately related . They may be used interchangeably, 
depending on what one puts under "reflection". Flavel (1979) describes metacogni-
tion as the cognitive faculty that allows the subject to think about how he thinks . As 
its name indicates, metacognition is a cognitive level on top of another cognitive leve/, 
observing it, taking action to regulate it (Brown, 1987). Note that it is not to be con-
fused with monitoring consciousness, which is a cognitive process that observes the 
senses (a non-cognitive faculty). 
8 As is still the case with most words surrounding consciousness, "sentience" nature 
and description are debated and may be understood as the mere ability ta sense. However, it 
can be nearly confused with phenomenal consciousness. According ta David Cole (found in 
David Chalmer's compilation at http://consc.net/on line1 .html#perception), 
sentience, having a sensation or a feeling, or "qualia", is a phenomenon which goes 
beyond mere sensing, for it involves an internai state in which information (typically) 
about the environment is treated by the system sa that it cames ta have a subjective 
character. We know what this is like from our own case. Each normal persan has had 
sensations of cold , bright light, sound , and pain. lt is from such occurrences that we 
understand the reference of "having a sensation". Once we distinguish sensing from 
sentience, we may note that sensing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for sentience. 
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Reflection (or "self-reflection", a term more clearly differentiated from delibera-
tion) may refer only to the voluntary activity or process that turns the subject's atten-
tion towards itself, as if he was two persons at the same time, one making 
observations about the other one. A reflexively conscious state is one that is phe-
nomenally presented in a thought about that state (Biock, 2003). When this reflection , 
this "discussion", turns into an analysis , it becomes metacognition , especially if it 
primes mechanisms that will work at regulating further actions and thinking. But then, 
there may be reflections of the person about his metacognitive abilities to improve 
them (Gama , 2000).. . So , we see that these two concepts are not the same, but 
may sometimes do the same thing . 
The deflection of the thinking process towards oneself (reflection) is not con-
sciousness in itself but uses it. If the report gets accompanied by thought to the ef-
fect that one is in that state, then we talk about metacognition, according to Block 
(2002). One may then decide to enter a deliberation for further analyzing the facts , 
finding corrective measures and applying them (the control aspect of metacognition). 
This level of interaction requires consciousness. 
2.2.3 Intelligence 
As for most concepts, the exact description of intelligence is debated and im-
precise. Here are two that 1 like for their simplicity and globality: 
• Y am ( 1998): An exact definition of intelligence is probably impossible, but the 
data at hand suggest at least one: an ability to handle complexity and solve 
problems in some useful context. 
• Peter Voss (2004): an entity's ability to achieve goals. Greater intelligence al-
lows coping with more complex and novel situations. On three axes ( com-
plexity, adaptability and flexibility) , intelligence exists on a continuum . 
Voss puts consciousness as the highest level of intelligence. This corresponds 
to the iceberg hypothesis in which consciousness is the controlled part of the infor-
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mation processing . ln the opinion of Edelman (1989, 1992), consciousness emerges 
from intelligent processing ( essentially ta king place as re-entrant signa ling between 
neural maps, confronting self to non-self, or memories to perception ; see note 16 
differentiating reentrant signaling and CTS/IDA's looping through its cognitive cycle ). 
Black is just a little clearer about their separation, saying that consciousness allows 
intelligence to contemplate and regulate its effects. 
So, we may conclude that they are separate but strongly connected realities . 
Consciousness makes possible the highest form of intelligence, and reciprocally, 
intelligence is the substrate from which consciousness emerges. 
Now, after separating apples from oranges, and oranges from mandarins and 
tangerines, we are better equipped to dive into Baars' theory about consciousness 
and appreciate how weil it encompasses consciousness and its related phenomena. 
2.3 BAARS' GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY 
2.3.1 Background 
There are many hypotheses about what consciousness is, and there are many 
others that propose how it may work. 1 have discussed the former ones in the two 
previous sections; the latter ones are of concern in this section . 1 will only mention 
some that correspond to the basic ideas of Baars' theory. 
Baars' theory is a global one that has taken many separate ideas and organ-
ized them in a coherent whole. His proposai is gathering a growing consensus and is 
receiving new confirmations every year from neuroscientific empirical research (see 
especially Baars, 2002). lnterestingly, the ideas it contains are descriptions that bear 
themselves quite weil to computer implementations. This, and the globality of the 
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theory, may explain why it was chosen by Professer Franklin as the basis for his 
agents (Conscious Mattie, IDA and LIDA). 
ln a 2001 paper, Engel and Singer gave an overview of the synchrony hy-
pothesis, exposing that many researchers came to similar ideas. For instance, Crick 
and Koch ( 1990) proposed that only appropriately bou nd neuronal activity can trigger 
short-term memory and, thus, become available for access to phenomenal con-
sciousness. Damasio (1990) presented a similar idea, stating that conscious recall of 
sensory contents requires the binding of distributed information stored in spatially 
separate cortical areas; the binding happens through synchronization of the firing 
rates of local and distant neurons, which eventually makes the content globally 
available . Edelman (1989; 1992) and Tononi and Edelman (1998) also suggested a 
similar binding process by reentrant loops between systems performing perceptual 
categorization and brain structures related to working memory and action planning . 
They also explain self-consciousness by the distance this process maintains be-
tween feeds from the perception and feeds from memories. Grossberg, in ART, has 
offered his explanation of conscious states as resulting from a resonance (or match) 
between top-dawn priming and bottom-up processing of incoming information, which 
also allows learning of information into coherent internai representations (Grossberg, 
1999). These ideas about synchrony try to explain how various aspects, analyzed by 
separate brain structures, can come together under a common "concept" or a unified 
sensation. Various neurons from different cell assemblies fire their action potentials 
in temporal synchrony, putting together the various bits of information about an ab-
ject or event to form a coalition making up the perception (or the complete idea, 
when the coalition is formed by internally generated information). 
This binding of sources of information is also present in Baar's Global Work-
space theory, albeit in a higher-level view of the process. We will now examine his 
description. 
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2.3.2 A theater metaphor for the Global Workspace 
The Global Workspace theory can be summarized in a theater metaphor as fol-
lows (which 1 adapted a little from Ba ars ( 1997b, p.41) ). The mi nd can be modeled 
after a theater, where we find a stage, a large audience (and 1 mean LARGE!) of 
specialized actors, and a backstage setting . The play has no script and relies on the 
talent of actors found in the audience to intervene when they feel they can contribute 
to the story they are watching . Actors are members of specialized theatrical campa-
nies . They may come to the stage alone, but generally have a complex message that 
needs the presence of more than one actor to present it (often coming from different 
companies). On stage, there is always only a small number of actors, with only a few 
of them having the spotlight shining on them . Those in the spotlight are somehow 
related and synergistically support each other; their global excitement demonstrates 
that they have the most important message to tell to the audience at the current point 
in the play. Backstage, there is a small number of staff that hear what is said on 
stage, prepare material that the actors request, and change the backdrops that set 
the meaning of what is spoken to the audience. There is also the director, never to 
be seen but often having a major influence on the next part of the play. 
Figure 1 depicts mind 's functions (appearing in bold in my description) corre-
sponding to the entities of this metaphor. Working memory is like a theater stage 
(Baars, 1997b, p.41 ). lt is the "structure" which contains the information we intend to 
use. For instance, it holds a telephone number we are rehearsing (to use it in a little 
while). lt is also the place that sees our inner speech and visual imagery. The audi-
ence members are the processes that respond to the content of consciousness; 
they are neuronal networks that perform unconscious functions, widely distributed 
throughout the brain (massively-parallel processing is distributed over millions of 
specialized neural groupings; Ba ars, 1997b ). Some are automatic routines , su ch as 
the brain mechanisms that guide muscles activation for a gesture, or jaw and tangue 
muscles that are needed for speaking . Others involve declarative memories, which 
are semantic networks th at hold our abstract knowledge of the world ( semantic 
memory, for tacts and beliefs, and autobiographical memory, the subjective memo-
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ries of our life), and implicit memories, that maintain attitudes, skills, and social 
savoir-faire. 
Audience members may come on stage, making new content in working 
memory available to the next consciousness "oration" . The spotlight re presents the 
the 
play ers 
... the spotlight 
of attention 
shining on the 
stage 
of workîng 
memory ... 
Memory systems: 
Lexicon 
Semantic networks 
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Beliefs, knowled!;"'! 
of the world, of 
oneself and ethers. 
Context operators behind the scenes 
Director Spotlight 
Con troUer 
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uses imagery for spatial tasks, ali under voluntary control. 
the unconscious audience ... 
Interpreting consdous contents: 
Recognizing objects, faces, speech, 
events. Syntactic analysis. Spatial 
relationships. Social inferences. 
Automatisms: 
Skill memory. 
Details of language, 
action control, reading. 
thinking. and 
thousands more ... 
Motivational systems: 
ls the conscious event relevant to my goals? Emotional responses, facial 
expressions, preparing the body for action. Managing goal conflicts. 
Figure 1 Baars' interpretation of the theater metaphor. Source: Baars, 1997b, p.42. 
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attention mechanism that makes an information (a coalition of information frag-
ments or aspects) become the one presented to the audience (to ali of the uncon-
scious processes ). What is in working me mory but not und er the spotlight of 
attention crea tes the feeling of knowing (Baars, 1997b, p.44 ). William James ( 1889) 
called it the fringe consciousness. lt is what creates the sense of familiarity, or the 
inclination of thinking something to be true, without being able to pinpoint the con-
scious event that is the source of such impression. 
The Director represents the Self. Baars relates it to the frontal cortex exerting a 
voluntary control over parts of working memory to request what will come into con-
sciousness next, sometimes redirecting the current stream when something more 
urgent happens. 
The back-drop of the stage represents the contexts of interpretation that 
have been primed by anterior conscious contents. They are semantic networks that 
supply possible referents ; neural networks implementing implicit memories that 
encode frames of knowledge; automated processes; attitudes that feed expectations 
forward . They ali tend to have their information connect to the current conscious con-
tent and so orient the final meaning extracted from what is declaimed on stage. 
2.3.3 Sorne specifie ideas proposed in the theory 
A collection of distributed specialized networks 
The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed specialized networks, 
most of which do not directly support conscious experiences (Baars, Ramsoy and 
Laureys, 2003) 
Consciousness limited capacity 
As Baars states (Baars, 1997b, p.43, 54, 56), psychologists believe that con-
sciousness is capable of containing only one chunk of information (simple or com-
plex idea that makes sense on its own) at a time. Or, to put it in a way we are more 
familiar with , we are capable of sustaining only one idea at a time (or, in Baars' terms, 
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of only one coherent event, or unified experience, in each moment), although suc-
cessive ideas may form a chain of ideas that flows very fast, giving the impression of 
entertaining many ideas at the same time. We may jump from idea to idea pretty fast, 
maintaining alive a few items in our working memory (seven , plus or minus two)-
but not simultaneously as conscious content. That limited capacity, which forces a 
seriai processing , is in shocking contrast with the massively parallel unconscious 
processing . Would it not be much more efficient to sometimes be able to voluntarily 
process many things at a time? Of course it would, and we are capable of this! But 
at a very limited level, with just a few automated processes at a time (Baars, 1997b, 
p.96). And , in fact , these processes are not controlled through consciousness, but 
simply monitored (with only inconsistencies being brought into working memory; 
Baars, 1997b, pp. 134-136, 116). Consciousness limited capacity is in fact for the 
efficiency of the system, implementing trade-offs between energy consumption and 
benefits in our ability to plan , to control ourselves, and to think (Baars, 1997b, p. 57). 
The one thing that comes into consciousness is what appears to be the most impor-
tant information at that point in time, ali things being considered (we will come back 
to these last few words in the next point) . That way, the consciously mediated proc-
ess, heavy on resources, is restricted to acting where it counts most. Consciousness' 
selectivity produces a reduction in complexity (Baars, 1997b, p.55). 
Another point about this limited capacity is related to the next one, as it has to 
do with collaboration and competition among information sources. Because only one 
coherent idea may come to consciousness at a time (inputs incompatible to the cur-
rent content are excluded; Baars, 1997b, p.43, 54), grouping various aspects und er 
higher concepts allows processing more information at a time, optimizing our con-
sciousness space usage. So, systems that collaborate and supply sub-ideas that 
form a coherent concept produce more enticing information for the attention . 
Collaboration and competition 
"Ali things being considered" , as mentioned in the previous point, refers to the 
"global" conclusion brought to working memory, drawn from the parallel processing 
made by multiple mind structures operating in the darkness of the theater. At the 
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same time as the potentially conscious brain activities may collaborate to create a 
rich and strong description of the situation, various other coalitions that are forming 
about something else can compete for access to the limited-capacity neuronal global 
workspace capacity (generally called "consciousness" in this section). 
Convergence and divergence 
What cames into working memory may be the result of the collaboration of 
many structures, reinforcing one another and ultimately having the result of their col-
laboration come into the conscious bright spot. This reflects a process of conver-
gence that consciousness forces. ln Baars opinion , this is perhaps the single most 
important feature of consciousness (Baars, 1997b, p.162), and is weil represented in 
the theater metaphor: it combines convergent input with divergent output. Whatever 
cames to mind reflects a compromise between competition and cooperation, fusing 
whatever is compatible and excluding for the moment anything that is not (Baars, 
1997b, p.52). Then, what occupies consciousness is pushed out, diverging toward 
the vast audience of unconscious processes. 
Recruiting of unconscious resources 
The three previous features (limited capacity, collaboration, conver-
gence/divergence) add up to say that consciousness is the gateway to the uncon-
scious mind . This idea opens up to another consciousness' feature: recruiting 
unconscious resources. William James' ideomotor theory corresponds weil to this 
idea, showing how a conscious goal can recruit and activate automatisms to carry 
out a voluntary act. Conscious goal images serve to organize and trigger automati-
cally controlled actions, when not opposed by an inhibitory idea. James proposes the 
amusing but powerful example of the debate that precedes getting out of bed in a 
cold morning. Opposite wishes may meet in our conscious mind : the desire to rise 
and fill our normal obligations, and the desire to remain in the warm bed. At some 
point, we may resolve to get up, putting in our mind the goal of getting out of bed, 
and then we just do it, thanks to involuntarily coordinated responses from our mus-
cles through an (usually) involuntary script. However, the stronger illustration of 
James ideomotor theory lies in the occasions where , during debating whether to get 
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out of bed , our mind starts to wander on a new stream about our daily obligations 
and routines , creating stronger resolve about getting up, and , most of ali , bringing a 
salutary lapse of consciousness about the cold that awaits us outside of the bed . We 
suddenly realize , after the fact, that we just got up. The original conscious goal of 
getting up ceased being inhibited , or counter-balanced , and played its role of "calling 
condition" . 
The Director and the Self 
The Director backstage involves a set of deep layers of expectations and inten-
tions about the world . The "self' of everyday life can be seen as a context that main-
tains long-term stability in our experiences and actions (Baars, 1997, p.142). William 
James sees two aspects to the self: the self as agent, and the self as observer. The 
"agent" part of the self is constituted by the processes that maintain a goal hierarchy 
that distinguishes long-term goals , such as survival , from momentary goals like read-
ing to the end of this sentence (Baars, 1997, p.143). They are intentions with various 
temporal spans. 
William James' "self as an observer" may be understood as a collection of "pat-
tern recognizers" (Baars, 1997, p. 144), a notion that Black sees as part of monitor-
ing consciousness. These processes constantly compare the current experience to 
immediate memory, routine persona! facts , persona! "marker" memories, and future 
plans or fantasized images. ln addition, we have expectations about our abilities; we 
expect to perform some action in some way, and bodily sensations that do not match 
are signaled . Similarly, the unexpected absence of the ability would create great 
surprise; in the same way, the loss of expected memories may impact one's sense of 
self, as would sudden blindness (Baars, 1997, p.153). 
Discrepancies are noted and reported in working memory. If published , they 
trigger various systems, among which autobiographical memory, that will recall how 
beneficiai or painful that experience has been in the past; it may also trigger attitude 
processes, which will send stimulation to other systems. These pattern recognizers 
may declare expectations (things we came to like, fear, or hope for). 
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2.3.4 The functions of consciousness 
Baars' theory includes the explicit enumeration of consciousness' roles9 . Nine 
points organize the many phenomena associated with consciousness. 
1. Creating access to unconscious resources 
The most prominent function of consciousness is to increase accessibility 
between otherwise separate sources of processing and of information. 
Everything is connected to most everything else via the bright spot onstage. 
Most other functions use this one. Sorne nervous systems (or functions) 
are reputed as being unreachable by design. Even there, Baars describes 
an experiment that may prove this wrong: learning to control a number of 
physiological functions thanks to immediate conscious biofeedback (Baars, 
1997b, pp. 58-59). 
2. Prioritizing 
Sorne things are more important than others, such as imminent dangers, 
the prospect of a very pleasurable activity, or the sound of one's own name 
spoken in a buzzing crowd . Unconscious processes monitor our senses 
and may bring a stimulus that requires breaking through to consciousness. 
But, whether coming from a voluntary thought or popping up from the un-
conscious, simultaneously occurring ideas may be willingly compared and 
prioritized for an orderly utilization or simply to choose the most appropriate 
one. lt must be pointed out that this prioritizing may happen unconsciously 
in working memory, with only the most important information finally coming 
to consciousness. This is what happens in experts, who come to progres-
sively automate processes; it also happens in intuitively-inclined persans. 
9 The exact list and the arder of the functions vary a little between the books and the 
papers; 1 offer here an arrangement that tries to reflect best Baars' writings. 
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3. Using unconscious errer-detection and correcting defective perceptions 
If we hear a sentence that contains a lexical or semantic error, the problem 
pops-up to our mind without any voluntary analysis. Expectations about the 
phrase structure and coming words have not been satisfied . Unconscious 
processes always monitor our senses in many ways and at many levels. 
When theses processes cannat themselves find the right correction (for in-
stance , automatically replacing the faulty word by the strongly expected 
one), they need other processes to take over. Bringing the problem to con-
sciousness presents the situation to ali the unconscious processes, some 
of which , in this case, will propose fixes that allow the sentence to regain 
meaning , and that satisfy the context. 
ln the same way, perception is about giving meaning to stimuli. If the per-
ceptual process cannat interpret a stimulus, this fact brings the executive 
processes to devote more attention to that process. Consequently, if what 
is delivered after perceptual processing is in discrepancy with past re-
cordings, with our semantic knowledge, or with expectations, that fact will 
be submitted for becoming conscious so that other processes may suggest 
fixes. 
4. Problem-solving and plans editing 
Consciousness allows the presentation of ideas, situations, and problems 
to the unconscious audience so that they analyze them and suggest a solu-
tion. Consciousness makes it possible to use the tremendous power of the 
millions of specialized neural groups, otherwise unreachable by any act of 
will. They may then supply the most appropriate plan or the proper informa-
tion to face a situation . Episodic memory may, for instance, bring back the 
information about where 1 parked my car. Consciousness may serve as 
kind of a blackboard to elaborate a completely new plan or procedure if 
none came up, or modify a plan that analysis revealed inappropriate. Pre-
arranged or generic plans rarely fit the situation at hand. 
,---- -------------- -----
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5. Adapting mental structures for learning 
Learning new material , as researchers like Piaget have explained , is more 
than plain memorizing into long-term memory. To become useful knowl-
edge, it must be integrated into mental structures we already possess. The 
more the new information differs from our existing knowledge, the longer it 
takes to modify the existing structures, and the more it requires the in-
volvement of consciousness to keep the information alive while the knowl-
edge structures are being modified by unconscious processes. 
6. Reflection , self-monitoring and executive control 
Through inner speech and imagery, we can reflect upon, , trouble-shoot 
and modify our own functioning. The self is quite involved in these opera-
tions. lt supplies the baseline to compare to the actual experience. lt often 
influences decisions at an unconscious level , but it may manifest itself at 
the feelings level (when one does not try to suppress them). Self systems 
located in the prefrontal cortex probably exercise their control by means of 
influencing conscious 'publicity', never entering consciousness directly. 
7. Creating the context for understanding 
The context is the combination of many unconscious networks that shape 
conscious contents: goals ( conscious or not) in the ir many levels and types, 
the self, those representing the situation. 
Reactions of the system are, in part, the result of past and current goals, 
which are presently conscious or came to consciousness some time before. 
These goals have primed mental structures, including semantic networks, 
creating a "context of understanding" which favars those structures (they 
should res pond first to the content of consciousness ). 
Other aspects of the context (self, expectations, state of the perceptual 
networks, emotions) also react to, influence somehow, even constrain what 
appears in consciousness. They orient what will ultimately be the global 
meaning of the perception or, more generally, the conscious experience. 
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For instance, contextual parietal maps of the visual field, which do not sup-
port conscious features, modulate visual feature cells that directly contrib-
ute to conscious aspects of seen abjects (Baars et al., 2003). 
8. Optimizing the trade-off between organization and flexibility 
Automatic responses are highly adaptive in predictable situations . However, 
in the face of novelty and uncertainty, the capacity of consciousness to re-
cruit and reconfigure specialized knowledge sources becomes vital. This 
being said, given no time and great urgency, only prepared actions are 
serviceable (Baars, 1997b, p.160), as there is insufficient time to make a 
long analysis, organize a thoroughly worked-out plan, or even simply adapt 
a script. Two phenomena may force this compromise: either an automatic 
reaction has already been put in motion when inhibitory information cornes 
to consciousness, or, since in such situations ali the conscious space is al-
ready filled with uncontrollable, task-irrelevant thoughts , conscious volition 
is struck-out and will not be serviceable until one cairns down. 
9. Recruiting and controlling actions (James' ideomotor theory) 
As illustrated with the difficult morning decision about getting out of bed, 
putting that goal in my mind is sufficient to have an uncontrolled script 
(automatic routine) fire-up, if no counter-acting idea shows up. Conscious 
goals serve to mobilize automatic routines and body muscles in order to 
carry out voluntary actions. 
Similarly, entertaining a thought about a life-threatening situation is suffi-
cient to mobilize autonomie arousal and prepare rapid muscular responses. 
As you can see, Baars' theory contains rather high-level ideas and descriptions. 
But they are weil organized and offer an interesting framework for a computer trans-
position. You will see an example of such a work in two chapters. Before coming to 
this , 1 offer in the next chapter kind of a baseline, with an overview of existing solu-
tions for consciousness models and "conscious" agents. 
Chapter 3 
CONSCIOUSNESS ARCHITECTURES 
AND "CONSCIOUS" AGENTS 
3.1 PREAMBLE: WHY FAVOUR AGENT ARCHITECTURE? 
Building tutoring systems as an agent (or as a multi-agents system) is the main 
stream of the recent years in the ITS community. But before turning to agent con-
cepts , computer-assisted learning systems (CALS) were designed within the con-
ventional paradigm of subsystems that perceive, process and react. Agents also do 
that, but they go further, as 1 will briefly describe in the following lines that essentially 
reproduce Franklin and Graesser's comprehension (Franklin and Graesser, 1997). 
1 must point out, at the onset, that the ward agent has an unclear definition ; 
there is not consensus on what an agent incorporates, as exposed by Franklin and 
Graesser ( 1997). 1 will adopt the proposition of these authors to understand the con-
cept as a system situated within and a part of an environment, thal senses thal envi-
ronment and acts on it, over lime, in pursuit of its own agenda. That definition in itself 
poses a problem as it contains an implicit reference to autonomy, a difficult concept 
to pin dawn precisely. Jennings et al. wants to convey the simple idea that the sys-
tem should be able to decide and act without the direct intervention of hu mans (or 
other agents), and should have control over its own actions and internai state. 
Autonomous behavior is not a new idea. lt has been implemented in numerous ap-
plications: we find these capabilities in process control systems, which must monitor 
a real-world environment and perform actions to modify it as conditions change 
(typically in real-time) ; we also find them in software daemons, which monitor a soft-
ware environment and perform actions to modify the environment as conditions 
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change. However, these systems cannet be called intelligent agents. When we add 
"intelligence" in the picture, we get the finer definition of an intelligent agent as a 
computer system that is capable of flexible autonomous action in order to meet its 
design objectives. By "flexible", Jennings, Sycara and Wooldridge ( 1998) mean th at 
the system must be: 
• responsive: an agent should perceive its environment (which may be the 
physical world, a user, a collection of agents, the Internet, etc.) and respond in 
a timely fashion to changes that occur in it, 
• proactive: an agent should not simply act in response to its environment; it 
should be able to exhibit opportunistic, goal-directed behavior and take the ini-
tiative where appropriate, 
• social: an agent should be able to interact, when it deems appropriate, with 
ether artificial agents and humans in order to complete its own problem solv-
ing and to help ethers with their activities. 
lt is the presence of the four components in a single software entity (autonomy, 
plus the three sub-components of "intelligence": responsiveness , proactivity and 
sociability) that makes for the originality and power of the agent paradigm. Hereafter, 
when 1 use the term 'agent' , it should be understood that 1 am using it as an abbre-
viation for the rich definition of 'artificial intelligent agent' . 
Just a little thinking makes it obvious that a tutor (human or artificial) has to be 
able to perceive his environment (including the learner) and possess the autonomy 
that allows him to react or act in the most appropriate way, at the right time. That is, 
he has to be able to seize the context, recognize trends, foresee consequences, 
plan and adapt on these bases and act to try producing the most appropriate result 
in the context. He might need to interact with ether agents to reach that goal. This 
description goes beyond the capability of a conventional system and justifies the 
point of adopting an agent paradigm. 
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The appropriateness of the agent paradigm being clarified, 1 now present dif-
ferent implementations of agents that attempt at capturing , or at least use, sorne of 
the features characteristic of human consciousness. 1 also cover sorne implementa-
tions that are not agents by themselves but offer the tools or framework that can 
support one. Taking a stroll along this overview, even if limited, will give a better per-
spective on CTS, which 1 will describe in the next chapter. 
3.2 VARIOUS APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE Al FIELD 
Al has integrated human consciousness in its realizations long ago. Bechtel 
(1995) recalls this fact quite elegantly, stating that many aspects proper to con-
sciousness seemed critical to any successful information processing model. For in-
stance, an interactive program (and more recently, agents) shows selective attention, 
either by design (with limited sensors) , or by prioritization . Sorne of the captured data 
is considered , but much is left ignored , as the mass of irrelevant stimuli in the real 
world would overwhelm the processes. Another parallel between technical artefacts 
and human consciousness holds in computers central control systems, typically 
summed up in the acronym CPU (Central Processing Unit). When CPUs get involved 
in the processing , they mimic the non parallelism of consciousness, churning one 
item at a time 10 from what is fed in its stack by the multiple autonomous co-
processors and sub-systems working in parallel. A third example can be given in the 
subsystems sending to the CPU only a fraction of their conclusions, making ali they 
can on their own , in the "unconscious" of the computer, bypassing the central pree-
essor as often as they can and having direct communications to other sub-systems. 
If needed, sorne of their work and sorne of the internai states of the computer can be 
made available, "bringing them to consciousness" so that sorne process can report 
10 See note 4 about CPU's seriality. 
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on them to computer designers, orso that direct actions can be taken accordingly by 
safeguard processes. Hardware people might balk at looking at computers architec-
tures as emulating consciousness and unconsciousness. Nature often inspires us 
without our realizing it, and it is sometimes difficult to admit that our great ideas are 
sim ply an intuitive transposition of what already exists in nature .. . 
Authors su ch as Johnson-Laird ( 1988) saw no shame in having an explicit, in-
quisitive look into consciousness, trying to understand its functions to implement 
them into computer algorithms. Paillard ( 1999) explains th at Johnson-Laird was posi-
tive about the fact that those "thinking" machines, computers , can generate functions 
analogous to becoming conscious. However, he remained sceptical about their use-
fulness for computers' "mental" operations and their performance. 
This kind of scepticism seems to have somewhat eroded over the time. Re-
searchers keep asking questions about the usefulness of consciousness for robots 
(or agents in general), but not anymore as a doubt, but a lighthouse's beam to follow, 
an obvious goal to reach . Recent researches , often stimulated by discoveries in neu-
rosciences , aim at integrating consciousness in various artefacts: models of the hu-
man mind, models of consciousness, computer implementations of the models. We 
see scientific communications proliferate on the subject. Conferences are created 
not only in the field of philosophy, but a Iso in events assembling Al leaders. ln 2001 , 
a three-days multidisciplinary workshop headed by Christof Koch (one of the authors 
of the biological 40Hz synchrony model), Chalmers, Goodman, Holland and 
Schwartz, had for theme «Can a machine be conscious?». At the end of the work-
shop, Koch inquired to the twenty researchers on how many would new give a posi-
tive answer; ali but one raised their hand. The theme had gene from an interesting 
subject to a clear and stimulating prospect. ln 2003, another sim ilar workshop had 
the objective of identifying the aspects in the diverse consciousness models which 
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could be implemented in computers or robots and explain the experimental data 
(Sioman and Chrisley, 2003)11 . 
lndeed , many researches aim at creating either a functional implementation of 
consciousness or an "authentic" artificial consciousness (biologically plausible). 1 will 
present a few of them that cover a spectrum of possibilities. Franklin (2003b) men-
tions sorne examples of such serious projects that 1 will not cover here: one headed 
by Igor Aleksander, MAGNUS, uses neural modelling ; another one inspired by neu-
ral modelling is the proposai of Lee McCauley that builds consciousness into a neu-
ral schema system; Owen Holland and Rodney Goodman follow a bottom up 
approach , adding capabilities to a robotic system until it shows signs of conscious-
ness. Many more exist, inspired by different horizons and field of interest, some with 
similarities, most with a specificity that would be worth mentioning. 
1 classify the systems that 1 will present under the following classes: 
Functional implementations want to reproduce the rotes held by conscious-
ness. Two subtypes exist. 
• Pure/y functional implementations. Here, ali is sought for are the al-
leged benefits coming with the consciousness mechanisms (for one, 
the mode of operation it enriches mind with). Whatever way is used to 
render them is fine . You will see here the reflexive computer language 
of McCarthy, and two "conscious" agents: GLAIR and lntrospect. 
• Psychologically plausible functional implementations. ln these cases, 
the authors try to respect sorne plausibility, for instance by founding 
their work on a psychological theory of the mind and consciousness 
(the Conscious Mattie/IDA/LIDA family rooted in Baars' Global Work-
11 Other examples: in 2003, ASSC 7 Symposium in Memphis; the 2003 ESF explora-
tory workshop "Models of Consciousness", in Birmingham; the 2004 "NoE 'Exystence' in 
Turino; in 2004, the parallel session at the ASSC 8 in Antwerp. 
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space theory). ACT-R also fits in this category, although consciousness 
was not at the root of the project. 1 will present ACT-R in a separate 
section (6.2), in a comparison to CTS. IDA/LIDA description permeates 
this whole document as those agents found CTS, so no section will be 
devoted to them ; differences are pointed out in italics text when a CTS 
feature is presented. 
Biologically plausible implementations want not only the results of con-
sciousness, but a closer relation with the low level of the "biological tissues" that are 
thought of as supporting consciousness. CyberChild appears in this category. 1 will 
also briefly present a neuron network that attempts to explain with some level of bio-
logical plausibility how the mind learns and how one could derive consciousness 
from it: ART. 
3.2.1 Functional approaches 
3.2.1 .1 A Computer Science approach to consciousness: McCarthy's reflexive 
language 
Among the firsts to propose the possible benefits of tracking and inserting hu-
man consciousness features in robots is John McCarthy (McCarthy 2002/1995; 
1959). He proposed mechanisms and a logical language making possible to repro-
duce some of human consciousness functions , including metacognition and intro-
spection , which he posits as equivalent to self-consciousness. The robot's beliefs 
are directly accessible in the computer's working memory, forming its awareness. 
Some permanent processes running in parallel can generale sentences about the 
beliefs. These comments on the beliefs create the robot's consciousness. Other sen-
tences come into "consciousness" as the result of introspective actions the robot 
decided to make, and create its self-consciousness. McCarthy conjectures that ro-
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bots will need meta-sentences and better abilities to comprehend so that they un-
derstand how they do things and can improve. 
Summing up, McCarthy proposai uses words associated to consciousness 
( «consciousness», «unconscious», «introspection», «awareness», «contexts», «free 
will») and proposes elever mechanisms for them. However, he admits not being in-
terested in "real " consciousness and makes no attempt in this direction (for instance, 
the "consciousness" the talks aboutis a specifie "place", a subset of memory). By no 
means does he feel bound by any human limitation ("many features of human con-
sciousness will be wanted , sorne will not" - in his opinion , not everything in human 
consciousness is useful for intelligent behavior). His robots ' unconscious mind can 
be inspected at will. This is a pragmatic, engineering view, with a priority on getting 
results. lt obtains sorne benefits from a distant observation of consciousness, but 
makes no attempt at explaining anything . ln my opinion, it does not reap the true 
benefits offered by human consciousness. 
3.2.1.2 Hexmoor, Lam mens and Shapiro's GLAIR ( 1993) 
GLAIR (Grounded Layered Architecture with lntegrated Reasoning) uses an 
architecture with three layers relating to the conscious/unconscious arrangement of 
the mind (see Figure 2). The two first layers process "unconsciously" what is sensed, 
deciding on the right action to take with their automated capabilities . The third, top 
layer is said to be "conscious" and is concerned with the tasks requiring deliberation 
for the adaptation to new situations. Albeit "on top", this layer does not take on any 
coordination role. 
The creators of GLAIR define an agent's consciousness as the awareness it 
has of its environment. lt takes three forms: (1) internai states or representations 
causally connected to the environment through perception and action , (2) explicit 
reasoning capabilities about the environment, and (3) its ability to communicate with 
an external agent about the environment ("reportability"). 
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The three layers operate in parallel but collaborate: the conscious reasoning 
guides the unconscious (automatic, reflexes) behaviors while these, constantly proc-
essing the inputs and preparing the outputs (the motor actions), can alarm the con-
scious level about important events. ln case of such events, the conscious level may 
take control of the agent. So, action selection and monitoring is not confined to a 
specifie level. Moreover, explicit rules elaborated by the conscious layer are trans-
ferred to the lower levels in an implicit form , where it is learned as a state transition. 
The next time the same conditions appear, this transition will automatically be se-
lected without any recourse to deliberation. 
The architecture has even more interesting functions . lt possesses reflexive 
and metacognitive mechanisms that evaluate actions value based on results . They 
serve in the agent's improvement. First, they identify frequent sequences of actions. 
If the routine can be associated with an improvement of the situation in the environ-
ment, the agent believes that a valuable routine emerged from reflex actions, and it 
augments its confidence in the sequence. When this confidence reaches a threshold, 
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a concept is created in the top level , which deals with explicit knowledge; this con-
cept will be available for ulterior reasoning . So, from its interactions with the envi-
ronment, the agent creates its own concepts. Self-observation and reasoning allow 
the agent to improve its efficiency in choosing a behavior, and its abilities to act, ali 
towards achieving its goals. 
GLAIR has been tested in air-combat simulations (named Gabby in this video-
game, for "GLAIR air battler"). ln non-learning mode, it lost nearly 70% of the battles. 
When it has been allowed to learn, the agent rapidly became more reactive (reacting 
more rapidly) and eventually won 50% of the combats. This is a convincing demon-
stration of the value of this architecture's self-observation and auto-modification. 
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So, while not referring to any global theory, the concepts GLAIR uses show 
their usefulness. lt presents an interesting combination of "unconscious"/automatic 
and "conscious"/deliberative mechanisms, balancing immediate efficiency and 
adaptability. 
3.2.1.3 Cazenave's lntrospect (1998) 
Cazenave has produced an agent capable of observing the results of its real-
time actions (as resulting from its current know-how) , of evaluating how weil it had 
predicted the results , and of finding the failings in its plans to correct them and im-
prove its performance. He demonstrated the value of his proposai by applying it to a 
Go player. Go is a very popular Chinese game of life, and the most complex two-
players game. Learning it takes years for humans, and transferring expert knowl-
edge into a program to a proficiency level borders on impossibility. An agent self-
observation and auto-improvement is the solution offered by Cazenave. 
ln spite of the simplicity of its rules, playing the game of Go is a very complex 
task. lt is impossible to make a brute force search of ali the maves in the game, and 
Algorithm followed by the expert-programmer team Algorithm fo llowed by lntrospect 
Figure 4 Comparison of developmental algorithm followed by the team of expert-
programmers, and the one followed by lntrospect. 
---- --------- -------------------------, 
46 
the best Go playing systems ali rely on a knowledge intensive approach. Tradition-
ally, expert players team with programmers to extract and encode knowledge, in a 
conventional knowledge design approach (for expert systems). Due to the high 
specificity of the situations, learning time is enormous and learned rules tend to be-
come unconscious in the experts. One would be tempted to log the moves made by 
two players during a great number of games and throw a machine learning algorithm 
at it. This is somewhat what Cazenave suggests, but instead of observing from 
scratch every time, he proposes a system that builds rules on the go (no pun in-
tended), and then uses "conscious introspection" to identify new rules, find errors in 
existing ones, and accommodate this new knowledge. 
After observing the state of the Go board , lntrospects makes ali inferences it 
can with its knowledge of the game, and records these deductions. Then, it chooses 
and applies a move, and deduces ali it can from the resulting configuration . lt com-
pares the prediction with the actual result. If something unexpected of interest is dis-
covered , something it was not capable of anticipating, it tries to find, by backward 
chaining , the source rule that needs to be modified or that should have been in-
volved before deciding on the move. 
The algorithm also tries to generalize the rules, replacing constants by vari-
ables; it "forgets" those that are now part of the generalization. lt completes its mem-
ory/time optimization with some meta-analysis that kills harmful rules . ln lntrospect, 
"harmful rules" are those which have a high probability of failing , either on the count 
of too many conditions to match, or too many actions to take afterward . The more 
conditions are to be fulfilled , the more the rule becomes likely to add match time 
without being applied; action lists with more than five actions to fulfil are rules likely 
to fa il (according to Cazenave experience; Cazenave, 1998, p.3). Finally, a compila-
tion of the rules transforms them to an "unconscious", implicit form . 
lntrospect is an interesting example of Al finding inspiration in cognitive re-
searches to construct an agent. lt parallels some features of consciousness (using 
ideas from Minsky and Sloman) to obtain a superior performance. lt mimics short-
lerm memory utilization, reflexivity (introspection), deliberation , metacognition and 
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implicit learning. The passage from explicit knowledge to implicit is only a matter of 
compiling the knowledge, which makes short work of the humanly process! Another 
negative small point is that the resulting agent does not possess human's reflexive 
and metacognitive capabilities on-line; improvement of its abilities cames only with 
an off-line process; lntrospect is a Go tournament player, and has to live with time 
constraints . However, adorning it with on-line adaptive capabilities could easily be 
done. ln any case, just like humans, it operates on the principle of trial-and-error, 
practice-and-improve to perfect its abilities. Although it does not try to explain any-
thing , it is nice to see the application of ideas about consciousness in real, efficient 
applications. 
3.2.2 Biologically-motivated approaches 
1 cali "biologically-motivated approaches" those that try to mimic nature. Some 
very far-fetched researches attempt to create human tissue through biomedical en-
gineering, but we are very far from anything that will lead to a brain. The closest 
things to human neural circuitry still exists only in computer simulations (for instance, 
de Garis' project in Starlab to build artilects, "artificial intellects" upon 100 million 
artificial brain ce lis, in a 2001 description of the project 12 ). More "traditional" ap-
proaches are the ones from Grossberg and from Cotterill. 1 describe them hereafter. 
12 http:/ /www. kurzweilai. net/meme/frame. html?main=/articles/art0131 .html 
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3.2.2.1 Cotterill's Cyberchild 
PRIMITIVE REFLEXES EYE AND RELATED MOVEMENTS 
Figure 5 Cyberchild's architecture. Cotterill wants his project to show not only a brain, 
but also biological functions and motivated emotions. Consciousness will eventually 
emerge from it. 
--- - ------------------------
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Igor Aleksander describes Cyberchild as «An accurate biochemical madel of a 
young baby.» 13 Although purely a computer simulation , Cyberchild is meant to be 
faithful to its madel, a human child that has everything to learn . With metabolic tune-
tians (bladders, blood stream with nutrients, a stomach that digests), it has needs, 
and experiences emotions. The child has to learn to behave correctly so as to re-
ceive what it needs from the experimenter. lts brain is quite detailed. Rodney Cotter-
ill explains: 
The underlying madel is based on the known circuitry of the mammalian 
nervous system, the neuronal groups of which are approximated as binary 
composite units. The simulated nervous system includes just two senses -
hearing and touch - and it drives a set of muscles that serve vocalisation, 
feeding and bladder control. These functions were chosen because of their 
relevance to the earliest stages of human life , and the simulation has been 
given the name CyberChild . The system 's pain receptors respond to a suffi-
ciently low milk level in the stomach, if there is simultaneously a low level of 
blood sugar, and also to a full bladder and an unchanged diaper. lt is believed 
that it may be possible to inter the presence of consciousness in the simulation 
through observations of CyberChild's behaviour, and from the monitoring of its 
ability to ontogenetically acquire novel reflexes. 14 
Cotterill thinks that sophisticated neural apparel is a prerequisite to conscious-
ness. lt must allow, among others, for the attention, re-entrant neuronal loops, and 
brain's plasticity. Everything is set up so that the child can do an authentic explora-
tion of his universe, can learn and make inferences, and eventually let us see his 
consciousness emerge. ln 2002, Cotterill did not think he saw any consciousness 
evidences in CyberChild . But he was not "cyberchilled" so soon . .. 
Even though Cotterill demonstrates a very honorable candor when he does not 
see traces of consciousness in his CyberChild , ali the apparatus seems in place for it, 
if complexity or grounding are conditions to consciousness, although not in real flesh 
and blood . ln fact, it possesses the mechanisms that correspond to other agents and 
13 http://www.cs .stir.ac.ukl-lss/BICS2004/Tutorials/AieksanderTutorial .pdf 
14 http://www.imprint.eo.uk/jcs_1 0_ 4-5.html#cotterill 
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other models deemed conscious. Moreover, the consciousness that will eventually 
emerge is in good position to be quite believable since it is totally grounded to the 
agent's environment (that is, linked to the environment's stimuli , which are then per-
ceived by processes that are in accordance to what we know of human cognition . 
3.2.2.2 Carpenter and Grossberg's ART (1976; 1987) 
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Figure 6 Fundamental principles of ART. 
Weil known for its applications to categorization and learning , ART (Adaptive 
Resonance Theory) could easily go unnoticed when talking about consciousness. 
lndeed, the basic ART system is usually classified an unsupervised learning model. 
Yet, in a 1999 article, Grossberg affirms that ever since its inception , a central hy-
pothesis in ART poses conscious states as resonant states (states that lead to the 
recall of existing memories). Resonant states are what ART is about, thus con-
sciousness concerns were present at the very beginning of ART. He adds that those 
processes that allow our brain to learn over a lifetime while maintaining its stability 
(remaining organized , not becoming chaotic) create conscious experiences. Conse-
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quently, only those resonant states should be learned . The mechanism that forms 
the resonant loops takes time to stabilize, which corresponds to the delay observed 
between a stimulus and the report a subject is able to do about it (after becoming 
conscious of it). 
The general mechanism that makes us learn wh ile preserving the existing 
knowledge is based on expectations that center our attention on stimuli having value. 
The focus of our attention becomes confirmed when a resonant state emerges from 
a feed-back loo p. This can only happen when the bottom-up signal ( coming from the 
input) corresponds to the top-down signal (the expectation). The latter is prepared 
and oriented by the priming mechanism. lt stimulates, ahead of time, cells (concep-
tual nades) that should react to the sensory information, amplifying sorne character-
istics and inhibiting cells of which no activity is expected . This process filters out 
"noise" that would otherwise rapidly destabilize past acquisitions. After stability is 
obtained , the resonant state locks up the activity pattern at a much higher activation 
level and makes it last much longer then what would be observed from individual 
activations. Only these highly activated patterns emerge and remain observable long 
enough to be learned. 
Top-down signais represent expectation learned by the brain about what the 
inputs should be, based on past experiences. Philosophers often cali them intention-
ality. Since past experiences incur intentionality, Grossberg asserts that ART offers 
the basis for self-consciousness. Carpenter and Gross berg (2003, p.1 0) cite Pollen 
as backing their hypotheses and the correspondence of their madel with conscious-
ness: 
Pollen (1999) resolves various past and current views of cortical function 
by placing them in a framework he calls adaptive resonance theories . This uni-
fying perspective postulates resonant feedback loops as the substrate of phe-
nomenal experience. ( ... ) As Pollen (pp. 15-16) suggests: "it may be the 
consensus of neuronal activity across ascending and descending pathways 
linking multiple cortical areas that in anatomical sequence subserves phe-
nomenal visual experience and abject recognition and that may underlie the 
normal unity of conscious experience." 
1 
_j 
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ART was at first a theory and a functional recreation of mind attempting to ex-
plain categorization and lifelong learning. lt keeps growing towards a robust frame-
work with links to experimental data . Consciousness in this framework is becoming 
less of a peripheral interest, and more of a central concern , as a recent (2005) paper 
by Grossberg demonstrates: «Attention, like consciousness, is often described in a 
disembodied way. The present article summarizes neural models and supportive 
data about how attention is linked to processes of /earning, expectation, competition, 
and consciousness». Grossberg deserves credits for offering a viable explanation of 
how consciousness could emerge and why. He also provides some roles for con-
sciousness. 
Many other models of the mind and of consciousness would have deserved 
being included in this overview: Taylor's models (the relational model of the mind, 
the ACTION network, etc.), Sun's CLARION, McCauley's neural schemas network, 
Aleksander's Magnus, Minsky's ideas about the mind , and many others. My first aim 
for this section was to show some agents that incorporated some form of conscious-
ness; 1 extended the review to incorporate some famous models of the mind, and an 
essential historical figure (McCarthy). However limited , this review of some Al's ar-
chitectural use of consciousness is sufficient to supply us with a much more enlight-
ened look at my own proposai for a conscious agent. 
Chapter 4 
CTS, OUR "CONSCIOUS" TUTORING AGENT 
The architecture that 1 propose for a conscious agent is the foundation for a tu-
toring agent 1 called CTS (Conscious Tutoring System). CTS is a son of IDA, the 
agent developed by professor Franklin (University of Memphis) and his team . CTS 
shares IDA's fundamental mechanisms for consciousness, and some other struc-
tures such as a Behavior Network, a Perception Network and long-term memories. 
However there are differences in the implementation of some mechanisms; 1 will 
present them along the way, while touring CTS. 
Before starting, l'd like to recall the advisory caution given in Chapter 2. Al-
though 1 do not put quotation marks around the ward "consciousness" when talking 
about CTS, 1 do not mean to support the interpretation that CTS consciousness is 
"real", or on a par with human consciousness. 
1 also wish to make orthographical and naming clarifications. First, an ortho-
graphical convention. Since many of CTS' modules refer by name to the biological 
function they implement (for instance, access consciousness, working memory, 
autobiographical memory), there may be confusion as to which side a sentence re-
fers to. 1 will be indicating CTS' modules with initial capitals (ex.: Working Memory, 
Behavior Network, Learner Madel , etc.), whereas 1 willleave brain's biological "func-
tions" in small caps (working memory, access consciousness, perception, etc.). 
"Codelets", which names do not duplicate biological counterparts, will be left in small 
caps. For instance, 1 will explain about CTS that the coalition selected in Working 
Memory by the Attention mechanism is then broadcast by the Access Conscious-
ness. 
-~ --- - ----------------
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As second clarification, 1 wish to explain that 1 will be using "broadcasting" and 
"publishing" as synonyms in the descriptions. 1 use both to give some variety to de-
scriptions that use them quite intensively and might get a little boring at times! 
4.1 CTS' ARCHITECTURE 
CTS presents a functional (it implements brain and mind functions), distributed 
architecture with both high-level entities (modules) and low-level entities (codelets, to 
be described later on). The coupling between modules is weak, with message ex-
changes happening mostly (in fact, exclusive/y, for the time being) through the in-
termediary of Working Memory (WM) and Access Consciousness. lt covers every 
major aspect of cognition , with many functional correlations to the physiology of the 
brain (see Baars and Franklin , 2003; see also (Franklin , 2003a) for a comparison of 
IDA with Crick and Koch's framework for consciousness). 
Two general considerations have to be mentioned before starting the tour. The 
architecture that underlies CTS is concerned with consciousness and ali the benefits 
this faculty can bring. To try to reap ali the advantages, one has to respect the prin-
ciples enunciated in an all-encompassing theory, in this case, Baars' , and reproduce 
every aspect of consequence. ln this line of reasoning , it would be nice to create ali 
peripheral modules in a faithful manner, but is not required . What is really necessary 
is that they allow the consciousness mechanisms (Working Memory, Attention echa-
nism, Access Consciousness) to work in the fundamental way they have been de-
signed to follow, using codelets to communicate with Working Memory and Access 
Consciousness. So, aside from a communication layer that reads and translates 
information into information codelet structures, designers of a module are free to use 
whatever mean they find useful to produce their "unconscious" analyses. This opens 
the door to an easy integration of any existing module . As an illustration , the Domain 
Expert and the Transient Episodic Memory show an eclectic collection of techniques 
that collaborate perfectly to the performance of the global agent. 
55 
The second point 1 need to make is about the width , that is, the number of 
fields our architecture encompasses. Each of its modules would deserve pages of 
description to give a thorough account, and each will require its own research pro-
gram to reach a satisfactory implementation. 1 will not try to caver every base. This 
thesis is about the Global Workspace theory, and its possibilities when applied to a 
tutoring agent. My descriptions will stay within the ideas that this theory offers, allow-
ing the reader to understand the theory, its implementation , and its possibilities. 
Along the way, 1 will indicate major discrepancies with respect to IDA, sorne-
times to LIDA, with sentences written in italics. LIDA (Learning IDA) is the newest 
member of Franklin's agents family; IDA has been the starting point of CTS and has 
more direct resemblances. 
Now, let's start the tour. To be able to describe many functions of the architec-
ture, 1 need first to describe special low-level entities: codelets . Talking about them 
will often bring references to CTS' architecture, so 1 include its diagram here, but will 
be specifically referring to it only starting with section 4.1.4. 
implemented 1 
simulated module planed module 1 
information conveyed as : 
_____.... information codelet(s) 
__,.. energy 
Figure 7 Conceptual architecture of CTS. Colored (grayed) boxes indicate which func-
tions are implemented in the prototype. Orange doubled arrows show messages flowing in 
the form of energy feeds . 
-------------------
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4.1.1 Codelets 
Codelets, although individualistic in their nature, show up on the conceptual 
architecture only in boxes indicative of "full-status" modules. Some of them effec-
tively render as a group the services of a "virtual" module (attention codelets, meta-
cognition codelets). Others are "hidden" within their module, since they work as part 
of a higher-level structure (Perception codelets, in the Perception module, and a 
variety of codelets in the Behavior Net). Still ethers (information codelets) masquer-
ade as communication arrows in the diagram since they play the traditional role of 
information vectors. 
The name "codelet" has been kept from IDA, which borrowed it to the Copycat 
architecture (Hofstadter and Mitchell, 1995). lt designates simple unintelligent agents 
that simulate neuronal groups. As their counterparts, they are specialized in their 
raies , with limited abilities and range, but very efficient. Various types have been 
pre pa red th at reflect the types of activities (or functions) va rio us neuronal groups 
may: perception, reasoning (information and attention codelets , the latter including 
expectation and metacognition codelets), and behavior codelets. 
We classify codelets as agents, after Franklin , in the sense of Minsky's Society 
of Mind (Minsky, 1985). They possess many of agents' characteristics: they are 
autonomous, perceive, process, and act. They also do an elementary form of learn-
ing in the strength of the associations they create with each other, this mechanism 
coming from Pandemonium theory (Jackson, 1987). CTS is an agent containing a 
multi-agent architecture. 
Codelets life spans reflect that in the human mind . We, human, have pree-
esses always active (or, at least, never very far away) that have to do with basic sur-
vival. We exhibit ethers that exist for an extended period of time (for instance, when 
playing hockey, the very needed single-minded processes that monitor senses to 
detect and recognize the arrivai of an adversary); they exist at the same time as 
those related to the survival instincts. We also constantly start sorne very specifie 
and short-lived ones, such as those that monitor the events after 1 screamed at the 
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left-wing player to receive a pass. An even shorter process might be one attending to 
the sound my car's motor does after turning the ignition key. 1 may be thinking of 
something el se wh ile 1 do it, but if the sound is strange ( differs from wh at usually 
happens), 1 will instantly turn my attention toit. 
Table 4- 1 CTS' codelets taxonomy. 
Type Sub-type Group name Role 
Perception Perception Perception Give an interpretation to what the 
code lets agent senses from its environment 
Arbiter Arbiter Control the deliberation process 
code lets 
Attention • Monitor WM for patterns 
code lets 
• Bias information selection 
• Monitor CTS' internai processes Metacognition 
code lets • Help regulate and correct proc-
Attention esses 
• Check that expected results do 
happen, then either : 
Reasoning Expectation 0 strengthen links in the 
codelets Behavior Net, 
0 put information codelets 
describing the difficulty 
encountered . 
Information Information Represent and transfer information 
code let 
Find new information in WM , en-
Encoding Encoding code it and feed L TM; decode asso-
code lets ciations returned by L TM and 
deposit them in WM. 
Emotion Emotion Represent affective valuation of 
code lets information in coalitions of codelets 
Motor Motor Act on the environment 
code lets 
Behavior 
Generator Generator Create reasoning codelets 
code lets 
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4.1.1 .1 Perception codelets 
Although they show commonalities with attention codelets, they do not watch 
Working Memory. They have effects in the processing of sensed information (or 
data). Their eyes stay riveted on the Sensory Buffer(s 15) , each one looking for one or 
a few specifie patterns of letters. If a perceptual codelet finds what it is after, it trans-
fers the information found to the Perception Network node it is attached to , and it 
resets the activation of the node to its nominal value (or somewhat less, wh en ha-
bituation kicks in). 
4.1.1.2 Attention codelets: Arbiter, attention , expectation, metacognition codelets 
A very interesting type of codelet is the attention one. The name designates a 
category of codelets that include a sub-category with the same name (attention 
codelets). They are either innate, starting their activity with the start-up of the system, 
or released by a Behavior node to attend to some matter. ln ali their varieties, they 
are pattern recognizers that watch WM. 
Arbiter codelets watch WM and detect when an information calls for delibera-
tion. ln such cases, it will successively play various roles : counting cycles since the 
last enrichment of the coalition , selecting the most probable cause to attach to a coa-
lition , declaring the end of a deliberation and marking a coalition as apt to enter the 
competition for the selection by the Attention mechanism. 
Attention codelets are not to be confused with the mechanism named Atten-
tion that selects the most activated coalition in Working Memory. Some of them look 
for a specifie ward or pattern of letters; some are interested in the appearance of a 
15 We presently have only one Sensory Butter that holds textual information coming 
from the environment (which is presently limited to the ISS simulator and the user interface), 
but the architecture can accommodate multiple Sensory Buffers. 
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type of information; ethers try to spot the presence of some instantaneous codelet 
pattern (the co-occurrence of sorne codelets in WM) or the build-up of a temporal 
pattern , even over quite distant but related events. Whereas IDA uses attention 
codelets as the exclusive means to form coalitions that can enter consciousness, 
CTS takes the position that coalitions form without the necessary intervention of at-
tention codelets . Coalitions form on the simple basis of compatibility between infor-
mation codelets (Baars convergence process that fuses whatever is compatible 
(Baars, 1997, p.52)) and on acquaintance (innate or learned). ln CTS (as in IDA), 
attention codelets look for information in WM (before it becomes conscious); what is 
proper to CTS is they may serve as a means to create a voluntary bias toward cer-
tain information (Baars, 1997, p. 1 00) in temporary situations. They may be involved 
with early perceptual stages, recreating the phenomenon of that Feldman, Barrett et 
al. describe as "influencing how sensory information is selected , taken in , and proc-
essed." (Feldman, Barrett, Tugade and Engle, 2004). 
Expectation codelets are of the short-lived kind . They are sent by a Behavior 
to ascertain whether the intended effect(s) did happen after the action has been 
executed . They keep a vigilant eye directly on WM for the appearance of perception 
or other information codelets with content that confirm the expected effect. If so, they 
see no need to bother anyone about the normality of things (Baars, 1997, p.116), 
and the expectation codelet will only silently send a reinforcement energy to the Be-
havior node that created the effect, confirming its effectiveness and bringing its 
base-level activation higher. If the expected effect does not show up, the expectation 
codelet does not wait forever in hope. After a predetermined number of cycles, it 
puts into WM an information codelet advising of the problem. 
Metacognition codelets (none designed yet), just like attention codelets, may 
be looking for patterns, but these are about the processing of the information, about 
the repetition of unsatisfactory interventions, about trends. They may also be trying 
to identify patterns of patterns. 
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When either of these attention codelets is aroused , it spins-out an information 
codelet, or a coalition of them, that contains words indicative of the situation de-
tected and deposits it in Working Memory. 
4.1.1 .3 Information codelets 
Information codelets are of the short-lived kind , serving only for holding an idea 
during its transit to and from Working Memory and represent it there until it is pub-
lished or naturally dies away. The role of information codelets , although very simple, 
is crucial : they transport information. They are those codelets that progressively form 
associations leading to new concepts , and they enable the deliberation whereby an 
idea gets iteratively enriched or inhibited. 
4.1 .1.4 Encoding codelets , emotion codelets and motor codelets . 
There are three kinds of codelets that are not yet designed but for which a role 
has been conceived . Encoding codelets bear similarities with perceptual codelets: 
they recognize information and feed the mid- or long-term memory they are related 
to. They prepare the information found in WM to be supplied to Long-Term and 
Transient Episodic memories. Emotion codelets have yet to be elaborated in our 
architecture but have an important role for an agent that wants to be perceived as 
real/y intelligent by its human user (Picard , 2000). ln fact , IDA has had an emotional 
mechanism for some time, which is now being redesigned . 1 would agree with Frank-
lin and Ramamurthy' propositions that they intervene and influence in many places 
and ways in the cognitive cycle (see Franklin and Ramamurthy, 2006 for more de-
tails) . Motor codelets, members of behavior codelets , will one day serve the pur-
pose of activating bodily parts of the agent, if it ever gets a body. 
61 
4.1 .1.5 Behavior codelets 
ln their latent state, they are attached to a Behavior node in the Behavior Net, 
along with other types of codelets (information codelets, expectation codelets, and 
sorne fleeting attention codelets that remain dormant under Behavior nades). Behav-
ior codelets are those that know how to, and do take action on demand . For instance, 
one codelet may know how to contact a database to receive information about a 
recent space mission, or how to contact a jokes service to get sorne material to pre-
sent to the astronaut after a long session . Their actions could aim at the internai 
structure of the agent, to bring modifications to a Behavior node or insert a new one 
in the BN (after being notified of that need by a metacognition codelet). 
4.1 .2 Coalitions of codelets 
Information codelets almost always form coalitions with other compatible 
codelets . They have an activation value indicative of the importance of the informa-
tion they bear. When grouped in a coalition, they form a global activation value that 
will decide whether Attention will descend on them. The coming sections 4.1.3, 4.1.4 
and 4.1 .5 describe how the activation value of a coalition is obtained . 
4.1.3 Energy and activation value 
1 present the concepts of energy and activation separately from other entities, 
even though they do not exist on their own in CTS. They are found at many places in 
CTS, within many entities, and play a crucial role in planning, in the organization of 
the information and in the processing accomplished by the agent. Understanding 
them is essential for a good comprehension of the way CTS works. 
Within CTS, the concept of energy appears in the energy flows , in the activa-
tion levels, and in the links' strength . Energy represents the signal "strength" (fre-
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quency of pulse) that neurons generate from the stimulations they receive by their 
dendrites and push along their axon to communicate information to other neurons. 
The activation level (or just "activation") of neurons cames in part form the accumula-
tion of the energy received recently, and from the stable base-level activation level 
they acquire with experience. Just as in real neurons and in neural groups as a 
whole, internai energy (activation level) of various entities of CTS increases with the 
stimulation coming from internai sources, from codelets representing the environ-
ment, or from the passage of time. Nades in the Perception Network and attention 
codelets show this phenomenon. Every entity in the BN also do. For instance, when 
stimulated or when the time has come, a BN's Feeling pushes energy in the Behav-
ior Network to the Goal nades that connect to it. When satisfied, the Feeling of the 
need decays rapidly, and it stops feeding the network with energy. The flow of en-
ergy within the Behavior Network accomplishes an important part of the planning . 
The energy that flows from the Feeling nades indicates the wishes of the agent and 
which Goal may be relevant to satisfy it; it sustains a top-dawn (goal-driven 1 proac-
tive) planning. Conversely, the energy that cames from the activated States main-
tains CTS reactivity to the outside world by sustaining bottom-up (reactive) planning . 
Energy serves as a common language between multiple entities of various 
functions and Behavior nades. The accumulation of energy in Behavior nades indi-
cates how much a Behavior is appropriate to the global context. However, precise 
causality is lost, just as happens with intuition, where someone knows what he 
should do without being able to tell exactly why. "Intuition" is also found in Feeling or 
Desire nades, which are stimulated by a variety of stimuli (events); one cannat say 
precisely what caused the Feeling to become strong. 
The Perception Network also makes use of energy levels. When messages re-
ceived in the Sensory Buffer contain an appropriate chunk of information, a percep-
tual node activates to its "natural" activation value, or climbs to its "habituated" 
(diminished) value. 
The activation level indicates the importance of the information that an informa-
tion codelet or a State carries . lt may come from the natural value of the information 
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(see Appendix C), from the contextual value (as obtained in the BN or in the PN), or 
the historical value that a link represents. ln Working Memory, the activation level of 
related codelets add-up in some way and support the competition for consciousness. 
Just as is the case for a single codelet, it is on the basis of its activation level that the 
importance of the information borne by a coalition is measured. 1 will say more about 
the computation of coalition 's activation level in the coming section 4.1.5. States in 
the BN compute their activation from the value of the information they find in the 
conscious broadcasts (see section 4.1.7 for more on States). So, broadcasts by the 
Access Consciousness (to be explained in a few moments) also realize an energy 
transfer. 
Everywhere activation exists in CTS, activation decay follows . lt implements 
the general idea that information looses importance with its aging, a hypothesis gen-
erally verified in a dynamic environment. lt also reflects the fact that our mind (and 
our whole nervous system , in fact) is a dynamic system that needs let go of some 
information to avoid becoming clogged by pieces of information that are no longer 
relevant to the context. Without it, ali our senses would eventually become stimu-
lated and remain excited long after the event happened, even years later! ln the Per-
ception Network, a stimulated node starts loosing its activation right after being 
excited by a stimulus. If stimulated again, it reacquires a portion of this activation , not 
ali of it, and even less in the following stimulations. This corresponds to the habitua-
tion of the senses, a progressive desensitization of the perceptual mechanisms that 
tends to orient attention towards what changes in the environment. Decaying is also 
present in the links' strength acquired by experience. Without the forgetting process, 
the system would keep planning on the basis of relevance that was true long ago but 
was never seen again. 
We use curves similar as those used in LIDA for learning and forgetting . Learn-
ing (acquiring base-value activation) rate follows a sigmoid curve, starting a bit 
slowly in the first few experiences, then growing rapidly in the next occurrences of 
the event, to eventually saturate and reach a quasi permanent status. Forgetting rate 
uses the inverse sigmoid curve, for a slow forgetting when the base-activation level 
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is close to an irreversible value, being faster if the value has not reached the quasi-
stable level, and returning very slowly to a final erasure a the lower values of the 
curve. As decaying is a continuous process, if the experiences are not repeated 
soon enough, the base-level activation returns to zero (and the link created is even-
tually forgotten , erased). However, we have chosen to apply a softer slant to the 
forgetting curve, since we think that it generally takes much longer to forget than to 
learn (we recall meeting someone days later, even if the event lasted just for a few 
seconds). If the events happen frequently enough , the base-level grows. Faghihi 
(2007) gives a more detailed account of these processes. 
4.1.4 Sensory Buffer (SB) and Perception Network (PN) 
The Sensory Buffer serves as an inward interface to any external actor. ln its 
present instantiation , CTS only has the International Space Station simulator and 
RomanTutor's user interface as an external environment. These sources alone sup-
ply a relatively rich information: every dynamic aspect of the "environment" appear in 
the messages received from the Simulator: Canadarm2 configuration (rotation angle 
of every joint), position of the payload , camera selected on each of the three moni-
tors along with its dynamic attributes (zoom, pitch and yaw angles), etc. If the event 
was not manipulation related , other types of information are supplied, such as exer-
Mouvement 
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Q, OOS 
Jo in 
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Rotation 
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Élément 
TrussR 
Figure 8 Portion of the "active" Perception Network. ln this state, the net-
work describes a rotation that brought joint WE to a distance of 6.96 from the 
Space Station element TrussR, creating a situation of possible collisions . 
Source: Hohmeyer (2006). 
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cise type and specifications - these aspects remain to be implemented. The nodes 
(information codelets produced by these nodes, in fact) give semantic meaning to 
the data through the hierarchical organization of the network (resulting in "concepts" 
the agent can recognize: "Canadarm2 manipulation", "user answer", etc.). They also 
grant importance on a semantic basis. lt must be pointed out that "Sensory Buffer" is 
a somewhat abusive terminology in the current setup since what the simulator cur-
rently sends is not images or sounds but a train of words, which already have se-
mantic meaning as such . But for CTS, these words constitute data since they still 
need to be given a meaning for CTS to understand and use. 
Our Perception Network does not incorporate IDA 's slipnet capabilities. How-
ever, the Perception module is an example of our architecture's capability to inte-
grate "alien" mechanisms. Our Perception creates the flexible, weakly coupled 
bridge between the environment and our internai Perception Network. Patrick Hoh-
meyer, as part of his Master thesis (Hohmeyer, 2006), designed this mechanism that 
takes any message coming from the environment and rewrites it so that it can be 
processed by CTS' internai perceptual codelets. That translation makes use of a 
formai grammar describing the environment's elements and their semantic relations . 
A syntactic analyzer that incorporates feature-detecting processes examines the 
incoming message and reorganizes it into a hierarchical tree. Then, the perceptual 
codelets can inspect the tree, looking for information they recognize. When a codelet 
does recognize something , it grabs the information and passes it to the PN informa-
tion codelet to which it corresponds. For instance, there is a perceptual codelet for 
each Canadarm2 joint, one for each camera, one for each monitor; there are others 
corresponding to higher-level concepts such as a request for help made by the user. 
When a specifie joint's perception codelet finds the proper descriptor, it isolates the 
information about the joint's angle and starts its transfer process. lt compares it to 
the information previously held by the information codelet representing the joint; if 
identical , it does only a partial infusion of energy. 
That particular aspect, the energy transfer, is directly related to a fundamental 
hypothesis in CTS' architecture: information has a value. lt corresponds to Baars 
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affirmation that sorne things are more important than others, and that high-priority 
stimuli , like the sound of one's own name, are even detected unconsciously (Baars, 
1997, p.158). Perception is the first place (the first step in the cognitive cycle) where 
information value is implemented. This will later allow CTS to put its attention on 
what is most important, on which information has more value in the current context, 
and put its costly conscious resources at work on what deserves it most. This, as we 
will see again later, is part of the prioritizing function of consciousness (the phe-
nomenon called monitoring consciousness). Although there is still much work to be 
done in this area, we have made sorne preliminary hypothesis about the relative 
importance of information ( see Appendix C) and elaborated a short set of heuristics. 
The heuristics that apply to stimuli valuation are: 
1. The information type dictates a first part of the information value. For in-
stance, an environmental consequence (collisions risk or effective collision) 
has more importance than a joint rotation. Canadarm2 coming into close 
proximity of the Station can be generalized as a "proximity" situation. If 
situations of the type "proximity" happen often, the tutor may feel the need 
to intervene to correct this problem. So, the type of the situation is sufficient 
to draw the tutor's attention and has a value on its own. 
2. A piece of information that changed (a variable that changed its value) is 
more important than one that remains unchanged. For instance, there is 
usually less danger with something standing still than with a moving abject. 
This principle is related to sensory habituation. This rule holds true unless it 
refers to a situation of repetition (insistence) watched for by an attention 
codelet. 
3. An improving situation is of less immediate consequence than a deteriorat-
ing one. For instance, a coalition of information indicating a joint getting 
closer to a Space Station module is of greater immediate importance than 
one indicating a joint moving away from the Station. 
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Codelets that have sorne activation (just received, or remaining from previous 
stimulations; see an example in Figure 8) form the perception (sub-)network that 
joins the Scene (in the theater metaphor), that is, appears in Working Memory. 
At this point, the Coalition Manager will identify the various possible coalitions 
from the percept and compute each one's value, allowing Attention to find the most 
activated coalition (the most important one in WM). 1 will give more detail about coali-
tions and the valuation process in the next section ( 4.1.5). 
4.1.5 Working Memory (WM) and the creation of coalitions 
ln the GW theory, "consciousness is associated with a global workspace in the 
brain - a fleeting memory capacity whose focal contents are widely distributed 
('broadcast') to many unconscious specialized networks" (Baars and Franklin, 2003). 
That "fleeting memory capacity" is more commonly seen as a working memory that 
is central to many processes. As recalled by Franklin (Franklin , 2006) from Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974), working memory is not a biological structure on its own, but a cog-
nitive psychology term referring to a theoretical framework specifying and describing 
multiple structures and processes used for temporarily storing and manipulating in-
formation. However, in accordance with one of GW theory's assumptions asserting 
that a global workspace can also serve to integrate many competing and cooperat-
ing input networks (Baars and Franklin, 2003), it is interpreted in our architecture as 
a single, unconstrained "place" where ali codelets meet when needing to be "pub-
lished". lt corresponds to the stage in the theater metaphor of Baars' theory. lt is 
where associations are created and where these associations get stronger between 
codelets that spend time together. Working Memory is where coalitions are sent by 
ali modules, where they combine, get enriched or opposed. This is where ali atten-
tion codelets (the group in that specifie name) look for information. The Attention 
mechanism, corresponding to the theater's spotlight, constantly monitors it, selecting 
at every cognitive cycle the next winner to come to consciousness. One could cali it 
the Central Working Memory, as there also seems to exist in the brain many local 
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working memories for the use of each specialized neuronal group (Baars, 1997, 
p.41 ). 
There are two differences of our WM with IDA's. First, IDA's Working Memory 
is analogous to the preconscious buffers of human working memory (D'Mello et al. , 
2006) and limited to them. Second, IDA 's WM is constrained by the fixed structure of 
the preconscious buffers that implement it (Franklin, 2003b, p.5) - LIDA has seen 
this constraint relieved with its workspace that keeps the sti/1 constrained precon-
scious buffers but otherwise now allows the building of unconstrained structures over 
multiple cycles. ln comparison , CTS uses as WM a structure that is not constrained 
by fixed registers or depth limitations, that is highly dynamic and that is separate 
from preconscious buffers (read sub-section 4.1.11 for sorne more explanations). 
"Highly dynamic" is used here in the sense that it allows the formation of links be-
tween codelets and coalitions that temporarily inhabit it, whereas IDA's preconscious 
buffers simply serve as receptacles for information. 
When our team will put a declarative memory in place, 1 plan to add encoding 
codelets that will create the bi-directional communication between the preconscious 
buffers feeding the long-term declarative memories (called the Focus by Kanerva) 
and Working Memory. The Focus' eue vector will be built with information either 
found in WM by encoding codelets or placed there directly from the Perception Net-
work. 
Perception is not the only place where information valuation takes place. 
Things that slip into consciousness are not ali issued by the perceptual process; they 
are as much a matter of internally-generated material: concepts recalled from meme-
ries, remembered episodes, preferences, emotional state, personality, and lessons 
learned (experience, currently exclusively stored in CTS links' strength). They may 
also result from reflection , where CTS analyses, links ideas together, compares al-
ternatives and makes decisions. Even conceptual (vs. concrete) ideas have value to 
humans, and thus are able to compete with coalitions coming from Perception . 
CTS is endowed with explicit deliberation capability thanks to its conscious-
ness mechanism. As a result , just as codelets create coalitions, coalitions may form 
69 
bigger coalitions of coalitions, which 1 cali complex coalitions. A complex coalition 
progressively forms during deliberations, adding new chunks of information (codelets 
or coalition of them) in subsequent steps until the deliberation is considered com-
plete by the Arbiter codelet. Figure 9 shows an example of complex coalition com-
prising three coalitions. 
Manipulation steps 
Learner preference 
Hints 
Figure 9 Example of a complex coalition as it has grown to during an ongoing 
deliberation . Nades with a bold contour are central nades of a coalition that appeared in 
WM as a direct response to a conscious publication, at some part of the deliberation. 
The complex refers to a problematic situation noticed by the Domain Expert 
module: a procedural step that has been omitted by the astronaut. Before impelling 
any new motion to Canadarm2, he was supposed to create the appropriate views on 
the three monitors of the workstation (see Figure 21 ), selecting the right camera on 
each and adjusting the orientation and zoom. The combination of the three views 
has to be the most informative possible. If the astronaut starts moving Canadarm2 
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has to be the most informative possible . If the astronaut starts moving Canadarm2 
before adjusting the views, this is a procedural mistake, and the Domain Expert will 
spot it. ln subsequent cognitive cycles, relevant resources (most likely modules, here) 
will then supply probable causes for this problem. 
The main principles guiding the valuation process in WM, in addition to those 
mentioned about Perception, are the following : 
1. ln addition to the information type, specifie aspects and specifie values 
may also bear some importance. For instance, a weak understanding 
of a concept may be more important to take into account than an aver-
age understanding, which has less probability of incurring grave conse-
quences. If the aspect is a belief of CTS, than it is also subject to a 
confidence level, which modulates the importance of the information. 
Another example of the value of specifies can be given with the cause 
of a problematic situation. Some causes of a problem are more serious 
than others and should be prioritized . 
2. If an information coalition gets richer through deliberation, CTS should 
usual/y bear more consideration to it than to an idea just arrived in WM 
(although the specifie evaluation depends on the intrinsic value of the 
information just arrived). The more the global resulting coalition com-
prises central nodes, indicative of more deliberation steps, the more the 
coalition has value. 
Of course, it would be ideal if the intrinsic value of the information evolved fol-
lowing CTS experiences and observations. lt will be part of future works. 
The valuation process differs from IDA 's, where the coalition takes on the av-
erage value of aff the codelets that form it. 
Here is the algorithm deriving from these principles that computes the coali-
tions values. 
1. If a coalition has two or more levels, consider only the first two for the 
valuation process. 
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2. Compute the average value of information codelets in the second level. 
3. Add this average value to the value of the central (main) node (that in-
dicates the type of the info) 
For complex coalitions: 
4. Add the values of the central nades to that of the "first" central node. 
Complex coalition central node: \ 
(0 ,55+0,50)=1 ,05 
+2nd central node: 0,53 
+3rd central node: 0,55 
Tota 1 for complex coalition= 2,13 
ProDiematlc 
situation 1 0,55 
~0,55 
(0,40+0,20)*60%)/2 030+(0 10+ \ / ~o.  
= 0,53 Missing step 
CAUSE 1 0,30 Views setup 
'----
~~ 
Cause - Defective knowt. 0,20 Conf. 
Defective knowl. 0,10 
Poor knowledge of 0,40 60% 
manipulation steps 
'-
Leamer preference 0.20 
Hints 
lntervene r 0,40+(0,20+0, 1 0)/ Approved = 0,55 2 
.,:,~ [ Hint given -First 0,10 
Figure 10 Example of a complex coalition grown by a deliberation process. Boxes 
with a bold contour indicate central nades that represent their coalition in terms of activa-
tion level. The first central node, the one that caused others to come ta consciousness 
from various sources takes on the supplemental role of "central" central node, that is , the 
central node for the complex coalition, the one that is considered in the competition for 
consciousness . 
What is implicit in this algorithm is that adding or suppressing a link (a codelet) 
ultimately changes the global value of the whole complex through the variation of the 
value of the central node to which it connects (or was connected). More than one 
coalition may be formed from the same percept, each having its own value that de-
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pends on the arrangement of the codelets. Figure 1 0 shows how the complex coali-
tion's value is computed from the value of each of its member coalitions. The first 
step of the algorithm is a consequence of this practical consideration. We must limit 
coalitions evaluation to the first two levels of a coalition: its central node and the 
nades directly connected to it. This is of particular importance for information coming 
from Perception, as our Perception Network is a cyclical graph (it contains loops) 
and at some point, it becomes impossible to isolate the various possible coalitions in 
the same network to compute the value of each. lndeed, in this cyclical graph, coali-
tions are interdependent. By limiting the number of levels considered, we render the 
computation possible while preserving the richness of the information: the coal ition 
that is published contains ali of the attached information, not just the first two levels. 
Another mechanism affects coalitions' values: activation decays. Just as is 
happening in the PN nades, in preconscious buffers, in L TM , in BN nades and links, 
the activation of an entity decays with the passage of time (D'Mello et al., 2006; 
Franklin, 2005b). As mentioned in the section on Energy and activation value (4.1.3), 
we have adopted the same inverse log curve as D'Mello for this phenomenon. 
A coalition formed in a previous cycle may compete in the next coming cycles, 
but not forever, as it will eventually decay away. 
4.1.6 Access Consciousness 
At the center (graphically and conceptually) of the architecture, we find the ac-
cess "consciousness" which "publishes" the information selected by the Attention 
mechanism to make it available to ali (unconscious) modules (by a "broadcast"). lt 
implements the still debated mechanism that effectively binds various regions of the 
brain together and propagates their information content, allowing ali other systems to 
become aware of the situation. This mechanism is crucial for the collaboration of the 
parts, for instance in reaching a diagnosis. 
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Selecting information that will be broadcast establishes an important difference 
with the Blackboard madel. A blackboard broadcasts ali the information it contains to 
every resource , whereas the LIDA/CTS architecture selects which information is the 
most important one in the context, and only that one is broadcast. This helps steer 
the global behavior of the agent, and it avoids that many modules work on informa-
tion of lesser importance, or globally insignificant. 
The apparatus for producing "consciousness" consists of a Coalition Manager, 
a Spotlight Controller, and a Broadcast Manager. LIDA adds the attention codelets 
as part of the necessary elements for information to come to consciousness (Rama-
murthy et al., 2006). ln CTS, attention codelets are not required for a coalition to be 
chosen and reach consciousness. Their purpose is to watch for the appearance of 
sorne situation , sometimes to insure fast reaction in situations akin to an alert, or to 
offer the means for attentional bias (adding activation to sorne coalition). 
The Coalition Manager is responsible for forming and tracking coalitions of 
codelets . Such coalitions are initiated on the basis of the mutual associations be-
tween the member codelets ; in CTS, these associations come either from their 
neighboring in a percept, or from spontaneous association in WM (see sub-section 
4.3.5.1 on this last subject). During any given cognitive cycle , one of these coalitions 
finds its way to "consciousness," chosen by the Spotlight Controller (the "Attention") , 
which picks the coalition with the highest global (average, in LIDA) activation among 
its member codelets (see section 4.1.5 above about the computation of coalitions 
activation). Global Workspace theory calls for the contents of "consciousness" to be 
broadcast to every codelet in the system. The Broadcast Manager accomplishes this . 
4.1.7 The Behavior Network (BN) 
This structure is at the same time a planning mechanism, a decision structure, 
and a long-term procedural memory. The planning and the decisions it makes are 
taken "unconsciously" but rely on consciousness' broadcasts to keep abreast of the 
evolution of situations. This is what is called "consciously mediated action selection". 
6 
launched 
1 
Launch task 
Task choosen 
1 
Choose 
manipulation task 
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The actions it provokes eventually 
become conscious, either when they 
justify a publication , either indirectly in 
their perceived effects (information 
received from the outside) or by a 
message from metacognition codelets 
about them. lts learning is both 
unconscious and conscious ( conscious 
learning already exists in LIDA , but is 
part of future works on CTS). 
Based on an idea from Maes (1989) 
and modified by Negatu and Franklin 
(2002), the Behavior Network holds the 
repertoire of the agent's know-how in the 
form of streams of Behavior nodes. 
LIDA has separated the procedural 
memory from the decision mechanism, 
adding the Scheme Net to hold the 
dormant templates of schemes. Streams 
are organized under motivators and sub-
goal nodes (see Figure 11). Examples of 
motivators (or, in terms of CTS structures, 
Feelings and Desires) are Need to 
launch a manipulation task, Need 
Figure 11 Example of a simple structure in the 
BN . Filled red circles are "Feelings" or "Desires", 
octagons are sub-goals, triangles indicate States, 
and rounded rectangles contain Behaviors. A more 
complex stream could include branching and multi-
ple preconditions and effects . 
to intervene, Need to reme-
diate , and Need to give 
affective support. The network 
architecture offers a way to 
decide on which Behavior 
should activate according to 
"Feelings"' and "Desires'" activation (see next point), to States (shown as triangles in 
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the BN Editor), to links between nades, and to various thresholds. ln its logical as-
pect, the BN does "HTN decomposition and planning" (HTN stands for "Hierarchical 
Task Network"), as described by Russell and Norvig 2003). Each Behavior node 
has necessary preconditions and indicates effects it should have on the environment, 
creating a natural link with those nodes that have these effects as preconditions. 
Preconditions and effects exist as State nodes connecting Behavior nodes together 
through links. For every top-down link, there is a reciprocal bottom-up one. There 
also are inhibitory links that project from a Behavior toward other Behaviors that 
would undo its preconditions . When a node receives some stimulation (in the form of 
energy), it pushes some of it towards inhibiting these contradictory Behaviors. More 
generally speaking, at every cycle, some energy is replicated by ali active energy 
sources to their neighbors. A Behavior node accumulates the energy that comes 
"atop" from the agent's "Feelings" and "Desires" (feelings, or drives, in IDA), from 
States and other nades until it is elected for action . The direction of the energy flow 
is forward (from the Behavior node towards a Goal node) only wh en that node tires, 
in which case it pushes its energy to its temporal successor(s). Otherwise, the flow 
follows the downward (top-down) links, splitting at branches, eventually reaching a 
"starting" node, a node at the temporal beginning of a sequence. One main idea that 
this arrangement supports is that shorter solutions are better; indeed, shorter plans 
should usually be tried first because there is a lower probability of making a mistake 
(with less steps and less understanding required) and because a good approxima-
tion is often sufficient. This heuristic is particularly true in survival situations. Auto-
mated responses ("reflexes") are of the same nature, on this account, and will 
normally be used even before any non-reflex plan, unless they are consciously 
blocked . They come to exist in the BN when experience reinforces links and Behav-
iors in a stream so much that they transform the stream's (or the sub-stream's) reac-
tion, making it react much sooner and unfold faster. We will come back later to these 
subjects, in the section presenting the implicit learning mechanisms in CTS (section 
4.3.5.3). 
Franklin and his team modified Maes madel so that each Behavior is realized 
by a collection of codelets (Behaviors nodes do not act by themselves; they only 
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serve in the planning of the next behavior). Behavior codelets in IDA are a/ways ac-
tive, listening to broadcasts; when they find themselves relevant, they have their 
stream template get instantiated to become part of the Behavior Net (the actually 
instantiated streams), and they send activation to their respective node. ln CTS as in 
IDA, when a Behavior node gets elected , its codelets are released with the energy 
level of their node and start doing what they are meant to do, sorne putting informa-
tion in WM , sorne requesting information, sorne starting to watch what will happen in 
the next few cycles to confirm that the expected effect(s) happens, etc. 
States in CTS have multiple roles . As preconditions, they control the Behavior 
nades selection , since ali preconditions must be present before the Behavior may 
fire . They are meant to represent neuronal groups that have been stimulated by pre-
vious interactions (by previous information received) , and that keep that information 
alive for a certain time (their activation decays with time). ln that respect, they play 
much of the same roles as IDA's behavior codelets in their listening mode. They rec-
ognize words in broadcasts, store them in variables, transfer their content to the 
codelets of the Behaviors they are connected to, along with environmental activation . 
Differences lie in that our States do not connect to a procedural memory; they do not 
request for the instantiation of the relevant stream: there is no instantiation of the 
"active BN" in CTS. Whereas IDA separates the (active) Behavior Network from the 
scheme memory, CTS keeps its whole BN "on-fine" on the idea that in our brain, 
neurons are ali active at the same time (Baars, 1997, p.55), even if they do not par-
ticipate in the current intervention. This idea is particularly of relevance in the plan-
ning phase. Franklin's idea of instantiation stands its grounds on the basis that ali 
our action plans are not active ali the time, only those that are of relevance in the 
precise context and get recruited . 
At each cognitive cycle , a Behavior is selected for action. If, however, none 
has reached the necessary energy threshold, the value of the threshold is lowered 
by the BN Manager for the next cycle . The higher the threshold value is set, the 
longer the BN will be planning before a node can fire, exploring longer paths (plans) 
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and allowing for more interactions between nades to influence each other. This 
makes for a more "prudent" and "analytical" agent. 
4.1.8 "Feelings" and "Desires" 
Feelings and Desires in CTS' Behavior Network are special high-level Goal 
nades playing the role of behavior motivators. Much can be said about motivators, 
feelings, drives and the likes, and the concepts are still quite debated. «Motivation, 
drive, goal and emotion are used to refer to and mean a number of different things. 
There is no universal definition of these terms across (or even within) the fields of 
philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence» (Davis, 2002). 
ln an undocumented writing (on the website of University of Geneva), Gagné cites 
Good and Brophy ( 1990) for the ir understanding of motivation and attitude: «Motiva-
tion is whatever initiates, sustains or causes a direction or intensity toward a particu-
lar behavior. ln contrast, an attitude, as discussed above, is a predisposition to 
choose one behavior over another» . ln a perfect illustration of the fact that there ex-
ists various comprehensions of these concepts, Davis proposes to define motiva-
tions rather as dispositions to assess situations in certain ways. ln his view, they can 
include goals and desires as weil as attitudes. Goals would be quantitative or quali-
tative, the latter mostly being used in agents as involving relations, predicates, states 
and behaviors. Attitudes are predispositions to respond or act. ldeas from Good and 
Brophy, and from Davis are found in CTS' motivators as specifie sensitivity of Feel-
ings and Desires to events, and preeminence of some over others. 
Franklin and Ramamurthy (2006) also have reviewed the subjects of motiva-
tions, values and emotions. Feelings in human include hunger, thirst, pain, being hot 
or cold, the urge to urinate, tiredness, depression, etc. "One feels feelings in the 
body." Feelings refer to the basic needs of a persan; they result from his fundamen-
tal biological processes. Referring to Johnston (1999), the authors separate emo-
tions from feelings . Fear, anger, joy, sadness, shame, embarrassment, resentment, 
guilt, etc. are higher-level feelings, that is, with cognitive content. One "feels good" 
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after meeting one's objectives; a tutor might feel shame if it cannat bring a student to 
complete an exercise. But one is simply hungry, tired , or cold (intransitive words). 
Emotions are relational ; they come from an interaction with the environment. So, 
according to Franklin and McCauley, feelings are the motivators that refer to homeo-
static drives (the motivators that refer exclusively to the subject and help regulate his 
internai, basic, physiological needs), and emotions, motivators that result from exter-
nal events. «Feelings, including emotions, are nature's means of implementing moti-
vations for actions in humans and other animais. They have evolved so as to adapt 
us to regularities in our environments». They are the two mechanisms that impie-
ment general preferences, often called "values". IDA implements drives as feelings 
nades in a way similar to CTS, at the "top" of its BN; but LIDA has removed feelings 
as "top-leve/" sources of activation in its Behavior Net (now ca/led Scheme net) and 
changed the way "feelings" and "emotions" intervene - they bring their direct influ-
ence elsewhere in the architecture and sti/1 modulate action selection. Feelings and 
emotions act at the perceptual levet as semantic nades of the Slipnet to help deter-
mine the content of the percept. Feelings and emotions are also found in episodic 
memories, as part of episodes content; when recalled into workspace, they influence 
information structures by bringing activation into them and help determine the selec-
tion of conscious content. When broadcast, these coalitions transfer not on/y infor-
mation, but also the activation content borne by the emotional codelets, to 
instantiating schemes. 
ln CTS, 1 adopt Franklin's conceptual views about feelings and emotions, to 
which 1 add a clear role for the idea of attitude (predisposition to react in a certain 
way). CTS' Feelings sense broadcasts by the way of their ward-specifie sensors (1 
was tempted to write their "dendrites"), and the sensitivity of each sensor can be 
adjusted (by the network designer). As a result, each Feeling can react more or less 
to the various aspects of an event, depending on the personality profile selected for 
the agent. However, since 1 have not yet designed emotional mechanism, bath feel-
ings and emotions are incorporated in CTS as the generic mechanism of Feelings; 
thus, CTS' "Feelings" play a role only in the Behavior Network. This being said, 1 add 
another notion in the BN, Desires, as high-level motivators of a psychological nature 
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but that play the same role on action selection. Desires will never have an impact 
over learning. So, in CTS, Feelings (including Franklin's notion of "emotion") and 
Desires behave the same way; the distinction is currently only for the benefit of the 
agent's designer (although, in time, the separation may allow separate processing 
methods). "Feelings" are meant primarily to react to the external environment but 
might include preoccupations for internai needs the agent might have (for instance, 
the need to terminate a session so that it can organize its data, or the need to make 
deep analyses, as indicated by serious users problems to which the agent presently 
finds no cause). "Desires" cover mostly the agent professional goals (as a teacher). 
Upon announcement of situations (consciousness broadcasts), a Feeling (or 
Desire) node eleva tes its activation level according to the importance of that informa-
tion (or a portion of it), according to the sensitivity it has for it, and according to how 
many of its sensors have been stimulated . The Feeling starts feeding energy to BN 
Goal nodes attached to it, or increases its previous output. But its activation de-
creases progressively, following the inverse logarithmic curve. 
A last word about CTS' Feelings and Desires: they have a correspondence to 
high-level , global desires in BDI parlance. ln effect, they accomplish high-level plan-
ning. The backward flow of energy from the Feelings and Desires nodes is a form of 
implicit planning influenced by the goals. 
4.1.9 The Learner Model 
The learner model is composed of three separate mechanisms that run in par-
alle!. The Learner Profile Model (LPM) contains stable psychological indications 
about the learner, including learner's learning style and preferences; the Learner 
Affective Status Model (LASM) tracks learner's mood and affective state. The 
Learner Knowledge Model (LKM) holds facts , infers knowledge and trends, and 
computes statistics. Ali three (sub-)modules receive the consciousness publications 
to stay informed about the learner. They send information to WM when they receive 
a request or whenever they deem appropriate. The LPM has a light inference engine 
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and reacts when it recognizes a situation needing a first-level (superficial) diagnosis, 
that is, a probable immediate cause for the problematic situation. The LKM will also 
do this from its standpoint, but it will also volunteer information when its inferences 
show a significant problem with learner's knowledge, or when a trend about learner's 
performances should be signaled , eventually priming some "Feeling" in the agent. At 
the time of this writing , ali three modules of the Learner Mode! (LPM, LASM and 
LKM) are temporarily faked with attention codelets and will very likely be replaced 
with Bayesian networks. 
4.1.1 0 The Domain Expert (DE) 
The Domain Expertisa good example of an external module (or an agent) gel-
ting integrated into our conscious agent framework. 
ln a single three-layered entity, Fournier-Viger's dynamic mode! contains the 
capacities to reason about a specifie domain, a semantic memory that is used as 
CTS' own semantic memory (see Fournier-Viger et a/., 2006, for a complete descrip-
tion), and a procedural memory about the domain. Together, the semantic and pro-
cedural structures encode CTS' expertise about the domain of application . For 
example, the semantic part of the memory indicates what camera can see what 
structures of the International Space Station (ISS); the procedural part describes the 
required steps before moving Canadarm2. CTS could use those procedures to ac-
complish operations in the simulator and demonstrate how to proceed. 
The Domain Expert's first (bottom) layer contains descriptive knowledge, that is, 
the physical description of the (simulated) world (the elements and the relations be-
tween them) and the concepts that refer to that world, organized in an ontology. This 
allows logical reasoning . Applied to our case, it describes the ISS' structures (the 
modules, their role(s) , their physical characteristics and their relations, such as «is 
above» , «is below», «is to the left of» , etc.), the elements of Canadarm2. lt also con-
tains abstract concepts such as distance, coordinate systems and collision risk. The 
formalism used is description logics (Baader, 2003). 
81 
The second layer describes the relevant correct and erroneous knowledge that 
students may manipulate while utilizing the learning environment. Knowledge is en-
coded from a cognitive perspective as semantic and procedural memory with struc-
tures having their roots in ACT-R (Anderson , 1993, 2004) and Miace (Mayers et al. , 
2001) theories. Layer 2 links the semantic memory description to the layer 1 antal-
ogy. Whereas, layer 1 describes concepts as part of an ontology, layer 2 describes 
concepts using attributes that describes their cognitive use (for instance the inten-
tions that a student can have with a concept). Procedural knowledge describes the 
means to manipulate semantic knowledge to realize intentions. The second layer 
also adds domain specifie didactic knowledge. 
The third layer defines learning objectives and organizes the two other layers 
under these, packaging them into reusable learning units. 
The Domain Expert provides information in three situations: a) if it "hears" (or 
"sees" ... ) a request for information it can supply; b) if it recognizes a situation th at 
needs a first-level diagnosis; c) if it believes the user errs about a procedure (missing 
step, reversed steps, wrong procedure). lt is informed of what the user is doing by 
the consciousness' publications, and tries to recognize the plan and steps followed 
by the user (doing mode/ tracing against the procedures stored in its domain madel). 
Then, as is the case with the Learner Madel, when it believes it identified important 
information to communicate, it sends a coalition of codelets to WM describing the 
fa ct. 
ln the present instance of our prototype, we have incorporated in the Domain 
Expert four "levels" of hinting : 1) a general clue, 2) a more specifie clue, 3) the tact 
observed, and 4) the suggested course of action. They are made available when an 
intervention is needed to correct a problematic situation. The hints may be given in 
this arder, or can be supplied by the Domain Expert specifically, upon explicit re-
quests from a tutoring Behavior. There could be more complex algorithms involved 
here, with more material available (for instance, many hints of the same intervention 
level per situation, each adopting a different point of view), more involved BN 
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streams, a variety of tones and styles, and so on, but we kept it simple in our proto-
type, with a simple sequence of levels bearing only one hint per level. 
4.1.11 Long-term memories 
There is a variety of long-term memories in CTS' conceptual architecture, cor-
responding to what is generally believed about human memories (Baars and Frank-
lin , 2003; see Figure 12): the Transient Episodic Memory, the Autobiographical 
Memory, and the Semantic Memory. «The Transient Episodic Memory (TEM) cor-
responds to humans' content-addressable, associative, transient episodic memory 
with a decay rate measured in hours.» (Conway 2001 , cited by Baars and Franklin, 
2003). IDA implements the hypothesis that a conscious event is stored in transient 
episodic memory by a broadcast from the global workspace. A corollary to this hy-
pothesis says that conscious contents can only be encoded (consolidated) in long-
term declarative memory via transient episodic memory (Franklin et al. , 2005). The 
Human Memory 
Systems 
Figure 12 The human memory. Source: (Franklin et al. , 2005) 
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Autobiographical Memory (AM) integrates events that have not decayed away in 
TEM when the consolidation takes place. This transfer process remains to be speci-
fied in our architecture. AM is currently only part of CTS' conceptual architecture. 
The Semantic Memory (SM) is held in the Domain Expert. 
Just like ether modules in the architecture, memory mechanisms receive the 
broadcasts from Access Consciousness. This is what they store (integrate with their 
anterior knowledge, in other words, what they learn). Learning only from the broad-
casts is congruent with the hypothesis that we learn explicit concepts only from what 
cames into consciousness (Baars, 1997, p.60). lt allows storing only structured 
knowledge, not bits and pieces of unorganized data, as is the case with the eues that 
trigger a read operation . The Consciousness content, structured and meaningful, 
differs from what is put in the unconscious buffers by the encoding codelets. The 
content of Working Memory is constantly looked up by a great number of encoding 
codelets that haver it and do exactly the same kind of job perceptual codelets do. 
When they find information of the type they are concerned with, they put it into their 
corresponding slots in the eue veetors that will be submitted to the various long-term 
declarative memories. The eues assembled in the input vectors by these codelets 
may show a pretty nice jumble. If it makes no sense, the "read operation" will not 
converge, and declarative memories will not be able to return anything from this eue. 
Aside from completed words (what was submitted may have been partial words), 
these explicit memories return associated information. The vectors are intermediary 
constructs between WM and long-term declarative memories ("declarative", as op-
posed to "implicit"). 
1 need to make a digression here to present the general idea of a special algo-
rithm we are currently reimplementing at our lab for our TEM: Kanerva's ( 1988, 1993) 
Sparse Distributed Memory. Franklin and his team have been experimenting with 
this algorithm ever since 1995 (Franklin , 1995) to implement a transient episodic 
memory and an autobiographical memory. They improved the original specifications 
to obtain better results when retrieving the information associated with less complete 
eues (Ramamurthy, D'Mello and Franklin, 2004; D'Mello, Ramamurthy, and Franklin, 
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2006). CTS job of tutoring involves a rich enough domain , making difficult to fit the 
elements of information in the constrained vectors as described both in Kanerva's 
theory and in IOA's implementation. We are exploring avenues of solution : pre-
classification of the information; recoding it into shorter character strings; holographie 
distribution of the information over the whole vector (Kanerva , 1997). That challenge 
is actually under consideration by a colleague in his Master research. The SOM al-
gorithm will be part of the next iteration of our prototype and cannat be covered here. 
So, 1 barrow a concise description of the SOM by Baars, Ramamurthy and Franklin 
(2006), that conveys the basic ideas that our SOM will use: 
SOM is a content addressable memory that, in many ways, is an ideal 
computational mechanism for use as a long-term associative memory (Kan-
erva, 1988). Content addressable means that items in memory can be re-
trieved by using part of their contents as a eue, rather than having to know the 
item's address in memory. 
The inner workings of SOM rely on large binary spaces, that is, spaces of 
vectors containing only zeros and ones, called bits. These binary vectors, 
called words, serve as both the addresses and the contents of the memory. 
The dimension of the space determines the richness of each word . These 
spaces are typically far too large to implement in any conceivable computer. 
Approximating the space uniformly with some manageable number of actually 
implemented, hard locations surmounts this difficulty. The number of such hard 
locations determines the carrying capacity of the memory. Features are repre-
sented as one or more bits. Groups of features are concatenated to form a 
word . When writing a word to memory, a copy of the word is placed in ali close 
enough hard locations. When read ing a word, a close enough eue would reach 
ali close enough hard locations and get some sort of aggregate or average out 
of them. As mentioned above, reading is not always successful. Oepending on 
the eue and the previously written information, among other factors , conver-
gence or divergence during a reading operation may occur. If convergence oc-
curs, the pooled word will be the closest match (with abstraction) of the input 
reading eue. On the other hand, when divergence occurs, there is no relation, 
in general, between the input eue and what is retrieved from memory. 
SOM is much like human long-term declarative memory. A human often 
knows what he or she does or does not know. If asked for a telephone number 
you have once known , you may search for it. When asked for one you have 
never known , an immediate "1 don't know" response ensues. SOM makes such 
decisions based on the speed of initial convergence. The reading of memory in 
SOM is an iterative process. The eue is used as an address. The content at 
that address is read as a second eue, and so on, until convergence, that is, un-
til subsequent contents look alike. If it does not quickly converge, an "1 don't 
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know" is the response. The "on the tip of my tangue phenomenon" corre-
sponds to the eue having content just at the threshold of convergence. Yet an-
ether similarity is the power of rehearsal , during which an item would be written 
many times and, at each of these, to a thousand locations-that is the distrib-
uted part of sparse distributed memory. A well-rehearsed item can be retrieved 
with smaller eues. Another similarity is interference, which would tend to in-
crease over time as a result of other similar writes to memory. 
As a final word about memories, 1 would like to point out that there exists more 
memory structures in CTS than just TEM and AM. The Behavior Network is a proce-
dural memory; the Perceptual Network, the Domain Madel, and the event log also 
are memories. Learning mechanisms just as weil create implicit memories in the 
form of links strength in the PN and in the BN, and in learned associations between 
codelets in WM. 1 will describe these implicit learning mechanisms in the subsection 
4.3.5 below. 
4.2 THE COGNITIVE CYCLE 
Our agent's internai operations follow a continuous stream of interactions quite 
close to IDA's cognitive cycle (Baars and Franklin, 2003). This cycle offers an hy-
pothesis by Baars and Franklin about human cognition, and is much more detailed 
than any provided in other agents. With convergence, divergence, competition and 
collaboration taking place in Working Memory, one may come to think of IDA's cogni-
tive cycle as similar to Edelman's reentrant signaling 16 . lt is generally considered to 
be starting with a perception and ending with an action taken . 
16 Reentry is a dynamical and ongoing process that makes neuronal groups, and maps 
between them, exchange stimuli (excitatory and inhibitory) until a stable pattern emerges and 
is strong enough to come to consciousness . IDA's cognitive cycle includes a broadcasting 
step that brings unconscious resources to respond to other's stimuli. However, for broadcast-
ing to happen, a pattern already has to be stable in Working Memory. Thus "signaling" takes 
place only at a higher level of organization, after stabilization, between recognized patterns. 
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lt may not lead to an external action but to an action having internai repercus-
sions. This cycle organizes CTS internai interactions and preserves consciousness 
seriality by putting conscious broadcasts as an explicit step in cognition . Human 
consciousness is formed from a continuous flow, an uninterrupted succession of 
episodes (Crick and Koch, 2003) to which we give meaning and then broadcast 
throughout our brain. Accordingly, we are constantly sensing; perceiving new stimuli 
does not wait that the previous perceptions be completely processed . Thus many 
cycles overlap in a cascade fashion , as the steps of a cycle solicit different cognitive 
abilities of our brain. ln fact, according to Baars and Franklin (2003), «We conjecture 
that a full cognitive cycle might take a minimum of 200 ms. But because of overlap-
ping and automaticity, which shortens the cycle (see below), as many as twenty cy-
cles could be running per second.» (p.3). 
IDA chops the cognitive cycle in nine steps distributed in the the three parts 
perceive, interpret, act. However, because CTS' functioning differs from IDA's in the 
instantiation part, CTS' cycle ho/ds on/y eight operations. 1 describe hereunder these 
steps, drawing much of the description from Baars et al. (in press) and Franklin 
(2005), again painting out differences under italie text. Step number corresponds to 
numbers inside triangles in Figure 13. 
1) Perception. External sensory stimuli are received and interpreted by Per-
ception , creating meaning. Note that this stage, as others before step 5, is 
unconscious. ln addition to external stimuli, IDA a/so re-interprets interna/ 
stimuli through ifs perceptua/ apparatus. 
Edelman's allows for such signaling between high-level structures, but also explains the for-
mation of low-level patterns, before they eventually reach working memory and can be 
"broadcast" (in Baars terms). 
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Figure 13 CTS' cognitive cycle. Although inherited from IDA, CTS' cognitive cycle 
presents originalities due to implementation differences (new modules, different 
implementations, different hypotheses). For instance, there is no instanciation in the 
Resource recruiting (61h) step. 
a. Early perception : Input arrives through senses; for CTS, senses ex-
istas communication channels with external entities (currently, CTS 
offers only one channel dedicated to communications with the ISS 
simulator and its user interface). The actual single channel funnels 
textual inputs to the Sensory Buffer, whereas IDA direct/y looks-up 
the content of the e-mails it receives. Features detectors (that are 
part of the syntactic analyzer) find relevant words in the string and 
collectively create a syntactic tree. 
b. Active Perception Network creation/update: Perception codelets 
descend on the syntactic tree. Those that find features relevant to 
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their specialty activate appropriate nades (information codelets) in 
CTS' Perceptual Network. At this point, IDA sees energy flows cir-
culate within its Perceptua/ Memory (S/ipnet) . The activated nades 
form the percept that will be transferred to WM. 
2) Percept and other sources transfer to WM. The percept is brought into 
WM as a network of information codelets that covers the many aspects of 
the situation, including some anterior sensing . IDA sends the percept (the 
meaning plus seme relevant data) direct/y into preconscious buffers. As 
saon as our implementation renders TEM available, we will also send the 
percept to Preconscious Buffers, but as a copy to what is deposited in WM 
(the justification for this is given in the next step). Other modules in CTS 
send their contribution at any time after processing a previous broadcast. 
The information they send may mingle with the percept, or be spotted by 
Attention or expectation codelets at any time, preparing coalitions for the 
coming competition for consciousness (step 4), when the cycle allows them 
to act. 
3) Local Associations. As AM and TEM for CTS are still under development, 
1 will supply here the process to the best it is currently known. Encoding 
codelets react to a new percept coming into WM. They look for aspects that 
fit their realm , do whatever encoding they are programmed to do, and put 
the result in the preconscious buffer they are related to. Some do this proc-
essing for the TEM, ethers do it for the AM. LIDA does not have to caver 
the previous step as its percepts are deposited direct/y into the precon-
scious buffers. Depositing the new percept in WM at the same time as it is 
copied to the preconscious buffers allows for a faster reaction time as this 
new percept may be noticed by attention codelets watching for urgent in-
formation , and by expectation codelets that expect the unexpected; bath 
teams will not wait for memories to respond , and will already create coali-
tions for the next conscious publication. 
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This new information replaces some of the residual contents of the precon-
scious buffers, leaving untouched the other fields. The resulting vectors are 
used as eues by the two long-term memories, which return local associa-
tions into the ir output Preconscious Buffers. Ericsson and Kin tseh ( 1995) 
put forward the hypothesis that experts' superior memory when dealing 
with their field of expertise cames from their ability to refer rapidly and re-
liably to long-term memory for domain-specifie information. Some attention 
codelets might exist in CTS that compare what was supplied and what was 
returned to decide which is most likely to be the proper information. 
4) Competition for consciousness. Codelets that are familiar together 
(forming innate or learned concepts), or those that are about the same 
event, create coalitions in WM (4a). Attention codelets, whose job it is to 
bring special , urgent, or insistent events to "consciousness", may also see 
information codelets of interest in WM and gather the appropriate codelets 
in a coalition they create, or they may join a coalition to increase its likeli-
ness of being elected "winner" (also 4a). The expectation codelets may 
also have supplied to WM information codelets about a problem they no-
ticed regarding an action initiated in a previous cycle (also 4a). Ali these 
codelets forming coalitions sum up their activation in some way (see sec-
tion 4.1.5) and compete to bring Attention upon them ( 4b ). The competition 
may also include coalitions from a recent previous cycle. The activation of 
coalitions decays, making it more difficult for unsuccessful ones to compete 
with newer arrivais. 
5) "Conscious" broadcast. A coalition of codelets is selected and has its 
contents broadcast by Access Consciousness. The broadcast is "heard" (or 
"seen") by memories, Learner Madel sub-modules, Domain Expert, and 
some BN components (States and Feelings/Desires). Not ali will respond, 
but ali use information of concern to them to update their beliefs . Con-
scious broadcast is the only way the various modules become aware of the 
new information, although direct unconscious communication does happen: 
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between codelets when looking for associations and when assembling into 
coalitions, between expectation codelets and Behavior nodes, and within 
the BN (between States, Feelings and Behavior nodes, which are meant to 
represent different neuronal groups). The eurre nt content of "conscious-
ness", as organized by the encoding codelets , is also stored in Transient 
Episodic Memory. At recurring times not part of the cognitive cycle , the 
content of TEM is consolidated into AM. 
6) Recruitment of behavioral resources. With the broadcast, ali of the sys-
tem became aware of the situation, including the BN. Relevant States rec-
ognize parts of the broadcast, elevate their activation level according to the 
activation level of the codelet bearing their information, and start pushing 
energy backward into the Behavior node(s) they are connected to . Feelings 
and Desires also react particularly at this step, usually sensitive to the 
situation's type (recall that information codelets have may have either a 
type or a content, or both) ; maybe they were already stimulated by previ-
ous broadcasts and gain some more stimulation from the latest one. Note 
that there is no direct connection between what stimulates States and Feel-
ings/Desires. 
Feelings/Desires have effects (energy output) that get modulated by ex-
perience in links strengths, and by the active personality of the tutor. Other 
modules receive the broadcast and start processing the content they rec-
ognize. So , by the mechanism of broadcasting and the specifie alertness of 
resources , consciousness offers a nice way to bring into action only the 
relevant resources. 
After processing the broadcast, modules may have something to contribute 
about the situation . They send it as soon as they can , but it will be consid-
ered only by the next cycle. 
7) Selection. This step involves only the Be havi or Net. IDA 's 1h step regards 
the instantiation of a stream, with the transfer of information from priming 
(Behavior) codelets and the related infusion of energy. Since CTS does not 
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instantiate streams before they become active, CTS' cycle jumps to the se-
lection of Behavior in the BN. Among ali the stimulated, executable Behav-
ior nodes, the BN chooses a single one and executes it. "Executable" 
refers to a node that has ali its preconditions met (ali the States it has as 
preconditions are active). The choice is affected by internai motivation (ac-
tivation from Feelings/Desires), by the eurre nt situation ( external and/or in-
ternai environmental activation) and by the shape of the stream (length , 
branching, etc.). LI DA (but not IDA) also sees influences from the agent's 
emotions, currently absent from CTS. 
8) Action. Action is taken in step 8, the final step of the cycle. The execution 
of a Behavior results in the Behavior's underlying Behavior codelets per-
forming their tasks, which may have external or internai consequences. 
This part of the process is the only one that may generate an action that 
can be perceived by an external observer. The released codelets also in-
elude at least one expectation codelet (see Step 4), whose task it is to 
monitor the action taken, and to try and bring to consciousness any failure. 
4.3 SOME INTERESTING FEATURES 
The way CTS cognitive architecture works may seem quite different to what 
one is used to in "regular" ITS agents; 1 admit that the high distribution of the proc-
essing is rather disorienting at first, especially for someone used to centralized and 
controlled operations. 1 provide here explanations about emerging features that jus-
tify adapting to this new way of doing things. 
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4.3.1 Tutor is always up to date with the situation (vs. plain rule-based architec-
tures) 
One nice feature of Maes Action Selection Mechanism (upon which the BN is 
based) is that it does not require that a unification mechanism goes through the 
whole rule base at every cognitive cycle. There is only a lightweight summing proc-
ess that adds ali the energy sources for every Behavior node. The BN "thinking" 
process is differentiai , cumulative, with the energy making its way in the network at 
every cognitive cycle. Thanks to the energy flow and accumulation of activation in 
the succession of nod es, alternate solutions are always in preparation (if available ), 
if not ready to fire, to take over a path that gets stuck because of effects that delay 
their realization . This natural alternative preparation also serves weil the necessary 
adaptation of the agent when a solution initially favored gets stalled in the process of 
being chosen because one condition remains absent of its necessary context (pre-
conditions) . 
4.3.2 Analysis and planning are holistic 
CTS is based on a highly parallel architecture. Many processes are perma-
nently kept abreast of what is happening. The Domain Expert, the Learner Knowl-
edge Madel , the Learner Profile Madel, the Learner Affective State Madel , numerous 
individual codelets , they ali analyze the events from their point of view, in parallel. 
They may spontaneously offer an advice, an opinion, or return a feed-back on an 
aspect of the situation or about a hypothesis suggested by another module. When 
they send information to Working Memory (WM), their information codelets either 
combine into a coalition, bring inhibition to a coalition, or offer a competing proposi-
tion , to which other modules may react and supply complementary aspects or oppo-
sition . So a proposition might be opposed on the basis of any aspect of the situation , 
or it might be strongly comforted by multiple agreeing points of views. 
--------
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At the same time, complementing or following the work in WM , there is the Be-
havior Network (BN) that also does multi-aspectual planning and decision-making. 
lts various Feelings may react to the same information but with different strengths; a 
stream may incorporate alternatives with some common preconditions (with some 
part of the context being common to them) and some specifie States tied to a spe-
cifie path. A stream may also be favored because of past experiences that increased 
the base-level activation of some of its Behavior nades. Past experiences, also ex-
plicitly recorded in the Transient Episodic or Autobiographie memory, indicate what 
result an action has had (for instance, the user either succeeded or indicated his 
an noya nee), complementing or reinforcing the adaptation brought about by the im-
plicit learning stored in BN links strength. So, as you see, there are multiple parallel 
mechanisms that collaborate to bring on the table as many aspects as possible, at 
many points in the cognitive processing . 
4.3.3 Feelings offer an intuitive contextual analysis 
One nicety of the architecture is that is combines logical , explicit analysis with 
"intuitive" analysis. lndeed, we find intuition in our agent. The Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary17 defines "intuition" as «quick and ready insight», «the power or 
faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought 
and inference». The way the BN works yields exactly this kind of instantaneous as-
sessment, not going through an obvious or easily tractable reasoning process. lt is 
always possible to follow the links in the BN, add every source of influence, and jus-
tify any implicit behavior in the standard Maes network, even in a big, complex one. 
But it nevertheless corresponds to the definition. With the addition of implicit learning 
in the BN, however, it becomes virtually impossible to tract the past sources of the 
17 (htt ://www.m-w.com/c i-bin/dictionar ?book=Dictionar &va=intu ition ) 
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current state of the network, yet a decision can readily be made. This strongly sup-
ports the notion of intuition. 
1 find that this intuitive analysis capability takes our agent one step closer to 
human cognitive processing. 
4.3.4 Top-Down and bottom-up adaptation 
Adaptation in CTS is not univocally driven by the external inputs , by what is 
happening in the external environment (mostly what the user is doing). CTS has its 
own professional goals and beliefs as any expert tutor does (e.g. beliefs about what 
didactic method yields the best result for that specifie student; belief of whether past 
interactions have validated the efficiency of respecting user's preferences; beliefs 
indicating the importance of some domain content and the need to prioritize it to in-
sure learner's advance in the curriculum ; belief about the necessity to terminate the 
session soon , etc.). Reciprocally, CTS does not act purely to achieve the goal de-
cided upon some time ago, as if it were blind, deaf or plainly stubborn . CTS plans on 
the basis of a multitude of Goal nodes simultaneously more or less activated . Deci-
sions and actions always result from the combination of reactive mechanisms and 
the proactive pursuit of goals. ln particular, the BN includes parameters that control 
the balance between them. They can be set manually by the designer to create a 
more spontaneous attitude of the tutor, or a more analytical stance where CTS al-
lows more time for the energy to activate longer solution paths. Moreover, external 
and internai sources are always tempered by multiple internai filtering mechanisms 
that validate or modulate them. 
4.3.4.1 Adaptation with multiple personalities for the agent. 
"Feelings", "Desires" and "emotions", in our architecture, aside from motivating 
actions, are mechanisms forming the agent's personality. 1 will not discuss an emo-
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tians mechanism , as emotions have not yet been addressed in our design effort (al-
though IDA has had an emotional mechanism for some time but which has been 
removed , and LIDA presents a completely different approach to emotions in his con-
ceptual architecture). Feelings and Desires nod es are the motivational mechanisms 
that feed the Behavior Network with activation and so orient action selection in line 
with the agent's high-level goals. Specifie messages that stimulate a "Feeling" may 
appear when the Learner Knowledge Madel signais some important flaw in the 
learner's knowledge, or may appear after the broadcast of a perceived external 
situation, such as the possibility of a collision while the user is manipulating Cana-
darm2. Depending on the tutor's (agent) "personality" , the agent will be more or less 
inclined to take some kind of action, according to the sensitivity of its "Feelings" and 
"Desire" nades to the various factors . By creating sets of parameters about the sen-
sitivity of the Feelings towards the various events, states or aspects, and about 
which Goal nades are fed and with how much energy (maybe with no energy at ali), 
the designer may implement the various personalities he believes will be relevant in 
his field of application. Although not implemented yet, this capability might make the 
tutor a more pleasant fellow for the users. That capability could also be driven by the 
agent's metacognition as an automatic means of adaptation to the user. 
These adjustments combine with the various parameters available in the BN 
that allow making the agent more jumpy or more analytical , taking more or less time 
to examine various ways of intervening, and showing to the user more or less 
promptness in reacting to his actions . 
4.3.4.2 Adaptation at the planning level: deliberative capabilities may kick-in 
The Behavior Network is the primary means of planning in the agent. The se-
lection of proper behavior cames from the conjunction of the drive coming from the 
Feelings, and the drive coming from the environment (through the States). The de-
signer can specify the balance between the importance given to the Feelings and 
that given to the States. A second level of adaptation can be incorporated in the BN 
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by switching personality profiles for the agent, which specify the relative importance 
of each Feeling; this changes how it will react to various events created by the user, 
making the agent more rigid (less "perceptive") to some, or more friendly , etc .. So, 
the agent's adaptation (its planning) may be more or less influenced by the events 
(in their own rights , with their direct input to the Behaviors). ln summary, the BN dic-
tates what CTS should do, globally. But it has been surrounded in CTS with finer 
adaptation means that intervene to specify the details of an act. Explicit deliberation 
is often involved to complement the generic act selection and obtain the specifies of 
the situation at hand. For instance, hinting may have been decided upon in the BN 
as the most appropriate intervention in the current context but the Domain Expert is 
solicited to supply its specifie content. Such interaction will be illustrated in scenarios 
(section 5.4). 
Another type of planning involving deliberation may take the form of preparing 
lessons plans adapted to the learner (to his current knowledge, his believed defi-
ciencies, the time available, etc.). That plan creation would be scripted in a BN spe-
cialized stream and adapted with internai deliberation that goes as follows. The first 
act brings into Working Memory the announcement that lesson planning is beginning. 
If selected , the broadcast of this information is "heard" by every sub-systems of the 
agent but causes only some of them to react. For instance, the Learner Profile Madel 
(LPM) sends to WM the information about the learner's preferences (for instance, 
preferred type(s) of interaction , ideal duration of a lesson, etc.). The Domain Expert 
(DE), on his side, sends the list of the concepts that can be seen next (based on 
prerequisites). The publication of this new kit of information sees the LKM send sup-
plementary data: the probable level of expertise of the learner about each of these 
concepts. These are broadcast, allowing the DE to select the proper concepts (of 
appropriate level of difficulty, none over learner's capabilities) and send them, includ-
ing data about their intended durations and their level of priority. ln this round , "send-
ing the concepts" means sending links to the appropriate material. Now, ali the 
needed information has been gathered in WM that will allow building a tentative out-
line for the delivery plan. This makes a first sub-Goal node achieved , and this should 
be broadcast. 
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Through this last broadcast, the next Behavior is made aware that ali of the in-
formation it needs is available. The job of its codelet is to find the most appropriate 
concept as a starter. Seme rules it possesses guide its choice. For instance, it may 
take into consideration that the presentation should concentrate first on integrating 
the highest priority concepts (those deemed to be so by the pedagogue who built the 
domain model), but, based on the learner's profile, it should moreover consider se-
lecting one that is a grade in complexity below the learner's rated expertise: this 
learner needs to build confidence in its abilities at the first steps. If they happen to be 
ali of the same difficulty level , one is chosen at random . Eventually, the codelet sets 
its choice on one and puts it as the head of the presentation (delivery) plan in WM. 
This is noted by an expectation codelet that tries to have broadcast that the first con-
cept has been settled . This again causes a State to turn on to this effect, giving the 
proper precondition to the next Behavior. 
The next Behavior is then executable and , provided , as always, that it is the 
most activated executable node in the BN, it receives a green signal and sends its 
codelet, who's job is of adding a major (priority) concept to the plan . As long as un-
assigned information codelets containing major concepts are available in WM , an 
attention codelet will gather them and have this information broadcast. This will re-
assert the preconditions for our little plan building friend, which will be solicited again 
to do its job of selecting and adding a major concept to the outline . When no addi-
tional major concept is to be enlisted , or when an attention codelet computes that 
these concepts caver most of the time available for the lesson and mentions it in WM , 
the next act will start and look at the minor concepts. When the plan is set into mo-
tion , the ether adaptation means get involved . For instance, during the effective de-
livery, time may run out with respect to the allotted time for a lesson. ln this case, 
learner will be sign ified of this and offered the choice of continuing the lesson or de-
ferring the remaining concepts to the next session . Moreover, during the live presen-
tation , CTS "professional Desires" will do their job and bring-in sorne interleaving of 
learning with complementary activities (simple questions, more elaborate question-
naires or tests, exercises) according to the implicit or active pedagogical theory (see 
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next sub-section). Maybe some interaction will be initiated that will help the learner to 
relax, refocus , or regain confidence in his (or her) achievements. 
Another, quite important, example of deliberation is the possibility of some in-
formation source to oppose the propositions of another one. For instance, when a 
Behavior proposes taking action, the Learner Affective State Module may oppose 
because it believes it would bring the user's motivation (confidence) too low. This is 
consistent with what Libet describes (Franklin and Graesser, 2001, citing Libet, 1983) 
as the veto that volition can put after an action has been initiated unconsciously but 
before it can manifest itself to the exterior: 
Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specifie electrical change in the 
brain (the 'readiness potential', RP) that begins 550 ms before the act. Human 
subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 
ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated uncon-
sciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto 
the act. 
4.3.4.3 Adaptation with multiple pedagogical theories 
We can implement multiple pedagogical theories in the BN. However, much 
work remains to be done in order to translate pedagogical theories in exact BN struc-
tures. Since 1 concentrated first on obtaining basic coaching functionalities (in accor-
dance to our initial concern, astronauts training on a simulator) little effort went into 
using pedagogical theories. However, here are a few thoughts on how togo about it. 
The various aspects of the selected theories can be put under specifie Desire 
nodes and under various Goal nodes. The "Desires" (which, as you will recall , only 
differ from the "Feelings" in what they are intended to do: attend to the agent's pro-
fessional and persona! goals) may be used to detail the various general categories 
of behaviors (gaining attention , planning , presenting what is to come, having student 
generate ideas about issues and answers, provide related cases, provide worked-
out examples, pretest, offering self-assessment, presenting a concept, verifying the 
possession of knowledge, offering affective support, offering metacognitive stimula-
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tion, submitting exercises, and so on). The many ways of performing these "profes-
sional acts" appear as Goal nades connected to one or many Desires. Then , the 
designer describes how each pedagogical theory connects with each Desire (to 
which Desire , in what context, with what intensity/priority). 
Metacognitive codelets watch how things are going with the learner. Equipped 
with some inference rules, they are apt at trying some modulations on the Feelings 
sensitivities. Others watch over them and, upon judging that insufficient progress is 
made, may cali for a vote (a deliberation) about the necessary shift towards another 
pedagogical theory. Transiting to another theory might significantly change the tu-
tor's behavior, or it may affect it in some specifie areas. Each Behavior remains sub-
ject to Learner Model's vigilance, which always presents learner's preferences as 
support or opposition to an act (or otherwise support or opposes). For instance, if the 
Learner's Madel states that, for the kind of learner CTS is presently interacting with, 
or because it is trying submitting him to a higher level of difficulty, more frequent veri-
fications should be made about his comprehension , the activation level of the appro-
priate Feeling(s) will rise faster, eliciting learner's performance more frequently, 
modulating the actual pedagogical theory. Observation of learner's reactions indica-
tive of a possible lack of understanding may also stimulate some diagnosis acts to 
kick-in on the spot, without waiting for the completion of the lesson. 
4.3.4.4 Adaptation at the coalition selection level 
The Attention mechanism selects the most activated coalition in WM, that is, 
which contains the most activated codelets 18. There is an innate value to the infor-
mation about the domain , specified by the system's designer. But there is also dy-
namic values given to some information codelets. First, the information coming from 
18 The exact calculation is algorithmic. See section 4.1.5 for details . 
-------------
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the learner madel is dynamic; some information sees its gravity or the certainty of its 
beliet change with time, thus variations in its activation. Second, codelets issued by 
the BN receive an activation value that reflects the activation value of their Behavior 
node. For instance, if a Behavior is highly activated either because fed by a strong 
Feeling , or it is fed by more than one Feeling , or it had much time to accumulate 
energy, the codelets that implement the Behavior will be highly activated when they 
are released. Another reason for high activation is related to the learning that hap-
pens in the BN. The base-level activation of each Behavior node changes as expec-
tation codelets confirm the success or failure of its action. The more often successful , 
the higher its base-leve! activation and, thereof, the total activation reached by the 
node. lts codelets inherit this activation level, after normalization. So, the coalition of 
codelets that is selected by the Attention mechanism, eventually an action towards 
the environment, is adapted to the learner and the situation since some codelets had 
activation originating bottom-up (States) and top-dawn (Feelings). 
Attention bias. Attention bias can be voluntarily created with attention 
codelets (which role differs somewhat from the one they play in LIDA; see section 
4.1.1 .2). Doing so may be useful to change temporarily the significance (importance) 
of some information. For instance, in the case of the tutor trying to correct a bad 
habit in the way the astronaut does a certain maneuver, it becomes important to 
process the next maneuver, even if in itself a joint rotation does not bear much im-
portance and could normally be easily superseded by any other information appear-
ing in WM. That bias creation would be a remarkable adaptation to the specifie need 
of the user. 
l 
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4.3.5 Learning is decentralized into multiple structures 
CTS' conceptual architecture includes structures specifically related to knowl-
edge and memorization: a Transient Episodic Memory and a Semantic Memory. 1 
already described them . There are also other ways CTS learns, in supervised and 
unsupervised ways that lead to explicit and implicit knowledge 19: learning of regulari-
ties in WM that lead to new known entities or situations, and supervised implicit 
learning in the BN that translates into base-level activation of Behavior nades and 
into BN's links' strength. 1 present these mechanisms now. 
4.3.5.1 Discovery of regularities in Working Memory 
Learning of regularities in Working Memory is the first of the four types of im-
plicit learning in CTS (the other three being links strengthening in BN, modification of 
base-level activation of Behavior nades, and new associations and generalization 
created in TEM). lt designates the associations that form between codelets that 
spend time together in WM, in a Hebbian learning. lt is founded on Jackson's exten-
sion (Jackson, 1987) of Selfridge's (1959) Pandemonium theory that describes dae-
mons reinforcing their associations with others while they are also found in the arena 
(those that are active). LIDA has the same learning of associations between codelets 
that spend time together in the playing field (according to Jackson's Pandemonium). 
However, in CTS, this implicit learning of regularities applies exclusive/y to informa-
tion codelets and functions a little different/y. lt is intended for the discovery of regu-
larities in the environment and regularities happening from the internai processing of 
the agent that deserve to correspond to explicit concepts. Not ali initiated associa-
19 We may be tempted to associate supervised learning with explicit knowledge, and 
unsupervised learning with implicit learning. However, there is no exclusive relation . For in-
stance, explicit learning may lead to implicit knowledge, such as in acquisition of reflexes . 
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tians do correspond to regularities. Conservation of only confirmed regularities is 
assured by the principle that links have to survive their constant decay. If not rein-
forced soon enough , an association will decay away. lnfrequent coincidences have 
little probability of corresponding to a regularity, or it does not happen often enough 
to warrant the creation of a concept about it. 1 hypothesize that codelets that meet 
often in WM correspond to features of a common idea. Their association may reach 
a level that designates them as a coalition. Until they become a learned concept, 1 
cali this learning implicit, as it only exists in links, and the would-be concept cannat 
yet be used for reasoning; it remains latent. At the threshold point, their links become 
permanent and , as a coalition , they may be selected by the Attention mechanism for 
publication . This , in turn, will allow the semantic memory to learn it, to add it to its 
structure of concepts . The codelets of that new concept that are common to those of 
other concepts will naturally create semantic links with other concepts already in 
memory. This last idea has not yet been thoroughly worked out, nor implemented 
(our team has yet to implement both long-term memories ). 
4.3.5.2 Supervised learning in the BN: Experience as a planning factor 
ln any artificial agent, a behavior is designed with a goal in mind , with sorne ef-
fects expected. If experience reveals that sorne behavior does not work so weil in a 
situation , it should be avoided, or at least, kept as a fall-back solution . We implement 
the means for that kind of intelligence as base-level activation in the Behavior nades. 
Nades activation is composed of the current stimulations, brought about by the en-
ergy infused by every energy source it is connected to (States and other nades), and 
of its base-level activation . That last value integrates the result of past experience 
and measures the act reliability within its context. When a Behavior is successful , its 
expectation codelet(s) send(s) back a confirmation signal that brings the Behavior to 
elevate its activation level. ln the next occasion where this node is part of the plan-
ning , it will be favored for election because it will reach the "go" threshold sooner, 
already having sorne activation. 
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This base-level activation grows as a sigmoid curve, as described in section 
4.1 .3. After the initial phase of slow increase, there is a fast learning phase that 
slows down when the Behavior is about as strong as it can be. Just like in human, 
learning is constantly subjected to forgetting . If reinforcement does not come soon 
enough , what has been learned might be erased by decay. Our agent will not forget 
its original BN sequences since they are innate but it may loose the additional bene-
fit of experience (implicit reinforcement that it acquired). The inverse of the sigmoid 
function serves as the forgetting curve, but we give it a slope softer than the one 
used for learning. lndeed, humans generally forget more slowly then they have 
learned. For instance, if we learn a karate motion in half-an-hour, it is very likely we 
will remember some of it at the next training several days later, that is, after a period 
much longer than what it took to assimilate it. 
4.3.5.3 Unsupervised (implicit) learning in the BN: experience as an efficiency 
factor 
lmplicit learning may designate two realities: learning without awareness, and 
things someone learns (stores) in a form that is not explicit, that cannat be manipu-
lated in reasoning . ln any case, it generally refers to procedurallearning that leads to 
automaticity in some gesture. Being an important part in an agent's adaptability, a 
complete Master thesis has been devoted to it and offers the complete description 
(Faghihi , 2007). 1 provide here the general ideas that we are implementing. 
Aside from showing what gets the job done, experience has other closely re-
lated effects. The reinforcement from practicing brings both procedures to fire more 
easily (automaticity of decision) and to proceed more automatically (automaticity of 
execution). This phenomenon is quite obvious in sports, but is just as real in any 
activity. We want the same thing to happen in our BN: the more a stream is used , 
the faster it should come into a ready state, and the less it should involve conscious-
ness for its unfolding. 
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We implement the phenomenon of "faster reflexes" through reinforcing the 
strength of the links between Behavior nades in the BN. Stronger links modulate 
positively (amplify) the energy that transits through them, increasing its value. The 
main effect that this produces is that anterior nades (the nades in direction of the 
temporally first Behavior of the stream) reach the activation threshold sooner, in-
creasing the likeliness of the stream being selected for action. 
Exerted gestures or procedures need less conscious involvement to unfold . ln 
fact, one cannat even do a golf swing or a tennis drive if at !east some minimal 
automation has not taken place . A weil exerted golf swing requires only the initial 
analysis that decides on the value of the parameters (distance to reach , angle, 
strength to apply). Then, when the move is started, little consciousness is needed. 
Only the visual feed-back of the bali falling off the tee or the unpleasant vibration of 
the club hitting the ground will come to consciousness before the end of the swing . 
ln CTS, we considered implementing this kind of automaticity by "fusing" Behaviors 
together. Although this idea is rather seductive, its implementation is quite compli-
cated and remains under study for the moment. We rather have implemented a 
modification in the Behavior nades that allows them to directly stimulate States that 
are on their effects list; that way, the State does not need to hear the proper con-
sciousness broadcast to become excited (turning on). The next Behavior finds its 
preconditions in a ready status at the next cycle and is immediately executable 
(Maes' term meaning that a competence module, a Behavior node, has its "logical" 
preconditions met). ln that way, consciousness is not required for the stream to flow 
steadily. Expectation codelets continue to exist, but their role becomes to negate 
preconditions of Behaviors further in the chain , if expected effects do not come up; if 
that negative conclusion happens saon enough , it may black the continuation of the 
stream, just as becoming conscious of a problem would make us stop an automatic 
movement. 
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4.3.6 Designers may not need to do any programming 
ln developing our Behavior Network Editor, we have tried to put the basis of an 
easy-to-design agent, in the hope to put CTS within the reach of more researchers 
and practitioners. lts graphical user interface (see section 4.5 for an illustration) al-
lows the design of the BN without having to type XML code. Much can be specified 
at the information codelets fields level. With the addition of a similar tool for the Per-
ceptual Network, aside from field specifie analyses, one may obtain a complete tutor-
ing system without typing a single line of code. 
4.4 A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION 
The descriptions in this section owe much to Hohmeyer's Master thesis. The 
content also reflects Gaha's works for the implementation of modifications and ex-
tensions as part of his Master research. For a more detailed account of the mecha-
nisms, refer to Hohmeyer (2006) and Gaha (2007). 
We have adopted the Java language for implementing CTS, a popular platform, 
and the one used for IDA. The object philosophy of Java offers a natural parallel to 
Baars' idea of an audience of multiple independent specialists in the brain . Other 
features of Java also support the project quite weil, such as the publish-and-
subscribe mechanism: it resembles consciousness broadcasts and presents a very 
accommodating implementation vector. 
Many of the ideas underlying IDA have been taken back into CTS, but the 
code in itself is completely new20 . There were advantages to rewriting , but it also 
20 The reason for that is a practical one. As with any ongoing research project, IDA and 
LIDA are constantly being modified and improved, with temporary hypotheses, trials and 
hooks left in their code. With our limited knowledge and understanding of the hypotheses, we 
concluded that it would be easier to start anew then stitching our additions to the parts of the 
code that were directly applicable to our domain of a tutoring agent and readily reusable. 
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brought challenges, both in the implementation aspects and on the conceptual field. 
ln its actual state, CTS encompasses nearly a thousand classes. 
The whole architecture is highly modular. Ali modules (or rather, "packages") 
can do processing on their own , sensing their environment and responding to it. 
However, they need to use the Scene functions for their communication. The Scene 
creates a hub among ali other modules that permits a coordinated processing in 
CTS. Aside from the Scene, two other modules form the essential core of CTS as a 
generic agent: Perception and the Behavior Network (their mechanisms are generic, 
although they are both mostly domain-specifie in their content). Complementing the 
generic agent are the Semantic and Transient Episodic memories, still under devel-
opment. Some modules are add-ons that extend the generic agent in its specifie role : 
Learner Model and Domain Expert. Ali these need the "central" module to communi-
cate. Since everything is contained within Baars' theater, this will be our first point of 
«Theater» 
class 
Scene (Working Memory) 
package 
Coalition 
Manager class 
Spollight 
Controller class 
Broadcast 
Manager class 
Classes for «permanent>> 
attention codelets and 
expectation codelets 
Transient Episodic 
Memory package 
Figure 14 CTS' computational architecture 
Classes for 
metacognition 
code lets 
Behavior Network 
package 
Domain Expert 
package 
Declarative memory 
package 
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interest. As you will see, much of Baars' metaphor has been kept in naming modules: 
Theater, Scene, and so on, and will often appear in the descriptions. 
4.4.1.1 The Theater within CTS 
The Theater class in CTS has roles that correspond in part to the original idea 
of the "building". lt creates the Scene and contains every codelets that is created by 
any entity. lt incorporates the very fundamental process of the agent: it drives the 
loop for the cognitive cycle, which calls (directly or indirectly) every other abjects for 
their turn of execution. Permanent codelets (codelets are abjects instantiated from 
codelet classes) are called for and found here, such as attention codelets that need 
to run from the beginning to the end of CTS activation , or information codelets that 
need to be available before starting the cognitive cycle. 
The Theater drives the cognitive cycle, calling codelets at least once in every 
cycle , when their group's turn cames in the list. This manner of functioning has re-
placed our initial idea of having a thread for each codelet21. 
21 Although Java threads seem to correspond weil to what we know about the distrib-
uted, parallel processing of the brain , using one for each codelet exceeds our debugger's 
capabilities , seemingly limited to 200 threads . Thus, we chose to use a loop that calls each 
codelet once every cycle. IDA programmers also initially thought of devoting a thread to each 
codelet and to most any element of the architecture (such as the BN elements : Behavior 
nades, Goal nades, etc.). However, they observed that codelets are sometimes delayed for 
reasons having nothing to do with the agent's architecture. Threads are being controlled by 
Java with its own set of priorities. Programmers concluded that threads are not a reliable way 
of reproducing the mind's processors. 
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4.4.1.2 The Scene module 
The Scene "module" (package) is generic and totally reusable for any applica-
tion. lt supports the "conscious" aspects of the architecture, that is, competition and 
broadcasting . lt corresponds to the scene and the spotlight of Baars' theater meta-
phor. As such , it offers the framework within which codelets interact. 
Two auxiliary classes take on essential roles for the consciousness implemen-
tation : the Coalition Manager and the Spotlight Controller. They are needed to im-
plement the formation of information coalitions in Working Memory and the 
information selection prior to the publication of the winner. At every cycle , the Scene 
calls these two classes for the execution of the competition in working memory (step 
4 of the cognitive cycle). First, the Coalition Manager is called up for the determina-
tion of the coalitions. lt returns to the Scene the collection of the coalitions, which 
then passes iton to the Spotlight Controller. This class simply chooses the coalition 
showing the highest activation. The publication of the winner to every module and 
every listening codelet happens by the means of the publish-subscribe mechanism , 
under the control of the Broadcast Manager. 
A generic Java class, Codelet, specifies the generic behaviors of the 
codelets while they are alive (inside and outside Working Memory): progressive acti-
vation decay and mechanisms to join and leave the Scene. This base class also 
contains abstract methods for the specifie behaviors of each type of codelet; this 
allows easier extension while enforcing stable behavior when creating new domain-
specifie behavior codelets . 
Adding extensions can be done by calling the setPluginManager () 
method. lt is a very simple class containing only one method for each module that is 
added. The client application has to create a subclass of Pl uginManager return-
ing an operational implementation for the implemented modules. A simple but very 
useful extension has been the Consciousness Viewer (Figure 15). The Scene sig-
nais every arrivai and departure of codelets, which is then shawn in the Scene win-
dow of the viewer so that we, designers, can see what is inhabiting the Scene (WM). 
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~ Consc1ousness Viewer '' 
Last Message 
Event Status-80 occuring at 2005 :12:1 0:17:1 
Canadarm : 
the Mob il e Base Station with trans lation O.l 
Compone nt SR 
Joint SY wilh rotation 0.241512 
Joint SP with rotation 0 
Jo int SE with rotation 0.239575 
Joint WE with rotation 0.737825 
Jo int WP with rotation 0.495973 
Joint WY with rotation 0.517032 
Joint WR with rotation 0.515361 
the charge PLis al -183.234 ,-1 90.796,441 .1 
let! screen shows camera US_Lab_ Top wit 
center screen shows camera SP _Lefi_Back 
righi screen shows camera US_Lab_Bottor 
this ca used a colli sion between robot:S E an 
Current Scene 
Codetet -lnfo-Screen-Left:Screen:Left:Activation:2.0221231387939406E -7 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-SY:Joint:SY:Activation:0.39996000000000004 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-WP:Joint:WP:Activation:8.805808227170949E-56 
Codelet-lnfo-Component-Mobile-Base-station:ComtJOnent:Mohile-Base-st 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-WE:Joint:WE:Actilfation:6.351862427639877E-42 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-SE:Joint:SE:Activation:B.B05808227170949E-56 
Codelet-lnfo-Component-the-Charge:Component:the-Charge:Activation:O. 
Codelet-lnfo-Collision-':Collision:effective:Activation:0.951579035542923. 
Codelet-lnfo-Screen-Right:Screen:Right:Activation:4.00040857886199BE-
Codelet-lnfo-Movement-SY:Movement:SY:Activation:0.6931 85226393465< 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-Wf:Joint:Wf:Activation:B.B05808227170949E-56 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-WR:Joint:WR:Activation:8.805808227170949E-56 
Codelet -lnfo-Screen-Center:Screen:Center:Activation:4.00040857886199 
Codelet-lnfo-Component-SR:Comtlonent:SR:Activation:1.2650936245342! 
Codelet-lnfo-Event-' :Event:status-BO:Activation:3.1627340613356494E-1 ( 
Codelet-lnfo-Joint-SP:Joint:SP:Activation:3.09826833207681E-57 
l_.;.~ _,_l _ _;l::c..ll ---'------'1~• 1 Ill 
Broadcasts 
._ ..... ..... ....... .... . 7..... . .... ..... .... . ~ '"''"" ' .......... . ,..... ..... ... ..... • .._ ... , ~,.. .. • ........... .... • •r .. . ... .. · .,.... . - · .._ ............... . • • .._..., • ......... .... ..... .J 
{Camera-Move=Right-Screen,Screen=Rigtrt,timestamp=Mon Apr 24 23:25:13 EDT 2006} 
{Screen=Right,Zoom= 1.0, Tilt= 19.0,Pan=-75.0,Camera=US _Lah _Bottom,timestamtl=Mon Apr 24 23:25:16 EDT 2006} 
{Movement=Mobile-Base-station,Component=Mollile-Base-station, Translation-Amount=-1. 76E-12,timestamp=Mon 
{Movement=Mohile-Base-station,Component=Mohile-Base-station, Translation-A mount= 1. 76E-12,tirnestamp=Mon A 
Figure 15 The Consciousness Viewer, a simple but very useful extension of the Global 
Workspace class, for comprehension and debugging needs. 
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4.5 BN EDITOR, AN AUTHORING TOOL TO HELP ELABORATING CTS 
For the elaboration of the Behavior Network, we have developed the BN Editer. 
This graphical editor is meant to help designers think about the high-level Goal 
nodes, sub-Goal nodes, streams of Behaviors that can accomplish them , and 
codelets that realize their actions. One uses the icons to create stream boxes, put 
Goal node and Behavior nodes in them, link them , add their contexts (precondition 
and effect States). lt also supplies the environment to specify the codelets that un-
derlie the Behaviors. Specifie behaviors can be indicated by telling what the imple-
menting class is. The resulting network is saved in an xml file. 
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Chapter 5 
INSTANTIATING CTS IN CANADARM TUTOR 
Figure 17 The International Space Station as it was on August 6, 2005. The most 
complex piece of technology ever designed by Man. Canadarm2 appears as the slim 
structure extending "on top" of the Truss (at the forefront in this picture) and to the left of 
the main axis formed by the chain of modules. 
(Source: http://spacef/ight. nasa.gov/gal/erylimages/station!assembly!lores/s114e 7284.jpg) 
5.1 TUTORING CONTEXT 
The International Space Station is the most sophisticated piece of technology 
ever built. lt has been designed to sustain life in space and permit scientific experi-
ments. Thus, it needs regular replenishment in food, parts, fuel, experimental setups 
and other cargo. Containers return to Earth filled with used material and trash. The 
availability of a crane attached to the Station is a big bonus for ali the manipulations 
Boom 
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JEU (2 per joint) 
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Figure 3.9-3. Spa ce Station remote m nnipulator system. 
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Figure 18 Canadarm2, a complex robotic telemanipulator with seven joints. With 
three joints at each end (wrist joints) and one in the middle (elbow joint), the difficulty of 
manipulating this deviee cannot be tully appreciated before trying to . Astronauts need a 
thorough train ing, and frequent refreshers . (Source: NASA (2000) p.3-69) 
incurred, especially when they involve large size equipments such as the photo-
voltaic panels (that supply the Station with electricity). Canadarm (attached to the 
space shuttles) and Canadarm2 (mobile around the Space Station), the Canadian 
contributions to the international project, have been saluted as great Canadian 
achievements, offering to the astronauts tools that are wonderful to use as they 
almost feellike a natural extension to the human arm. 
However, there are constraints when dealing with the robotic arms. Even if de-
signed to be controlled with just two hand controllers, their operation really is quite 
complex and needs serious training . With seven degrees of freedom (as the human 
arm), this robotic arm is much harder to operate than regular cranes used on Earth 
113 
Figure 19 Portion of the workstation that allows controlling Canadarm2 on the ISS. 
The astronaut manipulates the robotic arm with two joysticks. He has to optimize the lim-
ited views offered by the three monitors. (Source: NASA) 
(see Figure 18). Lots of procedures and security check-ups have been put in place 
and need to be accomplished by the astronauts. 
Compounding the difficulty of operating Canadarm2 is the fact that astronauts 
cannat just sit at one extremity and watch what they are doing, as is the case for any 
ordinary crane on Earth. The operations can only be observed indirectly, in 20, 
through monitors (see Figure 19). There is no window to "look outside" , and cameras 
must be used to see. The choice of cameras is limited: only camera ports CP3, CP?, 
CP9, CP12, CP13, CP14 have received cameras (see Figure 20 for their location), 
plus the four installed on Canadarm2 and one on its mobile base. The astronaut has 
to select the best choice of cameras and create the views according to very general 
rules such as «the central view has to show the global situation» , and «The ether 
two views have to offer a detail view and a view that permits to measure the distance 
of Canadarm2 elements to the ISS». A complete check list of about 20 items indi-
cates what has to be done or verified every time before putting Canadarm2 into mo-
tion, and gone through again every time the astronaut stops in arder to replan the 
path or needs to move away from the station, even just for a few seconds. 
Externa 1 Cmnera Port Do i~ Nddon Co>'tln - 0<118, 2001 
ISS Extem al Camera and Wire less Video Sys tem !WVSl Antenna Planning 
m Fllght lnstolled 
~ E•rtlest '"' " install 
($) Not used . would requlre • move 
• Element lhat limite use of port • 6 
D Item on port lûom•••loriWETAI 
IWETAI? ? Whm plac e 6th WVS 
Figure 20 Location of the ISS camera ports that can connect installed cam-
eras to Canadarm2 workstation. (Source: unknown) 
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Lots of concepts and procedures have to be mastered, such as the position 
and function of every control on the workstation (Figure 21 ), selecting the information 
sources, placing them on the different monitors, immobilizing Canadarm2, the vari-
ous coordinate frames, making transformations from one coordinate frame to an-
ether, etc. Two crucial abilities that also have to be acquired deal with spatial 
representation and reasoning. Spatial awareness is about knowing where "the astro-
naut" is standing and where things are a round "hi m" , and at what distance - 1 use 
quotation marks around "the astronaut" meaning that the astronaut is not outside, 
manipulation payloads, but the views make him feel as if he were Canadarm2 him-
self. Situational awareness is about being able to understand and predict where 
things are going and where they will be with respect to one another. The astronaut 
has to be able to integrate the information from three separate views and reconstruct 
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Figure 21 The ISS robotic workstation used to control Canadarm2. Source: NASA 
(2000) p.3-71. 
a spatial map in his head, recognizing important elements, seizing distances, and 
extrapolating the resulting Arm displacement when he acts on one of the seven 
joints. 
The way astronauts are presently trained involves a rather traditional class-
room for the theoretical portion of their formation. After getting half a day of concep-
tual presentations and theoretical exercises, they spend the rest of the day in a 
simulation room where they are put in a pretty realistic setup with a workstation 
mock-up. A human tutor stands by their side, giving initial instructions and coaching 
while they accomplish the prescribed maneuvers. The time allotted for completing a 
task is pre-established, and astronauts are noted on many criteria. However, they 
are encouraged to ask as many questions as they please, making full use of the re-
sources at their disposai for an optimallearning experience. 
5.2 ACTIVITIES AND SERVICES IN CANADARM TUTOR WITH CTS 
The first version of Canadarm Tutor is called Roman Tutor. lt is a tutoring sys-
tem meant to train users on the manipulation of any robotic arm through a simulator. 
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Figure 22 The non-cognitive Canadarm Tutor. Menus at the top allow the selection of 
various functions: task desired, mode of operation, level of difficulty, what-if scenario, etc. 
ln its application to the training of astronauts on Canadarm2, it received the more 
evocative name of Canadarm Tutor; l'li use that appellation from now on. 
ln its original version (Kabanza et al. 2005), Canadarm Tutor is a non cognitive 
tutor. 1 will describe its features and the main services it offers before explaining 
what CTS brings in. 
5.2.1 The non cognitive Canadarm Tutor 
The tri-dimensional problem space for Canadarm2 manipulations around the 
ISS is infinite. lt cannat be modeled unless tasks are heavily constrained. Being able 
to plot a course around obstacles with the kinematics constraints coming from 
Canadarm2's structure is difficult enough. But in most situations, Canadarm2 is pi-
loted by a human (Figure 19), and only cameras allow him to see how things are 
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going. Most of the cameras being fixed adds the constraint of restricted sight, creat-
ing less desirable zones to bring Canadarm2 into. 
Facing these difficulties and constraints, Kabanza, Belghith and Nkambou pro-
posed relying on a new, powerful path planner. lts FADPRM (Flexible Anytime Dy-
namic Probabilistic Roadmap Methods) algorithm provides a framework to support 
spatial reasoning within the simulator. lt makes it possible to do model-tracing 
coaching with instant shallow feedback . 1 say "shallow feedback" because FADPRM 
can only signal observable events at the logical-physical leve!. The path planner is 
connected at the lowest logical leve! of the simulator (which is made up essentially of 
physical components in the environment, such as the robotic arm, the obstacles, the 
cameras, and spatial volumes). With the available information, Canadarm Tutor is 
able to flag proximities, dangerous zones, problematic configurations, and straying 
from the proposed path . 
Aside from coaching, the non cognitive Canadarm Tutor offers other training 
facilities . There are spatial awareness tasks such as name-and-localize exercises 
that teach and train on knowing "what is where" . lndeed, in real life, the views re-
turned by the cameras cannat be "straight" ali the time, and they are often upside-
down: most of the cameras currently available are the "upside-down" cameras con-
nected on ports 3, 7 and 9 (Figure 20). Consequently, they offer "upside-down" 
views (if there is something like "upside" things in space ... ) and not at ali natural to 
interpret for humans used to living on Earth! There are also distance evaluation ex-
ercises that help the astronaut sharpen his perceptual abilities. Manipulation tasks 
train the astronauts on efficiently using Canadarm2. Manipulation tasks can be exe-
cuted with or without assistance. With the what-if menu option , the astronaut can try 
alternatives before he effectively implements his best choice. 
,-------------------- -- ----------
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Figure 23 Architecture of Roman Tutor, cognitive version. Source: Nkambou, Belghith 
and Kabanza, 2006. 
5.2.2 The cognitive Canadarm Tutor 
ln its new framework (Nkambou, Belghith and Kabanza , 2006), Roman Tutor 
has made room for a cognitive tutor and added higher-level knowledge about the 
physical environment. This supplemental knowledge is organized as a second and a 
third layer on top of the logical one (see Figure 23). The cognitive layer aggregates 
the logical level in terms of zones and corridors of safe operation, and annotates 
them with different domain knowledge elements. The intention layer specifies struc-
tures of predefined tasks by assembling corridors and zones in various possible 
global paths between a starting and an ending point. This intentional leve! makes it 
possible to better follow the evolution of the astronaut in the execution of the se-
lected task. The whole environment is thus aggregated into various areas annotated 
with appropriate knowledge in order to get more semantic richness in guiding the 
astronaut during Canadarm2 displacements. 
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With CTS, Canadarm Tutor makes use of the information in the three layers, in 
addition CTS' own information sources (its own Learner Model , Domain Expert, de-
clarative memories, etc.). CTS complements Roman Tutor by adding cognitive mod-
eling for deeper analyses of what causes the difficulties, and for better adaptation to 
the learner. Just as its non cognitive version , Canadarm Tutor with CTS is meant to 
offer both theoretical and practical training when the astronaut is away from the train-
ing facilities . But it does so in an adaptive way, selecting material and adapting the 
presentations in accordance to the learner's progression and adjusting the interac-
tions to his personality. 
CTS uses the non cognitive Canadarm Tutor facilities as a foundation for its in-
terventions. For instance, it asks the simulator to record the learner's operations so 
that it may ask a replay of some sequence when it detects a problematic situation. 
Or it occasionally asks FADPRM to verify whether there is still a way to the goal. 
CTS also adds some deep analyses of the learner's actions, with many levels of pat-
tern recognizers implemented as expectation , attention and metacognition codelets . 
When CTS is alerted of problematic situations or behavioral patterns, it uses ali as-
pects of its learner madel to try to find the cause of the problem and then decide 
whether to intervene, and how. 
CTS is not limited in the ways it intervenes. Although not implemented yet, 
many pedagogical theories and strategies can be part of its Behavior Network, 
switching to another strategy when a first attempt fails , and even adopting another 
pedagogical theory when the user does not seem to perform weil under the premises 
of the actual one. 
5.3 SERVICES OFFERED BY CTS 
The services offered or supported are basically the same as "plain" Canadarm 
Tutor, to which it adds the followings (currently implemented, designed, or simply 
planned): 
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• Analyses of learner's performance (partly implemented) 
• Probabilistic modeling of learner's knowledge and competencies (under de-
sign) 
• Selection by CTS of the next activity, based on analysis of past performances 
(under design) 
• Capability to create !essons plans adapted to inferred learner's knowledge 
(designed) 
• Capacity to intervene at appropriate times with methods appropriate to the 
learner's profile and past performances (under design) 
• Partial analysis of views on monitors (planned) 
• Affective support (planned) 
• Ali these services being at the disposai of remediation operations (planned) 
With its ability to learn , CTS has a clear advantage over the non cognitive tutor. 
lt can track what the learner is doing, anticipate the problems and plan its actions. lt 
learns over the time what works and what does not when it intervenes (methods, 
timing , style). The statistics it keeps in its Learner Model indicates where the learner 
has weaknesses, so that CTS may chose efficient remediations (concepts and pro-
cedures that need explaining , operations that need more practice, etc.). 
5.4 EXAMPLE SCENARIOS 
1 present two scenarios that allow the demonstration of CTS features and per-
formance in different circumstances. 
CTS presently has the capability to tutor either as a coach or as a more tradi-
tional ILS (Intelligent Learning System) with question-answer type interactions. The 
latter may be used anytime, and it may come handy as a remediation to diagnosed 
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problems during a coaching session . Coaching seems to be the most difficult aspect 
to implement, and this is the type of interactions that 1 will be showing. 
Both our scenarios refer to the same task. The first scenario shows the astro-
naut at the beginning of a manipulation exercise, which requires that the astronaut 
move Canadarm2 from a starting poinUinitial configuration to a final configuration . A 
problematic situation happens right there, at the beginning: the astronaut takes a first 
action which is not the right one, forgetting to adjust views before moving the Arm. ln 
scenario 2, after making sorne manipulations, the astronaut immobilizes the Arm and 
does nothing for a prolonged time. ln both cases, CTS has to decide whether it will 
intervene or remain silent. CTS disposes of different ways of intervening: giving hints, 
stating the fact, showing the problem. ldeally, CTS will use the user's preferred way 
(either stated as part of its learner profile, or as explicitly indicated by him; the latter 
is a functionality yet to be implemented). We could even have CTS interact in a style 
appropriate to the astronaut, that is, using a style and a "tone" simulating an em-
pathie tutor, a "straight" one, or a friendly one. For our initial prototype, we do not 
have natural language generation algorithms, and textual interventions can only offer 
pre-written textual variations for the same elements of intervention. Since 1 haven't 
prepared the necessary variations , that aspect will not be demonstrated . 
ln Canadarm Tutor as in Roman Tutor, manipulation tasks ali use the same 
pattern : a) show the initial position or configuration of Canadarm2; b) show the des-
tination or the final configuration; c) start the chronometer and coach the astronaut. 
To ensure that we can measure the time taken by the astronaut to plan the path, we 
allot a limited time for inspecting the destination/ending configuration . 
1 give a few more general explanations before getting to the scenarios. Preced-
ing the manipulation of Canadarm2, there is a complete list of verifications, settings 
and planning that the astronaut must cover, such as setting the information sources 
and choosing where to display them on the monitors, checking if Earth sent new 
instructions, setting the right speed frame ( coarse or vernier) , setting the appropriate 
coordinates reference frame (ISSACS, OBAS, OCAS, LEE tip , etc.), checking the 
motors status, removing the brakes, etc. ln our simulator, the facilities are limited, 
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and CTS gets strong evidence of only one type of preliminary operation : adjusting 
views. Planning the path might be done completely in the mind of the astronaut with-
out any recourse to the perspective view (although this is doubtful). So, in case of 
trouble , CTS will have to ask the user if he has planned the path. 
At ali times, CTS has an attention codelet that counts the time elapsed since 
the last user operation (manipulating Canadarm2, answering a question, adjusting a 
view, using the menus, etc.). That codelet may watch the time with respect to a 
standard duration or to the duration indicated by the Domain Expert. If that duration 
is elapsed , the codelet tries bringing that observation to consciousness. ln addition, 
CTS starts another chronometer codelet at the beginning of a session, and a third 
one at the beginning of any manipulation exercise, this latter one being concerned 
with the duration of the exercise compared to what is expected from that learner. So, 
interventions may be driven by the passage of time. 
A last word : coalitions always compete to be selected in Working Memory by 
the Attention mechanism; none is certain to win . 1 will often simply write that a coali-
tion is broadcast (or "published" , an alternate word), or even completely forego men-
tioning any going into WM to avoid annoying repetitive descriptions about the 
selection process. But there never is any guarantee about the coming to conscious-
ness of any coalition of information, although the designer may have granted sorne 
information a high "natural" activation value to increase its likeliness of being pub-
lished. lt still depends on what else occupies WM at this point in time. ln a nutshell , 
the decision process is very dynamic, very contextual and not at ali deterministic. 
5.4.1 Scenario 1: Missing step; CTS inters the cause and offers hints 
This scenario emphasizes CTS deliberative capabilities involving ali of the ar-
chitecture's modules. 
lt begins when the initialization steps of a manipulation exercise are about to 
be completed. The initial position and configuration and the destination have been 
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Figure 24 Portion of the initialization of a Canadarm2 manipulation exercise and 
noticing of inactivity by a "step timer" attention codelet. 
shawn, and the astronaut has clicked on the OK butten , indicating he has memo-
rized the task specifications and is ready to proceed (Figure 24). This «OK» was 
expected by an expectation codelet, and since it fulfills its expectation , it has no rea-
son to advertise anything . That codelet will simply loose its activation and die away. 
As the last step of the stream that submits a manipulation exercise, an exercise 
timer attention codelet is released to see how close to the expected duration we 
have gotten. 
A few moments pass, the astronaut selects one of Canadarm2 joints and starts 
rotating it (Figure 25). ln itself, this rotation may or may not be a good choice, but 
this is beside the point: what is important here is that the astronaut did not adjust the 
views before making the manipulation . If the monitors are the only means available 
to the astronaut to see Canadarm2 and its environment, it may seem surprising that 
the scenario suggests that he does not adjust the views first. 
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Figure 25 The astronaut started moving Canadarm2 without adjusting the initial views. 
ln fact, out of the three, there may be one view that is quite satisfactory, and 
makes the astronaut confortable to start the operation. However, procedure dictates 
that an "optimal" combination of views be established before any manipulation. lt is 
very unlikely that ali three monitors would offer the three best views from their default 
arrangement. 
1 Simul. I l Pere. Il Conf; Cod. Il Att.Cod. Il ~ & ~onsc. l 
: : 1 : 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
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Figure 26 Incorrect procedure followed by the astronaut. The Domain Expert notices it 
and attempts to bring this to the attention of the Attention mechanism. 
The Domain Expert was expecting a camera manipulation and has been made 
aware of a joint manipulation instead. lt is able to determine that this refers to the 
next step in the correct procedure. So, it inters a missing step and signais it in a coa-
lition of information codelets it sends into WM ( «Problematic situation : Missing step» 
+ «Missing step: Adjusting views» ). 
When this new information arrives into WM, the Deliberation Arbiter notices it 
as describing a situation that warrants an intervention and attaches to the coalition 
the information codelet «lntervening: Proposed» (Figure 27). ln effect, CTS is asking 
itself whether it should intervene; it will not just go out with its big boots and offer 
help to any user without thinking it through. A proposition for an intervention bears a 
relatively high importance (a high value); thus, the coalition containing this informa-
tion codelet shows high probabilities that it will immediately get the Attention's atten-
tion (!). Subsequent broadcasting primes the Feeling of the need for an intervention ; 
however, no action is taken now (no related Behavior in the network is fired) be-
cause ali the preconditions are not met yet: causes have not yet been identified . This 
will come through a deliberation involving the modules that can supply a justification 
and approve (or oppose) intervening, in extenso: ali the three sub-modules of the 
,----------------------------------------------------
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Figure 27 lntervening is proposed. As long as this is the most important coalition in 
WM, it gets published repetitively until the deliberation arbiter decides enough time has 
passed without any change (three cycles) or until causes are submitted. If more that one 
cause is offered, the Deliberation Arbiter chooses the most significant one and attaches it 
to the coalition under deliberation. If after a few cycles the cause proposed has not been 
opposed , the arbiter changes its status to «Approved» . 
Learner Model : the LKM (Learner Knowledge Model), the LPM (Learner Profile 
Madel) and the LAM (Learner Affective Madel). The LKM infers what the learner's 
knows from ali the evidences it gathers from the broadcasts: what the learner does, 
how he performs, and what material he has been exposed to. The LPM knows what 
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intervention should be appropriate for the specifie learner, and when . The LAM, 
aside from entertaining beliefs about how the learner is Feeling right now, keeps 
track of the impact of past interventions on the learner's motivation. lt might inter-
veneto indicate how the learner is feeling right now. 
The second arrow in Figure 27 ("Reca/1 broadcasf') indicates that the Delibera-
tion Arbiter reactivates the coalition just published in order to keep the context alive 
in WM and so that new information can be attached to it. As long as this coalition is 
the most important one in WM, it is broadcast repetitively until suggested causes do 
arrive into WM, or until the arbiter determines that enough time has passed without 
any change to the coalition. Here, the LKM and LPM modules have something to say 
about the last broadcast. After some time needed for their inference process (three 
cycles for both modules in our scenario), they offer the ir hypotheses about the cause 
of the overlooking : «Poor mastery of manipulation procedure» and «Distracted». 
ln designing the mechanism, we have elected the rule that only one cause can 
attach to the original coalition . When confronted with many possible causes (offered 
by different sources), the Deliberation Arbiter selects the most plausible cause in the 
current context. The plausibility of a cause is obtained by multiplying the cause's 
current valuation with the confidence on the hypothesis. Figure 1 0 gave the calcula-
tian for the cause «Poor mastery of manipulation steps» (0,53); the second cause 
( «Distracted») computes to 0,39 (0 ,30 + (0,30 x 30%)). So, the poor mastery hy-
pothesis is retained here. The Arbiter attaches that cause to the coalition , which 
adds new activation to it. This association mechanism implements Baars conver-
gence of information phenomenon (Baars, 1997, p. 52). If this coalition is selected in 
WM and is broadcast ( shown as the last arrow in Figure 27), the new aspects in the 
information should prompt new reactions in the audience (the modules hidden in the 
unconscious, in Baars' theater metaphor). Here, the Feeling for intervening gets 
more stimulation from it. Some module could also react and oppose the cause pro-
posed. This would stimulate the module that got its hypothesis refused to submit a 
new cause, extending the deliberation process. An opposition could also aim plainly 
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at the idea of intervening. A number of reasons could justify such opposition in dif-
ferent scenarios: 
• a module (possibly Learner Profile Module) estimates it would be damaging to 
intervene in the actual state of mind or affective state of the learner, as be-
lieved by the LAM ; 
• the re is no cause (or no sufficient cause) for it; 
• the support level chosen by the learner does not warrant intervening here. 
An opposition to intervening simulates the experience we ali have had of planning on 
intervening (for example, replying something nasty to someone) and just before the 
words went out of our mouth, refraining from doing so. lt reflects James ideomotor 
theory (Baars, 1997b, chapter six). 
ln this simple scenario, nothing of the sort happens. The "standard" waiting 
time of five cycles is respected, during which the coalition is published repetitively 
with the proposed cause. The cause is not opposed , and neither is the idea of inter-
vening . So, the Arbiter changes the status of both the cause and the proposition to 
intervene to «Approved». Then, the Arbiter knows it has completed its task. 
The broadcast that ensues stimulates the «lntervening approved» State in the 
BN, a fundamental precondition to the whole «Hinting» stream (see Figure 28). The 
proposition of intervening is implicitly sustained by the LPM by not opposing it and by 
indicating the user's preferred way of interaction: hinting (Figure 29). We suppose 
the astronauts indicated sometime in the past a preference for hinting, or this indica-
tion has come with the default profile for astronauts. 
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Figure 28 The Hinting stream of the BN. The context that renders hinting applicable is 
composed of three preconditions : «lntervening approved », «Cause approved» and «Hint 
available». Not showing here (above the stream) is the feeling it serves: «Need ta inter-
vene». When ali the preconditions have been created , the behavior «Advertise need ta 
compose hint» becomes executable and may tire if its activation is over the BN specified 
threshold , and is the most activated executable behavior in the BN. Little colored dots in 
the Behavior represent the codelets that implement the Behavior. 
An attention codelet concerned by the hints given keeps note of the number of 
hints previously given in this intervention and replies with the hint number (level) to 
request: «Hint to give: 1 ». With this last information about how to interact with the 
astronaut, the Domain Expert is able to offer a contribution in the form of the text of a 
hint appropriate for the situation (based on the problem observed , the actual status 
of the manipulation, and the previous hint given): «Hint: Haven't you forgotten to do 
something?». This first-level , very general hint refers to the fact that the astronaut 
forgot to adjust the views before moving Canadarm2. lts content is not directly 
shown to the astronaut, but sent into WM. 
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' ' • hint to give: 1 1 
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Figure 29 Selection and presentation of a hint to the user. An attention codelet keeps 
track of how many hints have been offered ta the user. 
When published l that content brings the final needed context in the Behavior 
Network for an intervention to start (see Figure 28): the activation of State «Hint 
available». When this information becomes available l the Behavior appearing to the 
left in the Hinting stream can send away its codelets l requesting that a hint be put 
into shape22 and shawn in a window on screen. A specialized process will later take 
care of building the window that will appear on the computer screen . The astronaut 
will see a message appear in the simulator «Hint: Haven't you forgotten some-
thing?». 
At this point, CTS has begun an adapted interaction with the learner. lt will 
continue with further hinting , progressively more specifie and instructionalist, until the 
astronaut corrects the situation . 
22 The name of the Behavior, as it appears in the diagram, is generic. lt allows any ap-
propriate resource (a composition codelet or a full composition stream) ta compose the tex-
tuai interventions from the available bits and pieces. For now, the raie is assumed by a 
composition codelet that simply takes the hint available and adds a «OK» button before 
transferring the result ta the Output Buffer. 
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5.4.2 Scenario 2: lnactivity. CTS does not see the cause and offers general help. 
This scenario emphasizes CTS' "unconscious" deliberative capabilities imple-
mented in the Behavior Network. My explanations in this scenario build upon those 
from the previous scenario; 1 will mostly add only the novelties. 
This scenario begins with CTS noticing (as revealed by the step timer attention 
codelet) an undue elapsed time since the last user action (Figure 30). ln itself, that 
inactivity is not indicative of a problem: the astronaut may be planning the next move. 
This analysis can be surprisingly complex and the astronaut may simply need more 
time to think. Or it may be that the astronaut is unsure of the next step he should 
pursue, a problem that would need caring for. ln any case, if published , that informa-
tion about inactivity stimulates the Feeling in the Behavior Network about the need to 
intervene, which starts pushing energy into ali the streams connected to it (through 
the ir top Goal node). But the complete necessary context has to be present for any 
action to be initiated by the BN. 
The first time intervening "crosses CTS' mind", if 1 may say so, it is rejected by 
the LPM (Learner Profile Module). lts inferences determine that, based on the user 
profile and on the fact that no strong cause has been proposed , not enough time has 
yet been allotted. ln fact, the idea of intervening has come to consciousness either 
before the various information sources had the time to react, or because the mod-
ules simply have no explaining cause to offer. ln a traditional setup, the human tutor 
can see what the astronaut is doing, he can see his face , and he listens to the verbal 
reports the astronauts has to give about what he is doing and of what mental opera-
tion he is accomplishing . So the human tutor gets pretty good elues about what is 
going on . CTS cannat (yet) rely on such information sources (works are under way 
for visual interpretation of facial expressions and biosignals) . lt only has its beliefs 
based on past evidences to try inferring what causes the inactivity. If CTS' Learner 
Madel can suggest a cause (for instance, erroneous or lack of knowledge, fatigue , or 
distraction, as in Figure 27), then CTS evaluates by an internai debate whether to 
intervene. 
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ln this second scenario, not a single cause shows up in Working Memory, 
even the second time inactivity is signaled . But no opposition cames up either. So, 
after publishing again the same information a few times, the Deliberation Arbiter 
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Figure 30 CTS deliberates about intervening and about the cause of user's inactivity. 
The conscious broadcast about the situation ( «lnactivity») brings the whole system to aware-
ness but no cause is suggested. Nevertheless, sorne feelings get stimulated by this situation 
of inactivity, and readies the BN to react eventually. Just at the end of the standard delibera-
tion duration, the LPM indicates its opposition to intervening without an explicit cause at this 
point in time: according to its beliefs about the astronaut, he probably just needs more time to 
think. After another waiting period, the same inactivity is signaled, but this time no one op-
poses an intervention. 
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Figure 31 Beginning of the «Give general help» stream. lt shares the precondition «lnter-
vening approved » with the «Hinting» stream, but has the unique precondition «Cause of 
difficulty unknown». This stream gets involved when no module could suggest a cause to the 
situation . ln this situation, CTS needs to interact with the user to find how it can help in what 
it believes to be a problematic situation. 
closes the deliberation, changes the status of «lntervene: Proposed» to «Approved» 
and attaches an information codelet stating «Cause: Unknown». That broadcast 
stimulates the «lntervening approved» State in the BN , a fundamental precondition 
to the «Hinting» stream, but also to the «General help» stream (see Figure 31 ). 
The States represent the context and will orient between many different ways 
of satisfying the Feeling of the need to intervene (CTS general intention). lndeed , 
that Feeling is connected to three streams that can satisfy it ( «Hinting», «General 
help» and «Interactive diagnosis» ; see Figure 32), and it supplies them ali with "top-
dawn" energy. Thus, the Feeling orients generally what the agent will do (here: mak-
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Figure 32 Portion of the Behavior Network concerned with tutorial interventions. 
The red dot at the top represents the feeling of the need to intervene. When stimulated, it 
feeds in energy the three separate streams that are connected to it (they serve its 
satisfaction) . This illustrates that there is competition in the BN, even under the same 
feeling, ali this serving the goal of adapting to the user. 
ing an inteNention about the problem), and the context decides on the precise way 
that will roll out. ln the present situation (cause unknown), the «General help» 
stream is the one that gets ali its preconditions activated. 
For the coming explanations about the chain of actions in the BN, 1 will forego 
describing every time the loops through WM and will not mention every time that the 
hint or question needs to win the competition for consciousness, or that the question 
needs to have been joined by the appropriate answer choices and buttons before 
getting thrown into the Output Buffer, and so on. However, 1 insist that these shorter 
explanations should never be interpreted as though CTS behavior is deterministic, 
even if the BN is deterministic by its States (but not by the dynamics of energy flows) 
Choices through the BN depend on the combination of current and past events and 
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on what impact learning has had in the past. The combination of the variably acti-
vated Feelings, evolving links strengths and nades base activation creates what can 
hardly be called deterministic There is always competition in WM for the most rele-
vant information, and it is the winner that decides of the fate of the States in the BN . 
Moreover, a stream can at any time get interrupted by something more important 
appearing in WM. 
The first Behavior in the «General help» stream politely and respectfully asks 
whether the astronaut would like some help (Figure 31 ). A «No» would stop the 
show here and now; the States and Behaviors that have been stimulated would 
slowly decay away (temporarily leaving a predisposition for intervening23 ) . At that 
point, the context «Cause of difficulty unknown» and «lntervening approved» is no 
longer required , so the BN turns these States off (they are part of the de/ete list of 
that Behavior node; delete links appear in red) . 
Let's say the astronaut desires help and answered «Yes». That «Yes» stimu-
lates the «Help desired» State, which creates the context for saying «Choose your 
help» (Figure 31 ). That question is generated by the codelets that support this Be-
havior. They are Behavior codelets that are capable of using variable content to 
adapt the questions to the specifie situation . Sometimes, the questions are static (for 
example: «Have you established your milestones?» ), sometimes they refer to the 
precise situation ( «What would you say is the structure actually nearest to Cana-
darm?», shawn in Figure 33) and rely on options returned by the Domain Expert to 
propose adapted answer choices. Also part of the Behavior is the confirmation 
codelet that gets launched to verify that the astronaut responds to the question. 
23 Not "turning off' instantaneously leaves some sort of trace of what happened re-
cently. If the need for general help was asserted again in the coming moments, that stream 
would tire sooner because it still bears some activation . 
-----------------------------------
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Figure 33 Behavior codelets that implement the question proposed by the Behavior 
node: «What would you say is the structure actually nearest to Canadarm?». The 
Domain Expert returns five names of modules to this specifie request, which become the 
adapted answer choices presented to the user. 
From there, the stream splits between many paths . The choice the astronaut 
makes in the proposed menu will decide which State turns on and which Behavior 
sees its precondition(s) come alive. Let us assume that the astronaut wishes help on 
setting the views. What the designer of this BN has deemed appropriate is asking 
then whether the astronaut has established the milestones for his path; in other 
words, if he has planned the path he intends to impel to the Arm. Choices are of-
fered through information codelets that inform the composition codelet to use the 
propositions: «Yes», «No», and «What are milestones?» The last option triggers the 
Behavior that advertises the need for information about the concept of milestones, to 
which the Domain Expert will react, sending a text that the codelets will be able to 
use to inform the astronaut. Finally, when the proper Behavior has constructed the 
adapted material, it is assembled by the composition codelet that deposits the mes-
sage, complete with the «OK» button , in the Output Buffer. An intervention has been 
completed. 
Chapter 6 
COMPARING CTS WITH OTHER POPULAR ARCHITECTURES 
6.1 COMPARING CTS WITH A POPULAR AGENT ARCHITECTURE: BDI 
When considering real-world applications that deal with complexity, change 
and uncertainty, conventional approaches falter (Georgeff and lngrand, 1989). They 
are mostly designed for static worlds with perfect information. Talking in a 1999 
panel (Georgeff, Pell et al. , 1999), Georgeff reaffirmed his belief that, contrasting 
with conventional approaches, software agents, in particular BOl agents, provide the 
necessary elements to cope with the characteristics of our world . BOl aims at allow-
ing a resource-bound agent to deal with an uncertain situation in a timely fashion , 
before the world has changed again. Jiang and Vidal (2006) explain that BOl has 
shown to be a very successful architecture for several reasons: first, it has widely 
Figure 34 The BDI architecture. Source: d'lnverno, Kinny, Luck, Michael, et al. (1997). 
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accepted philosophical roots; second , there are logical frameworks for modeling and 
reasoning about BDI agents; third , there is a considerable set of software systems 
which employ the architecture's concepts. 
Strictly speaking , there is no single software architecture that represents BDI 
since BDI describes high-level structures (Figure 34), constraints and mechanisms 
from which one can derive an architecture. The fundamental ideas include a set of 
beliefs about the world, as set of desires, which are possible goals about reacting 
and acting on these beliefs, a library of plans that may be used in reaching the se-
lected goals, and intentions, organized in an intention structure. As originally pro-
posed by Bratman et al. ( 1988), a practical-reasoning system inspired by the BDI 
principles sees these structures manipulated by various mechanisms, among which: 
a Means-End Reasoner, an Opportunity Analyzer, a Filtering Process, and a Delib-
eration Process. 
PRS 24 (Figure 35) has been the first architecture implementing BDI concepts , 
and has been the foundation of numerous subsequent works. lt implements BDI 
CO MM AND 
G ENERA TO R 
Figure 35 An agent implementing BDI principles: PRS. Source: Georgeff and lngrand, 
1989. 
24 My description of PRS relies heavily on Georgeff and lngrand's (1989) paper. 
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ideas with (a) a database containing current beliefs of the agent and facts about the 
world ; (b) a set of current goals to be realized ; (c) a set of plans, or declarative pro-
cedure specifications (called Knowledge Areas, or KAs) describing how certain se-
quences of actions and tests may be performed to achieve given goals or to react to 
particular situations; ( d) an intention structure containing th ose plans th at have been 
chosen for (eventual) execution. 1 will describe in the following paragraphs how 
these structures, and the mechanism that manipulate them, have been implemented 
in PRS. 
The agent interacts with its environment, including other systems, through its 
database, or more precisely, through monitoring mechanism that evaluate if there 
are changes in what is gathered by the sensors, and that feed the database. This 
structure, originally populated with static information about the domain of application, 
acquires new beliefs through its beliet-revision function that responds to change in 
the environment. The agent selects goals about these beliefs, forming its desires, 
from which an intended goal is selected. The various ways intentions can be carried 
out are represented in KAs. A KA has a body, which describes the steps of the pro-
cedure, and an invocation condition, which specifies under what situations the KA is 
useful (applicable). BDI's filtering and filter-override mechanisms, which evaluate the 
options, are implemented as a meta/eve/, in special Knowledge Areas (KA) struc-
tures. Although the states descriptions that give the necessary preconditions to KAs 
are written in first-order logic, they can serve the unification process at the metalevel 
as weil as at that of regular KAs. These metalevel states describe internai system 
states, typically the beliefs, goals and intentions of the system about its own func-
tioning , as weil as other important processing information . 
The goals in PRS may be of various natures: goals of achievement, goals of 
maintenance, and goals to test for given conditions. And just as with state descrip-
tions, goal descriptions may characterize the internai behavior of the system (in 
meta/eve/ goal descriptions) . Goals create constraints on what options need be seri-
ously considered. They influence what beliefs are taken into consideration for the 
reasoning , and they give plans some resistance to reconsideration or abandon . That 
---------------~----
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is necessary for a certain level of consistency in the sequence of actions the agent is 
taking . lndeed, PRS could be subject to erratic jumping for many reasons, including 
its adoption of partial planning, and it continuous scan of the environment. 
Partial planning brings the benefit of better reactivity, allowing the imposition of 
temporal constraints . lt sidesteps the need to wait for a thoroughly worked-out and 
validated plan before getting into action . lt helps avoid having to abandon plans, 
which might occur frequently if plans were very specifie. 
When a goal has been selected and PRS has committed to a plan (selected 
one as the most appropriate ), it does not look back, unless significant changes hap-
pen in the environment. And PRS is very vigilant, with the interpreter continuously 
attempting to match KAs with any newly acquired beliefs or goals. The system is 
able to notice newly applicable KAs after every primitive action it takes. If estimated 
necessary, the agent reassesses its current intentions, and plans that were dis-
missed become subject to reconsideration , even though the new options are not 
means to any already intended end. PRS plans are interruptible, and can completely 
change its focus towards new goals when the situation warrants it. 
Bratman's Opportunity Analyser is the component that keeps the agent open to 
changes in the environment and proposes new options to pursue the existing plan 
and cope with new perceptions. lt exists in PRS as metalevel KAs, just as does the 
idea of the filter-override mechanism . But a fi/ter override mechanism run in parallel 
allows maintaining the equilibrium between the stability of plans (keeping the focus 
of the reasoning) and the necessary revocability, given that plans were selected on 
the basis of incomplete information (the agent does not live in an idealized world of 
perfect information and total predictability) . The override mechanism encodes the 
agent's sensitivities to problems and opportunities in its environment. An option that 
does not survive the compatibility filter may still be subject to consideration if it trig-
gers a filter override. The surviving options are put into a deliberation process that 
weights them against one another and , ultimately, the deliberation process produces 
new intentions. So, the addition of appropriate metalevel KAs enables the system to 
make more informed choices (at the cost of longer decision times) . 
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There are numerous parallels relating CTS to PRS. ln fact, although CTS has 
not been conceived with BDI in mind, it really incorporates ali of its components and 
principles, as 1 will briefly summarize below. 
What CTS knows about the world , its beliefs in BDI parlance, are contained in 
various constructs: States, the Domain Expert, the Learner Model, etc. The Domain 
Expert contains static knowledge about the world (domain tacts and procedures), 
and status of current operation ; the Learner Model contains static and dynamic be-
liefs about the learner (tacts and inferences); the States in its Behavior Network con-
tain transient beliefs about the world and about the internai operations of the agent; 
mid- and long-term memories are also naturally concerned. CTS' Behavior Network 
bears much resemblance with PRS Plans Library: Knowledge Areas exist here as 
Behaviors, and plans correspond to sequences that embody partial planning with 
intermediate goals and partial specification with many generic behaviors that get 
specified through deliberation. Goals in CTS may be of various types, with interests 
in external actions as weil as internai adaptation and operations. Behavior nodes 
partially depend on preconditions ("invocation conditions") to fire . The Feeling nodes 
represent the global goals the agent may entertain , and incorporate the idea of de-
sires. lndeed , Feelings that are stimulated after an Access Consciousness publica-
tion show the desires of the agent, the goals that may more or less be appropriate to 
the situation (indicated by the activation levels ). The Behavior th at gets selected for 
action indicates which sequence and goal the agent has elected, that is, its inten-
tions (held within an intention structure: a stream). 
The Behavior Network has parameters that allow balancing the agent's sensi-
tivity to the environment and its stubbornness {how much its Goal nodes drive its 
global behavior). The firing threshold for Behaviors nodes allows more or less time 
for the energy to reach the ending nodes of longer sequences, giving more or less 
time for the agent to "think" through the options. When a Behavior tires , it pushes its 
energy forward to the next nodes in the plan , progressively increasing the commit-
ment of the agent to a plan . Just as BDI specifies, sequences (plans) in CTS may be 
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interrupted. A State may "turn off' as the result of a change in the environment; it 
may also happen following the arrivai of an information that turns on a State or 
strongly stimulates another Feeling that pours a great amount of energy into another 
branch of a plan. CTS' Behavior Network is always listening to new perceptions, 
making implicit means-ends analysis. The base-leve! activation of Behavior nades, 
modified by one of CTS' learning mechanisms, indicates how much the nades are 
theoretically apt at treating a situation and deserve to be selected . 
Sorne more connections exist. CTS Attention mechanism does a job equiva-
lent to the compatibility filters proposed by the BDI theory. lts attention and meta-
cognition codelets serve sorne of the purposes of the filter-override mechanism and 
ali of BDI's metalevel. And both have deliberative capabilities. 
According to Jiang and Vidal (2006), the main problems about BDI architec-
tures are about finding how to efficiently implement these functions and how to reach 
the balance between being committed to and over-committed to one's intentions. 
And, as they stand, BDI architectures ignore the influence of emotions in decision-
making (Jiang and Vidal , 2006). The first two criticisms apply just as weil to CTS, at 
!east until more time is devoted to the elaboration of a clear methodology and crea-
tion of well-defined rules for the instantiation of CTS to a new domain. However, 
CTS exhibits here a supplemental feature: its ability to deal with feelings and emo-
tions. Emotions have not been implemented as of now, but they are part of the con-
ceptual madel, and have already been implemented in IDA (and redesigned for 
LIDA), CTS' mother. They modulate learning and have influence throughout the ar-
chitecture, in many aspects (see Franklin and McCauley, 2004). 
CTS adds a few other features to the BDI framework. First, the Feeling nades 
serve in granting the agent with a personality, which allows it to be more or less sen-
sitive to sorne events, and react with a strength corresponding to such personality. 
Second, its Working Memory is central to additional capabilities : CTS deliberative 
capabilities are stronger, allowing the building of plans on-the-fly; the meeting of 
codelets in Working Memory permits bath the learning of regularities, and the emer-
gence of creative solutions. If a new coalition has merit in the situation, it will be se-
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lected by the Attention mechanism and published by the Access Consciousness for 
the whole system to use and process. These possibilities are alien to the original BDI 
ideas. 
So, with CTS, researchers may reap the advantages of BDI with its weil known 
concepts, and explore new applications that would be hard to take on with only the 
native BDI theory. 
6.2 COMPARISON OF CTS WITH A COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE: ACT-R 
Understanding what is happening in the head of a human being is a complex 
task that needs to be addressed if one is hoping to have his system provide the best 
support to the user. Reactive architectures are limited in this respect. There is a lot 
going on at the same time in the user's mind: recognizing symbols, memorizing new 
information, processing the syntax of instructions, reasoning about events, and much 
more. Understanding and following the evolution of each aspect is hard enough , but 
having them show a coherent processing that corresponds to the real user is more 
than a challenge. This has brought Newell to suggest constructing cognitive architec-
tures such as SOAR (Newell , 1990). 
ACT-R is such a cognitive architecture. lt describes and implements cognition 
at the grain size of laboratory research , and is still able to put the pieces together in 
a model of complex cogn ition (Anderson, 1993, 2004 ). lt provides a potential bridge 
between basic cognitive psychology and education (Anderson and Gluck, 2001 ). 
Basic assumptions of ACT theories (ACT* and its evolution, ACT -R25) are that hu-
man cognition emerges through an interaction between a procedural memory and a 
declarative memory, and it unfolds as a sequence of so-called production ru/es. New 
chunks of knowledge are added to declarative memory when goals are achieved . 
25 1 am refering to version 5.0 of ACT-R in my comparison . 
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For instance, if a child sets the goal to add 4 to 3, counts up, and finds 7 as the an-
swer, the goal and the answer are assembled in a knowledge chunk and stored . The 
goal can later be retrieved with the associated answer. Chunks may also be formed 
from a perception of the environment. Although ACT-R makes use of a subsymbolic 
level that models learning and chunks availability following learning and practice, the 
architecture treats cognition as a symbolic system . This and the subsymbolic level 
do not model the actual neural learning process; they rather madel their effects by a 
set of equations that characterize these processes . New productions rules can be 
formed by compiling solutions found in declarative memory. Production rules can 
change the goal state. 
The performance of the architecture is both parallel-based and serial-based. 
Many modules operate in parallel , with seriai internai operations in each . The per-
ceptual layer contains a number of independent modules capable of running in parai-
lei with cognition and with each other. However, each of these modules is doing only 
External W orld 
Figure 36 ACT-R's architecture. Source: Anderson et al., 2004 
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one thing at a time. And just as activation levels play an essential role in chunk se-
lection , the next production rule is selected on the basis of the highest utility among 
ali those that apply to the situation (Lebiere et al. , 2004). The utility is a noisy esti-
mate of the probability that if this production is chosen , the current goal will be 
achieved . The highest valued production is always selected , but on sorne trials , one 
might randomly be more highly valued than another. 
Coordination in the behavior of these modules is achieved through a central 
production system. This central production system is not sensitive to most of the 
internai activity of these modules; it only responds to the limited amount of informa-
tion that is deposited in the buffers of these modules. lt parallels the tacts that real 
people are not aware of ali the information in their visual field but only the object they 
are currently attending to ; they are not aware of ali the information in long-term 
memory but only the fact currently retrieved . An example of this limited information 
communication is that the whole memory of the agent is not available to the rules, 
only of the content of the retrieval buffer, which holds information retrieved from 
long-term declarative memory. 
The manual buffer is responsible for control of the hands. One of the visual 
buffers, associated with the dorsal "where" path of the visual system, keeps track of 
locations, while the other, associated with the ventral "what" system, keeps track of 
visual objects and their identity. The contents of these buffers can be determined by 
rather elaborate systems within the modules. For instance, the contents of the visual 
buffers represent the products of complex processes of the visual perception and 
attention systems. The goal buffer keeps track of one's internai state in solving a 
problem . This is a special buffer that has links to declarative memory, making some 
nodes more accessible than ethers (Lovett, Reder and Lebiere, 1999), and which 
content primarily drives ACT-R. The current goal contains the information in the fe-
eus of attention . 
A final word about consciousness in ACT-R framework. Lovett, Reder and Le-
biere (1999) and Taatgen (2006) attempt at clarifying how ACT-R may incorporate 
consciousness, and they locate the bridge in declarative memory. The declarative 
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memory's nades above threshold may be considered as accessible to conscious 
awareness -- although only what is retrieved and put in the retrieval buffer is view-
able for action selection. That is, the system can be considered "aware" of the con-
tents of ali these buffers, i.e., it is aware of the currently attended visual stimulus, it is 
aware of the current action that is being taken, it is aware of the current goal , and the 
currently active fact in declarative memory. However, in the opinion of Gray, 
Schoelles and Myers (2003), its "consciousness capability" is limited since it cannat 
madel the difference between the implicit, unconscious use of a strategy or acting on 
instinct, and the result of the act only later becoming conscious . 
From this description , one can establish many parallels between ACT-R's and 
CTS's architectures. ln fact, there are a lot of similarities: a procedural memory, a 
semantic memory, buffers, learning (bath procedural and semantic), a rule-based 
functioning that considers the context, multiple specialized modules with internai 
seriality and with an independence that allows them to run in parallel , competition in 
the action selection that takes into account past utility of resources. There is also 
bath symbolic and sub-symbolic processing , and a cognitive cycle. 1 could draw a 
detailed comparison of the two architectures. ln the following subsections 1 will 
mostly li mit myself to painting out major differences. 
6.2.1 Comparison of the cognitive cycles 
Although the two systems' cognitive cycles differ considerably and thus one 
could suppose that this might incur significant differences in the agents' behavioral 
responses, 1 could identify only one major consequence directly related to the cycles: 
the interaction of information coming from the various sources (modules) in working 
memory. According to Anderson (Anderson et al., 2004), the cognitive cycle in 
ACT-R starts at the point in which the buffers hold representations determined by the 
external world and internai modules. Chunks in these buffers are recognized , a pro-
duction tires, and the buffers are then updated for another cycle . Thus, a production 
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rule in ACT -R corresponds to a specification of a cycle from the cortex, to the basal 
ganglia , and back again . 
ln CTS , the cycle is more detailed , with eight steps, as described in section 4.2. 
One major difference resulting from the cognitive cycles stands in the place and time 
that is allowed for information to meet and interact and compete in Working Memory 
before the winning structure is selected and fed to modules. ACT-R's cycle and ar-
chitecture do not allow for such natural , unsupervised interaction that could lead to 
spontaneous discovery of new regularities or solutions. 
6.2.2 Buffers vs. Working Memory 
ACT-R's buffers hold information that goes back and forth between the central 
production system and modules. Buffers could be thought of as holding the informa-
tion in the focus of attention . They are checked at every cycle by the production rules 
matching system to determine what rule is most appropriate to the context. CTS also 
has buffers, but they only play their traditional role of temporary information recepta-
cles for transiting information (i.e. Sensory Buffer, the focus, which holds information 
destined to declarative memories, and any buffer peripheral modules may need). 
CTS' Working Memory would be a better related structure to ACT-R's buffers. 
Although it may be tempting to correlate buffers in ACT-R with its working 
memory (1 certainly am tempted), this is an incorrect assumption according to Chud-
erski et al. (2006). The authors explain that working memory in ACT-R may be de-
fined in two ways: as a subset of highly active elements of declarative memory or as 
a process of spreading source activation (i.e. attentional resource) from current goal 
to declarative elements strongly linked with that goal. ln comparison , while CTS' 
Working Memory holds information returned by declarative memories related to the 
current context, as is the case in ACT-R, it also welcomes information from other 
processes. ln that way, it can as weil be thought of a corresponding to sorne of 
ACT-R's buffers. Contrary to these buffers, CTS' Working Memory it is not con-
strained, neither asto the type of information it may contain, nor asto the quantity of 
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information (as was explained in section 4.1.5, whereas IDA presents the same con-
straints as ACT-R in this respect, LIDA is somewhat relieved from them) . CTS' WM 
can be described as a physical meeting place for ali the information returned by ali 
modules and of value in the context; "meeting place" is quite an apt description here. 
lt allows a very interesting phenomenon to happen: creation of spontaneous asso-
ciations between information codelets , eventually leading to new coalitions (kind of 
equivalent to chunks); it also permits association of related coalitions during delib-
erations. The unconstrained interaction of the information, which is impossible in 
ACT-R, enables the learning of new regularities in the environment. lt also allows a 
powerful and rich voting mechanism through reinforcement and inhibition between 
the information codelets . lt could also explain a part of creativity as the unforeseen 
association of ideas. 
6.2.3 Representation of the context 
The variety of buffers in ACT-R, doubled by the goal stack, creates a multi-
aspectual context. ACT-R can involve a Learner Madel just as CTS does to keep 
track of the learner as part of the context of decision. ln addition , ACT-R keeps an 
implicit trace of the context in the activation level of its memory chunks and in the 
sub-symbolic equations that compute the utility of the ru les. 
CTS has similar uses of activation , but in more places. Whereas ACT-R shows 
activation only in its declarative memory, CTS maintains its representation of the 
environment as the activation of States, the activation of Behavior and Feel-
ing/Desire nodes, as fading coalitions in its Working Memory. 1 would say that CTS 
offers a slightly richer representation of the context. When we add the capacity of 
CTS' architecture to take into consideration user's affective state and the agent's 
own affective state, then we add a dimension that currently overwhelms ACT-R's 
architecture. Anderson et al. (2004) are taking into consideration the idea of adding 
multiple goal structures. 
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6.2.4 Learner's goals vs. Tutor's goals 
CTS Feeling nodes allows to clearly separate learner (or more generally, 
user's) goals from the tutor's (or more generally, the artificial agent's), and maintain 
them simultaneously. The Domain Expert tries to keep track of the operations the 
learner is pursuing. The Feeling nodes (in the Behavior Network) represent the vari-
ous global goals the agent may entertain in as a tutor. 1 do not think ACT-R allows 
for such separation of goals. 
6.2.5 Information selection 
CTS' Working Memory is a pool inspected by the Attention mechanism that se-
lects the most important information at the moment for system-wide publication . Not 
everything contributed by modules and other processes is of equal value. ln CTS, 
the global activation value of a coalition indicates how important that information is, 
either intrinsically or with respect to the current situation . So, some things may be 
temporarily neglected to the benefit of more urgent or otherwise important informa-
tion, as indicated by the activation of the coalition . 
ACT-R functioning realizes something somewhat similar with its goal stack. Al-
though buffers contain only one kit of chunks at a time, previous collections are 
called back when a previous goal pops back up on top of the stack. Elements in the 
buffers ( corresponding to the left-hand si de of ru les) are not attributed values; the re 
is only a plain unification taking place. However, expected utility calculations for the 
ru les achieve the sa me result. What it just does not permit is the competition of goals 
for prioritization . 
ln ACT-R, the goals in the goal stack (up to version 5.0) ali influence the 
analysis of the situation by the declarative memory, just as CTS' Feelings and De-
sires do influence the action selection . ACT-R's conflict resolution mechanism (which 
analyses at the sub-symbolic level the expected benefit of taking various actions) 
leads to the same prioritizing of information as that in CTS because the rule selected 
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is chosen partly on the basis of the current value (importance) of the information. 
From that point of view, its does a job resembling that of the attention mechanism of 
CTS looking over Working Memory. ACT-R conflict resolution may, just as in CTS, 
lead to usefully neglecting sorne information. That will happen when a rule with a 
left-hand side not considering sorne information, computes to a higher expected util-
ity than a rule that integrales more buffers. However, CTS does not need to have 
predetermined specifie rules that make use of only part of that information to select it 
(or ignore it). ln CTS, the most globally energized coalition simply is selected and 
published , then the various modules decide whether they use it. There is no burden 
on a central coordinator and on its designer, leaving each separate module do what-
ever its designer has planned for that information. 
What's more, although many coalitions are predetermined by the system de-
signers or learned in the course of the operation, they do not have to be predeter-
mined or exist in declarative memory for their usefulness to be calculated and be 
selected; generic rules of association allow on-the-fly coalition formation in working 
memory, sometimes building unexpected combinations. If such combination reflects 
a regularity, the implicit learning mechanism will eventually learn it as a valuable, 
stable coalition, creating a new element for the declarative memory to assimilate. At 
that point, ACT-R chunking mechanism resembles CTS' coalition creation process. 
6.2.6 Action selection 
CTS's Behavior Network is, in part, a rule-based system where States play the 
role of the left hand side in a production rule. A State turns on when it recognizes in 
a broadcast the information it corresponds to, and in so doing, it serves as precondi-
tions (complete or partial) of the action node. The same State is also the confirma-
tion of the effect of the previous action. This description of the context is relatively 
stable (a State has to be turned off, or slowly does so on its own), so the Behavior 
Network is always up-to-date with the situation. Then, there is the energy part of the 
planning mechanism that complements the "logical" one. States feed Behavior 
----------------
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nodes with activation , "priming" them and indicating which ones are appropriate to 
the context; Feelings do the same, from "atop", indicating the current global goals of 
the agent (many may be active at the same time with varying strength), either react-
ing to the environment orto an "internai professional agenda" . 
ACT-R has sorne of the same energy mechanism, with current goals giving ac-
tivation to nodes in the declarative memory. The base-level activation , that effects 
the learning from experience in CTS, exists only in memory chunks; it nevertheless 
also exists for rules but under another appearance, as ru/es utility calculations. 
These subsymbolic processes keep a memory of past outcomes, estimating the cost 
(intime) of the operation and the probability of reaching the goal. 
What is different in CTS is that the summation of the energy sources in each 
Behavior node, combining with the base level activation of each (which reflects past 
successes of a Behavior), is somewhat resilient and perpetually shows which is the 
most globally appropriate Behavior (one may think of these Behavior nod es as the 
candidate immediate goals or, in Baars words, the local goal context). There is no 
need to completely reevaluate the whole rule base at every cycle and redo the prob-
ability computations, as ACT-R needs to do. A light iterative update on the activation 
values (a summation process) suffices. 
6.2.7 Consciousness in ACT-Rand CTS 
These two systems bear commonalities on awareness and consciousness. ln 
ACT-R, there is unconscious processing at the subsymbolic level (these processes 
are not controlled by the "conscious" rules) , and within the various modules. What 
modules deposit in their respective buffers is the information that could be thought of 
as becoming available to consciousness. 1 would say that it is brought to the "sys-
tem's" awareness when it is processed by the central production system to produce 
a system-leve! actions (the agent taking an action). 1 put "system" in quotations 
marks because the "system" here is, in fact, only the central processing module, and 
not the whole agent, as is the case in CTS processing. The rest of the system is 
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made aware of only the effect of the conscious content when new stuff is deposited 
in the buffers by the rule . 
ln CTS, what is selected for becoming conscious is published at large, to the 
whole system (in the proper sense, this time) so that ali the various modules become 
aware of it and may process it. ACT-R has a centralized processing of what has 
been made "conscious", whilest CTS has a distributed processing of that information. 
We can point out two other differences with respect to consciousness. First, 
there is nothing in CTS' architecture prohibiting the firing of unconscious actions. For 
instance, no central rule is involved in voluntarily, "consciously" updating the buffers. 
Another example is that sorne codelets may have become part of an automated 
process and send sorne requests to a database without recourse to conscious in-
volvement (publication). The information coming back could however be processed 
by the perception , eventually bringing the result of the action to consciousness. 
ACT-R can only take "conscious" , voluntary actions towards the external world . 
Second difference, CTS involves multiple levels of analysis and action-taking. 
lts metacognitive codelets analyse what is happening in the agent, what success 
plans have, find repeating information and temporal patterns. They may react and 
ask for the correction of sorne Behavior. To my knowledge, ACT-R has no specifie 
mechanism allowing for such metacognition ; once the information has been grabbed 
by a rule , it will very likely be modified and cannat serve a second pass for metacog-
nitive analysis. Metacognitive rules could fire first and leave buffers untouched, but 
they still would not allow for temporal correlations. 
6.2.8 Summing up 
The two architectures have much in common, more than 1 would have antici-
pated at first. They bath rely on a strong commitment to a cognitive approach to the 
mind and rest on empirical research , although one must recognize that ACT-R has 
an edge with respect to exact correspondence with empirical data . lt has been very 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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much validated . However, CTS will continue to progress and may reach an equiva-
lent validation status, especially with the continuing work of professors' Franklin and 
Baars team on LIDA. CTS may have an edge over ACT-R on some aspects: (a) its 
Working Memory allows information to simmer and create unforeseen associations; 
(b) this creation of associations may lead to new concepts creation, allowing for the 
learning of the environment; (c) its clear separation of the tutoring know-how and of 
the user modeling facilitates the independent design and improvement of the two 
aspects; (d) its generic processes for information selection in Working Memory allow 
for a relatively easy extension of the architecture with complementary modules; (e) 
CTS better reproduces at least one aspect of consciousness: it may take uncon-
scious actions on the environment and become conscious of only the results ; (f) its 
multiple levels of analyses incorporate autonomous metacognitive capabilities ; (g) 
with its essentially distributed processing, CTS lets behaviors emerge much more 
than ACT-R allows with its centralized rules system . lt is CTS' fundamental empha-
sis on consciousness mechanisms that grants it many of these advantages. 
Which is best? ACT-R gives more control to the designers; CTS incorporates 
a multi-level, multi-aspectual analysis of the situation and allows for a more "natural", 
emergent behavior. Ali in ali , it depends on what you are looking for from the system! 
Chapter 7 
VALIDATION AND EVALUATION 
The fundamental goal of this research is to establish the potential of using 
Baars' Global Workspace (GW) principles and their implementation in Franklin 's ar-
chitecture, IDA (recently extended into LIDA), for building an efficient artificial tutor-
ing agent. So what 1 need to establish as a proof of concept is the capability of the 
GW-based architecture to support valuable tutoring services such as madel tracing, 
coaching , criticizing , diagnosing, etc. 1 present in this chapter a more formai evalua-
tion of how weil this goal is reached . 
7.1 VALIDATION METHODOLOGY 
The method 1 apply for the validation is an expert analytical evaluation that 
compares CTS to three elements: 
• the GW theory; 
• commentaries from Leo Hartman, a Technologies specialist at the Canadian 
Space Agency (CSA), about the needed behaviors for the tutoring agent; 
• behaviors, strategies and rules inferred from field observations 1 made at the 
CSA during astronauts' training to Canadarm2 manipulation. 
The analyses for the first point serve to validate CTS as reflecting appropriately 
the GW theory; 1 will simply summarize here the parallels that have been drawn 
throughout Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, and offer my opinion about the conformity of 
CTS. Being very close to IDA, which raison d 'être is to implement Baars' theory, it 
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seems very unlikely that this target could have been missed. Nevertheless, our own 
modifications might have taken CTS out of the realm of direct implementations of 
GW theory, and this is something that needs to be assessed. 
Mr. Hartman has inspected the madel showing the proposed behaviors for 
CTS just before construction of the Behavior Network began. His comments were 
noted and integrated as much as possible in the appropriate structures of the proto-
type. These expert observations have been complemented by first-hand field obser-
vations of astronauts being trained by professional tutors. 1 observed the tutors 
actions , reactions, initiatives and strategies while 1 had the privilege of standing next 
to the astronauts to note their attitudes and reactions to the tutors instructions and 
interventions. The notes obtained from this and from collaboration with Mr. Hartman 
yielded many crucial artifacts: 
a) a list of valid tutoring behaviors; 
b) examples of reactions to be expected from the astronauts; 
c) examples of tutoring situations that inspired the proposed scenarios. 
The interventions that CTS made while traversing the scenarios presented in 
Chapter 5 can now be gauged against what is expected . 
The real test will happen when we can submit CTS to "real-world" interactions 
with astronauts on tutoring sessions. ln its current state, CTS does not include 
enough tutoring knowledge, pedagogical strategies, and domain knowledge to offer 
valuable tutoring advice in a variety of situations. Only setups corresponding to the 
described scenarios can be sustained. 
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7.2 RESULTS 
7.2.1 Validating CTS against the Global Workspace theory 
The main idea of the Global Workspace theory is that the brain has a way to al-
law separate, distributed processors (neuronal groups) to share information when 
needed, to collaborate and coordinate their efforts. ln essence, this theory has ex-
plicit raies for consciousness. Chapter 2 enunciated the principles of Baars ' Global 
Workspace (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) and the functions consciousness plays in 
the human mind (see section 2.3.4). 1 recall them here and show how CTS integrates 
them. 
Princip/es: 
• The distributed and decentralized nature of processing 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
The brain is massively parallel, with 
a collection of distributed specialized 
networks; the processing is widely 
decentralized in any given task. The 
detailed work is done by millions of 
specialized neural groupings without 
specifie instructions from some 
command centre. Conscious pme-
esses have a great range of possible 
contents, but the range of any single 
unconscious processor is 
limited. 
ln CTS 
CTS operates on the basis of collec-
tions of codelets and specialized 
modules that work independently 
from one another. Codelets are es-
pecially meant to be highly efficient 
at processing a simple aspect. How-
ever, there is nothing currently con-
straining codelets complexity; 
designers have to do their best to 
respect this line of conduct. 
Modules operate on the same prem-
ise of specialization, each also ren-
dering a specifie service but at a 
higher level of organization: tracking 
user's knowledge, user's mood, re-
membering user's psychological pro-
file, memorizing events and 
concepts, analyzing user's maneu-
vers, and so on. 
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• The collaborative and competitive nature processing 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
There is competition between the 
multiple sources to become con-
scious. 
The various brain regions collaborate 
to deal with the situation at hand, 
supply information or process what is 
published. 
• Information converges then diverges 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Global Workspace theory (GW) sug-
gests that conscious experiences 
involve widespread distribution of 
focal information obtained from mul-
tiple sources converging and orga-
nizing themselves together. 
ln CTS 
There is competition in the Behavior 
Network for the selection of the most 
relevant Behavior in the current con-
text, just as the Behavior nodes 
shunt those that would undo their 
preconditions. 
There is collaboration from various 
modules to lend a hand when they 
can help, bringing information or 
processing power. Collaboration is 
also found between individual 
codelets through associations that 
create coalitions and that stimulate 
other codelets. 
ln CTS 
The information parcels are sent 
from the various sources to Working 
Memory. There, they organize them-
selves in coalitions. Then , the one 
selected is broadcast, announced at 
large, diverging towards ali the sub-
systems. 
• Recruiting of unconscious resources is due to consciousness 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Consciousness is needed to trigger a 
great number of automatic routines 
that make up specifie actions. 
ln CTS 
What cornes to Consciousness 
brings the modules and various at-
tentional resources to react and ei-
ther send in codelets containing 
sorne information they possess, or 
take charge of some aspect of the 
situation and contribute to the resolu-
tion. 
~-----------
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• Interpretation is related to multiple levels of context 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Some unconscious networks, called 
contexts, shape conscious contents 
and strongly influence conscious 
processes. 
According to Baars, we continually 
benefit from a host of mental con-
texts without experiencing them as 
abjects of conscious experience. As 
long as they are successful, contex-
tual predictions give no sign of their 
existence (Baars, 1997b, p.116). 
ln CTS 
Many things in CTS form the context 
that brings meaning to what has 
been perceived : States, activation of 
Feelings and Desires, activation re-
ceived by a Behavior node from con-
nected anterior nades, links strength , 
base-level activation in Behavior 
nades, operation tracking by the 
Domain Expert, and analyses by the 
various modules of the Learner 
Madel. They ali propose an interpre-
tation of the events and influence 
which codelets will start working . 
Expectation codelets also take an 
important role here. They are by na-
ture totally contextual , being emitted 
by a Behavior node. If an information 
element coming into WM tells of a 
mismatch to what it expected, the 
codelet puts into WM information 
code let( s) stating its interpretation of 
the event. Otherwise, it dies away 
when satisfied. 
• Seriality and the limited capacity of consciousness vs. the parallel uncon-
scious 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Conscious ideas occur one after 
another (serially) (Baars , 1997b, 
p.63). There cannat be more than 
one idea conscious at a time, but 
unconscious processors can operate 
in parallel. 
lnCTS 
ln CTS, Consciousness publishes a 
single idea (coalition of information) 
at a time, although it may be rich. 
But lots of processing happens in 
parallel, in various modules, and in 
each individual codelet (although this 
parallelism is somewhat simulated , 
due to technical restrictions). 
- --- ------·------- -----
• The cognitive cycle 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
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ln CTS 
The cognitive cycle is an hypothesis 
set forth in IDA (Baars and Franklin , 
2003) to better explain the multiple 
operations happening in the brain. 
Moreover, it is organized to preserve 
consciousness seriality by putting 
conscious broadcast as a specifie 
step within it. But the cycle is not part 
of Baars GW theory in itself. Never-
theless , it has been kept from IDA as 
it offers a much better understanding 
of the theory and of the brains opera-
tions. 
• The highly structured and internally consistent nature of conscious ideas 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Selective attention always involves a 
densely coherent stream of events. 
We never mix up two streams of 
speech with different contents, or 
even with different vocal quality. lt is 
generally true that conscious experi-
ences are internally consistent. 
lnCTS 
ln CTS, percepts are naturally struc-
tured and consistent since the Per-
ception Network has been designed 
so, thus the coalitions that are 
formed from them. Coalitions may 
evolve and enrich from what is sup-
plied by various modules; rules have 
been set to specify how information 
codelets may attach , preserving 
structure and consistency. 
• There is a deep level of context that is stable and guides ail other processes: 
the Self 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Self refers to the deepest levels of 
context: the basic intentions and 
expectations we have toward the 
world , ourselves and each other. lt is 
a framework that remains lar el 
ln CTS 
The Self is implemented in part in 
CTS' Feelings and Desires. Partly 
formed by innate dispositions, partly 
by past experiences and their out-
come, it also exists in the form of 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
stable across many different life 
situations and guides our lives. 
Largely unconscious, it nonetheless 
profoundly shapes our conscious 
thoughts and experiences. Different 
levels of self seem to work together. 
• Voluntary and involuntary attention 
ln Baars' GW Theory 
Most shifts of attention are not under 
moment-tc-moment voluntary con-
trol. Mismatch-detection may trigger 
our attentional mechanism to direct 
the surprising event to conscious-
ness. 
But one may willingly decide to priori-
tize sorne source or sorne type of 
information, in other words, to focus 
one's attention to it. 
Functions of consciousness: 
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ln CTS 
links and their strength in the BN, 
and in base-level activation of the BN 
nodes. lnnate dispositions are atti-
tudes put in place within the Feelings 
(specifie sensitivity to sorne events) 
by the system's designer, or eventu-
ally by auto-adjustment. 
ln CTS 
-------
lnvoluntary attention happens in CTS 
in each single cycle from the natural 
selection of the most activated coali-
tion in WM, eventually coming from 
the action of an expectation codelet 
that suddenly puts sorne strong 
piece of information into WM. 
Voluntary attention is created with 
short-lived attention codelets sent by 
a Behavior or by sorne metacognition 
codelet. They will eventually rein-
force a coalition corresponding to 
sorne piece of information they moni-
tor in WM. 
• Creating access to unconscious resources 
Something put into CTS' Working Memory may be selected by the Spotlight 
Manager (the Attention mechanism) and broadcast to ali codelets and periph-
eral modules by the Access Consciousness. This is the only way to voluntarily 
send information to otherwise unreachable codelets. So, the "unconscious" 
resources become aware of the information by its "coming to Consciousness". 
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• Prioritizing 
The items of information th at exist in WM as coalitions (or assemble the re) 
add their activation (their importance) ta the central node of their coalition. 
Their importance is key ta being selected for broadcasting . Additional activa-
tion may come from an attention codelet that joins a specifie coalition , aug-
menting is importance, thus the probability that it will be selected before other 
coalitions. The activation level of a coalition is how information is prioritized, 
and this is what happens in Working Memory with the competition among coa-
litions. 
• Using unconscious errer-detection and correcting defective perceptions 
Sorne of this errer-detection is accomplished by expectation codelets, watch-
ing the outcomes, determining if they corresponds ta what was expected . If 
there is mismatch, they put an information codelet about their observation into 
WM . 
Another part of errer-detection is made by attention codelets noticing prob-
lematic situations such as when sorne information element returned by De-
clarative Memory has no relation ta the current context. Metacognition 
codelets also do errer-detection and eventually cause plans editing . One of 
them may observe, for instance, that the same plan , or the same strategy, has 
been used more than once in the current situation without success, indicative 
of the need for a repair in the assumptions of the system or the inference 
process. Metacognition codelets are not currently implemented, but are part of 
planned additions. The remainder of this function will be accomplished by the 
natural "clean-up" function offered by Declarative Memories: the associations 
that are returned by the Sparse Distributed Memory (the algorithm used ta 
create our Transient Episodic Memory) do sorne fill -in-the-blanks, returning 
prototypical or "averaged" information which can be used ta replace partial or 
corrupted information that it received as input (this kind of behavior is part of 
Kanerva 's ideas). An aspect that is not accomplished in our architecture is the 
clean-up that normally takes place during perception , giving meaning ta the 
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stimulus if it can be recognized , or finding the closest match. CTS' environ-
ment being fixed in nature, we did not need to concern ourselves with this. 
• Problem-solving and plans editing 
Our BN finds the best available way to solve a problem (react to the situation 
or act upon what is believed about the future) thanks to the information it itera-
tively receives from the Consciousness publications. This broadcasting organ 
also serves to solicit collaboration from peripheral modules so that they send 
needed information or do processing required to fix a problematic situation. 
For example, the Domain Expert sends the appropriate hint's content so that 
CTS may take care of the astronaut's inactivity. Another form of problem-
solving is the interactive, on-line building of a delivery (presentation) plan, 
when CTS is asked by the astronaut to do some teaching on some concept. 
Initial design for a BN stream has been made for such a stream; its principles 
have been presented in Dubois (2005). 
"Soft" plans editing is done, for some part, in deliberations: iterations of publi-
cations-responses supply the needed specifies for the interventions. Plans ed-
iting also comes by the learning in Behavior nodes base-level activation (plans 
that do not work get weaker). But stronger plans editing is considered , and 
would be implemented in a collection of streams in the BN. 
• Adapting mental structures for learning 
This adaptation refers to the time needed for declarative memory structures to 
reshape to accommodate new material. Without consciousness, which cre-
ates a stable and "durable" information, learning would not have the chance to 
occur, at least not for very different information. This role is hidden within the 
broadcasting in our architecture: learning in declarative memories only hap-
pens from what is broadcast; what is fed to them directly from WM only serves 
for the reca/1 of the associations, not for learning anything. 
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• Reflection , self-monitoring and executive control 
Reflection is present in CTS' deliberations, where the agent becomes aware 
of concepts and ideas that show up in its Working Memory from various 
sources, including from attention codelets that try to bring up to conscious-
ness things they notice . ln sorne way, it resembles the inner voice that we ex-
perience and use to discuss with ourselves. Self-monitoring is accomplished 
by the metacognitive codelets that keep analyzing the agent's functioning . Ex-
ecutive control is present in the Feelings/Desires that drive the BN; it is found 
also in the innate attention codelets , and in the orientation of the Attention 
mechanism by temporary attention codelets that can be released by the BN to 
bias information selection. 
• Creating the context for understanding 
Context is unconscious, but is brought about thanks to the conscious publica-
tions. CTS' Access Consciousness publishes information that makes ali mod-
ules aware of the situation . Traces of this broadcast appear everywhere in the 
architecture: as States in the BN, in the statistics updated in the LKM, in the 
tracking made by the Domain Expert. These "priming" events influence which 
codelets will become active next. Consciousness also creates context by the 
coalitions growing camp/ex, that is, include many aspects of the situation: the 
context. ln this way, when broadcast, a whole context is presented to the lis-
tening codelets and modules. 
• Optimizing the trade-off between organization and flexibility 
As long as available plans (in the BN) and solutions work, the optimized un-
conscious processes keep going. If unexpected results happen, though , new 
solutions are sought, either within the BN , or through plan repairs and modifi-
cations (not implemented yet in CTS, but feasible). Also, feedback to Behavior 
nodes by expectation codelets reinforce successful acts and tend to favor so-
lutions that work. Metacognition codelets (none have been implemented yet) 
noticing difficulties (through conscious broadcastings) with a plan may do mi-
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nor plan repairs , or request that deeper analyses be conducted . They may re-
quest that plan reparation streams (not designed, but feasible) be putto work 
to adapt the plans. 
• Recruiting and controlling actions (James' ideomotor theory) 
This point resembles the recruiting of resources, but brings the idea that any 
idea (internai proposai) for an action that cames to mind (to consciousness) is 
acted upon unless it provokes some opposing idea or some counter proposai. 
James gives an illustration of not wanting to get out of bed and blocking this 
act, until the mind gets wandering about the load of the day and suddenly, one 
realizes that he got out of bed, as the automatic morning action . Volition (vol-
untary orientation of actions) has stopped blocking the automatic response to 
planning the day while in bed. We have implemented that portion of the ideo-
motor theory with inhibitions in the BN, and with codelets opposing a proposi-
tion during deliberations. 
ln summary, 1 conclude that CTS does implement most of Baars' theory, even 
if some aspects are part of future works. 
7.2.2 Validating CTS against some behaviors that are expected from a tutor 
7.2.2.1 Indications received from the CSA's specialist 
What is expected from CTS has been dictated by an analytical evaluation from 
a Canadian Space Agency specialist, Mr. Leo Hartman. He has been presented a 
mock-up of the proposed prototype for CTS. His observations have been taken into 
account when elaborating the behaviors available to CTS and its user interface. 
Comments referring exclusively to the simulator are not presented here, which may 
--------
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give a false impression that he commented almost exclusively on the user interface. 
Relevant comments can be summarized as: 
• Keep text boxes short; do not offer lengthy commentaries. 
• Offer a recap after an exercise. 
• Use a friendly style; do not use a literary style orto polite preambles. 
• Do not insist on helping or offering orientation after the astronaut has been 
given the option to say "No, thanks! " Do not pursue the intervention to offer 
any "very interesting" supplementary tip. 
• If the astronaut says "No, 1 do not want help", he really means it. Give him the 
chance to express himself about this , and respect his wishes. 
• Choice boxes need to be perfectly adapted to the context. 
• The astronaut needs to be able to "play" with the Station and examine the 
situation from any angle. 
7.2.2.2 Indications inferred from field observations 
Field observation of astronauts' training also gave me many precious indica-
tions on how actual tutors ought to behave, what type of intervention they put for-
ward, and when they chose to remain silent. Four excerpts of the interactions appear 
in Appendix D. They illustrate the kind of notes that 1 took; not ali principles enunci-
ated below can be illustrated by this subset. Sorne of these principles are: 
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Table 7-1 Behaviors observed from human tutors at the Canadian Space 
Agency. 
Behavior observed Related Implementa-
excerpt(s) ti on 
Feedbacks, even words of encouragement, are 1 and 4 ln future works 
offered in a very calm tone. 
When the astronaut pauses for some time, the tu- 3 lmplemented, 
tor tries to determine the source of the problem. except for 
The tutor either has an idea of the problem the "looking at 
astronaut locked himself into, or looks at his face to learner's face" 
try to evaluate what is happening in his mind, or 
asks straight out for clarifications . 
When the astronaut moves Canadarm2 too close none lmplemented 
to a Station 's structure, the tutor does not point it (in a BN 
out at the outset, but rather hints at the impending 
stream) problem. 
The tutor does not always react when he detects a 2 lmplemented 
problem . His behavior indicates that he sometimes (see sce- (with simu-
evaluates that it would be beneficiai to wait before 
intervening . nario 2) lated Learner Model) 
When the astronaut makes several trips back-and- none Soon 
forth to the scaled-down model of the Space Sta- (with attention tion behind him, the tutor understands that the as-
tronauts has a difficulty with understanding the codelets) 
current views. 
There is plenty of supportive feedback, probably to 4 lmplemented 
create an immediate reinforcement of good think- (not dem- (in a BN ing and appropriate maneuvering (implemented but 
onstrated stream) 
not demonstrated in the presented scenarios). (ex- in scenar-
cerpt 4) ios) 
There is always recapitulation at the end of an ex- 1 ln future works 
ercise, pointing out good thinking , well-done ma- (required TEM 
neuvers, and mistakes with suggestions for a 
and more ma-better performance next time. terial in DE) 
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Behavior observed Related Implementa-
excerpt(s) ti on 
Teaching and tutoring of the astronauts use scaf- none ln future works 
folding with in and over many !essons (tutors pre- (required more 
sent gradually more complex concepts and 
streams, and 
maneuvers that use previously learned material). 
more material 
in DE) 
The coaching offers much help in the first attempts, none ln future works 
and progressively reduces support when the astro- (requires LKM, 
nauts manifests the capability to do more, or faster, 
or attention 
without mistake. 
codelets with 
more complex 
BN streams) 
Manipulating the physical abjects is very helpful 3 lmplemented 
and strongly recommended . (partly (uses a virtual 
observ- camera of the 
able there) simulator) 
7.2.3 Comparison of CTS' performances to CSA's specialist recommendations 
and field observations 
CTS has been submitted to the scenarios set out in section 5.4. lts reactions 
demonstrate that, even in its prototype state, it makes correct use of the strategies 
that have been incorporated in it: detecting unwarranted silences or inactivity, using 
progressive hinting, and refraining from intervening when it is better not to . Although 
humans do that kind of thing ali the time, it is not so straightforward to accomplish it 
right. Some human tutors talk too much, some offer too much help when they should 
just give a few hints. Some intervene ali the time, or conversely do not offer enough 
support. 
__ _j 
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The initial trials of CTS show that it reacts in the expected ways when submit-
ted to the proposed situations. lt is able to choose an appropriate action when it de-
tects inactivity on the astronaut's part. For that, it makes use of the cause proposed 
by the Learner Model; if it cannet think of a reason for the silence (the sub-modules 
of the Learner Model supply no probable cause) , and if the idea of intervening does 
not get opposed, then it makes an offer for help (Figure 37), which will then be fol-
lowed by choices if the astronaut accepts. Since the LM is still under development, it 
has been simulated. But when it becomes available, 1 am confident that the architec-
ture will process its richer contributions correctly. 
~ Seled Camera i Perspecttve [!JQ 1 Monitor 1 
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CTS : Choice 
Wowld youl1kesomehelp? 
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Figure 37 When CTS cannot think of a cause, it simply offers help (if the idea of in-
tervening is not opposed during the deliberation). If the astronaut accepts, then choices 
are offered for selecting the help desired . 
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CTS also detects incorrect procedures and gives feedback that solicits the as-
tronaut's metacognitive thinking . CTS can choose the appropriate way for giving 
feedback among those available: hinting (Figure 38), stating the fact, highlighting the 
problematic element on screen , or replaying the last maneuver. Here, again , the 
Learner Madel has been simulated, but information returned by the stubs has been 
properly used by the rest of the architecture. 
CTS is also capable of diagnosing a situation. lts primary mechanism for this, 
- ,}-. ~ - ~ =. 
Action Proximity Oe11lls 
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Figure 38 CTS reacts to an incorrect procedure. Here, the astronaut started moving 
Canadarm2 before creating ali the necessary views on the three monitors. Admittedly, the 
help windows presented could use some polishing with choices like «No», «Why do you 
ask?». ln any case, if the astronaut does not answer this message by adopting the needed 
corrections, CTS presents a more specifie hint, then the plain fact, and , if nothing helps, the 
appropriate operation. Four levels of hints are the current remediation available. 
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the Learner Model, still under development, is complemented by an interactive diag-
nosis sequences found in the Behavior Network. One has been elaborated for diag-
nosing and remediating proximity situations (see Appendix F). lt performs quite weil, 
reorienting the line of questioning and the actions proposed on the basis of the as-
tronaut's answers. The publications (the elected information becoming conscious) 
set properly the context in the BN . 
These simple evaluations demonstrate CTS capability to take into account 
many sources of information, to combine their specialized abilities and prioritize what 
occupies its Working Memory. They also demonstrate its ability to choose an action 
appropriate to the context, deliberate to adapt the intervention, and even decide 
whether it should intervene or remain silent. The agent's resulting behavior emerges 
as a natural process that even incorporates intuitive processing . 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
1 believe the results of my research efforts contribute both to cognitive sciences 
and to the field of artificial intelligence in education (AIED). ln particular, it should be 
of interest as: 
1. a new implementation of Baars' theory (we completely reimplemented 
IDA), presenting at the same time an exploration of other ways to im-
plement Franklin's ideas . 
2. a new cognitive tutor infrastructure with an architecture based on a the-
ory of cognition that incorporates an explicit consciousness mechanism 
as its core. lt offers an exploratory tool for cognitive scientists (mostly 
for philosophers, psychologists, linguists) and an alternative platform for 
ITS designers to build cognitive tutors. This is a significant contribution 
in AIED field where current cognitive tutors are ali based on ACT-R. 
3. a framework for developing other "conscious" cognitive agents with new 
insights about how to think about and use a cognitive architecture. This 
opens the door for other agents and other applications to make use of 
the most powerful adaptive means human kind exhibits: consciousness. 
lts modular architecture should be of interest to learning systems de-
signers. 
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4. a project that already offered opportunities to many students for learn-
ing, for gaining experience in research and obtaining their diplomas; a 
project that offers many open avenues for other researches. 
The second point deserves a few lines here, as it has rather been left alone in 
my document. lndeed , 1 find myself very excited at the prospect that ITS designers 
may use CTS as a foundation to be completed and extended. The reasons 1 see for 
them doing so is that the architecture offers a powerful holistic approach to analyses, 
adaptation and planning. CTS' decision processes and actions can take into account 
multiple factors naturally: learner state in its varied facets (knowledge, learning 
trends, psychological profile, mood and emotions), tutoring knowledge, and CTS 
goals as a proficient tutor that wishes to pursue the objectives of the pedagogical 
theory he currently "believes" in . lts parallel processing of ali the aspects, their itera-
tive addition through deliberation and their combination in Working Memory make for 
a rich decision process that is very flexible, very adaptive. The prioritization accom-
plished by the Attention mechanism helps eut through too various possible actions, 
through too much information, and concentrate on what is of paramount importance. 
Without the capacity to learn and improve, a tutor may become very annoying 
to learners, with unavoidable twitches and irritating personality traits. Happily, CTS 
can learn and can adapt to the context. Attention and metacognitive codelets make it 
relatively easy to add and retine specifie behaviors, even if CTS does not yet have a 
full-blown transformation mechanism for its Behavior Network, with only "soft" adap-
tation capabilities . The Feelings can be easily molded to support new attitudes, new 
personalities. lts modularity permits the addition of new capabilities that may be de-
veloped and perfected separately, for instance new processing options based on 
supplemental pedagogical theories. 
When 1 start elaborating on the potential of the architecture, my mind becomes 
on tire and 1 can easily get carried away. Much work remains to be done, even just to 
complete the cognitive architecture and to enrich the pedagogical capabilities, and 
even more to reach this architecture's full potential. But 1 perceive these as very mo-
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tivating prospects. 1 know 1 will witness this framework becoming a better tool, and 
CTS progressively turning into a convincing interlocutor. 1 have a strong desire of 
offering a cognitively interesting architecture, a framework for powerful agents , and 
reusable facilities for new levels of tutoring systems. 
Here is a list of works 1 intend to pursue in the coming months (and years!): 
Making CTS application to astronauts training more powerful 
• Adding more conceptual nodes in the Perception Network (PN) and enrich the 
formai grammar accordingly. 
• Designing exercises that can be used autonomously or as remediation follow-
ing a diagnosis. 
• Completing the diagnosing streams, and adding new ones. 
• Elaborating more capabilities in the Behavior Network (BN), such as affective 
support, flexible textual interactions, styles and tone for these interactions, a 
variety of personalities, and developing the existing prototype's streams. More 
pedagogical strategy streams have to be created, with sorne dedicated to the 
delivery of the subject matter. Multiple pedagogical theory streams are also 
needed, with capability to take charge when a theory is declared ineffective by 
a metacognitive codelet. 
• Creating the linkage to an ontology of pedagogical theories so that the BN can 
be validated while it is being designed or while it auto-adapts. 
• Augmenting the simulator so that it sends more information and becomes able 
to offer more services to CTS (highlighting abjects on the monitors or aspects 
of the user interface, replaying sequences of actions, presenting exercises 
generated on-the-fly by CTS, etc.). 
• Augmenting the simulator for analysis of the views selected by the astronaut. 
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Adaptation capabilities 
• lmplementing metacognitive codelets to modulate, modify and correct the 
agent's behaviors. 
• Adding metacognitive codelets that do analysis for temporal pattern recogni-
tion . 
• Designing and implementing the capacity for CTS to modify its BN with new 
nodes following an analysis by metacognition codelets (for instance). 
• Adding more concepts and generalization capabilities to the Perception Mod-
ule; examining how LIDA's slipnet capabilities could be inserted. 
• Adding the Transient Episodic Memory module, currently under development. 
• Designing and implementing emotion capabilities for CTS. 
• Adding sorne user interface widgets that would allow the user to express its 
reactions to the latest intervention , or how he now feels about the task (so that 
CTS may take appropriate action, pedagogical or affective). 
Perception Module 
• Examining the linkage of the Perception Network to the Declarative Memories. 
Tools to make CTS a framework for "conscious" cognitive agents 
• Preparing specifications and methodologies for the application of the agent to 
a new field. For instance, how one does disseminates the expert knowledge 
throughout the architecture (in the BN, in the Learner Model (which one could 
cali more generally User Model), in the Domain Expert, in the attention 
codelets of the various types). 
• lmproving the actual BN Editor's capabilities and services (ex.: complete link-
age to CTS actual code, automatic generation of codelets , libraries of reus-
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able code lets), and developing formai and uniform specifications for 
codelet/class naming, for usable fields (and their role in the codelet), etc. 
• Developing a way to automatically create parts of the BN from learning theo-
ries ontologies; this may lead to multi-strategy tutors that can switch from one 
instructional theory to another in the same learning session . 
• Developing a tool that allows one to see and analyze BN's reactions and state 
in correspondence to the conscious broadcasts. 
• Creating a mechanism that would allow CTS to explain its decisions. 
• Augmenting the BN with management features such as specification of per-
sonality profiles (groups of parameters for the Feeling nades), analysis of 
consistency, lists of States with their connections, etc. 
• Writing specifications that indicate how and in what form modules receive 
publications from the Access Consciousness, how and in what form they are 
expected to rea ct and res pond . 
• Specify an open standard for the Learner Madel so that it becomes easy to 
connect to existing models or import them. 
8.2 SCALABILITY OF THE ARCHITECTURE 
This point is of interest since 1 claimed that complexity is the beast to tame 
wh en considering a tutoring agent (or any agent with human capacities, for that mat-
ter). Can CTS' architecture take the load of an ever richer BN? Won't it get bogged 
dawn by many modules sending information? Can it really consider the multiple as-
pects of a situation? 
The initial works are encouraging but cali for sorne caution . The BN is, in part, 
a rule-based system and , as such , meets the same difficulties of rules complexity. 
However, since the analysis is distributed over different specialized structures and 
modules, the rules may not need to get as complex. Metacognitive codelets could be 
176 
created to alleviate the need for human designers involvement: they could analyze 
CTS performances and its internai operations and then bring changes to the BN, 
either on States, or on precondition links, or on effect links, or in the Behavior nodes. 
Now, this partial answer may in fact just move the difficulties to a new focus : 
how do we reassemble the pieces of more distributed and complex analyses? My 
answer to this is that the principles of the architecture, mainly the convergence of the 
information to Working Memory and the coalitions creation, assure that the bits and 
pieces get together automatically. Each piece of information sent by a module joins 
the coalition that stimulated the reaction. So, there can be no confusion there. 
So, if the basic mechanisms are designed correctly, CTS should be able to be-
come a multi-talented expert with sorne social graces too. 
8.3 REUSABILITY OF THE ARCHITECTURE 
How easy is it to reuse CTS and apply it to another field? How feasible does it 
come for ordinary people? 1 see its reuse as quite feasible , especially when sorne of 
the items enumerated in the "Future works" section will have been accomplished to 
facilitate the manipulation of the architecture. 
Sorne of the mechanisms are completely generic: Working Memory, coalitions 
creation, selection by the Attention mechanism, broadcasting . Sorne mechanisms 
are generic as a shell but need a field-specifie content: the BN structure is generic, 
and sorne of its streams can be reused , especially if they have been designed as 
generic Behaviors or as partially specified actions. For instance, the hinting stream 
can be reused for any field of application , as it has been created to rely on the Do-
main Expert for the content it will display. But the General Help stream is very field 
specifie. ln future works, 1 will base the design of the Learner Model on open stan-
dards and look for a generic core that can be extended to correspond to specifie 
needs. 
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8.4 IS THERE A FUTURE FOR THIS FUNCTIONAL APPROACH? 
Asking this last question after years of research and development is troubling. 
ln my opinion , there is a trend towards more biologically-oriented architectures. But 
these are further away for general use. lt will take good tools that insulate the de-
signers from the intricacies of undecipherable neural networks and "chemical" bonds. 
1 think CTS-Iike architectures have a pretty long future ahead of them because they 
are accessible to a wider public, being partly symbol-based . 
We still do not understand most of the human body functioning. Bio-chemists 
still try to unravel some aspects of the myriad of the body's enzymes and other com-
pounds. Neuroscientists are still baffled by much of the brain. Functional and hybrid 
architectures have the potential of offering much of the macro-level advantages of 
biological mechanisms without waiting for our full understanding of the human body 
and mind complexities. 
~~~~~--------- - - --
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• Error in distance evaluation +0,60 
• Error in contrais manipulation +0,60 
• Error in element recognition +0,40 
• Error in localization +0,40 
Defective knowledge 0,20 
Manipulation steps 
• po or +0,40 
• average +0 ,20 
• good +0,10 
Neighborhood 
• po or +0 ,35 
• average +0,15 
• good +0,10 
Help request 0,50 
User answer 0 ,60 
Dynamic element 0,40 
General information about user 0 ,20 
Static element 0,00 
APPENDIX D 
A FEW EXAMPLES TAKEN FROM TUTORING SESSIONS 
WITNESSED AT THE CANADIAN SPACE AGENCY 
ln the following transcripts 1 made of the coaching sessions on the simulator, 1 
cali the astronaut "A" and the tutor 'T '. 
Excerpt 1 
ln this interaction, we can see that initial coaching is about basic concepts, and that 
the astronaut is tightly conducted through the necessary reasonings. Even if the 
astronaut offers a good answer, the tutor takes the opportunity to remind the as-
tronaut of alternatives. Once the goal has been reached to the satisfaction of the 
tutor, he makes explicit what was good and weil done by the astronaut. 
T: On the simulator, T creates three views (one per monitor) and asks A to evaluate 
the distance between two specified points (LEE tip and a nearby Space Station 
module. 
T: After receiving an answer, he asks A «Which view is most useful for the task?» 
A: points at one of the monitors . 
T: «Good. llike what you did: using your fingers to ... » 
T: «One other thing you could do is [ . .. ]» 
A: explains his line of reasoning , why he made that choice. 
T: gives other hints about what could have be used. 
T: Then, T concludes «Excellent. Y ou used [ ... ] to obtain [ .. . ]» 
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Excerpt 2: Operating the Portable Computer System (PCS) and the Display and 
Control Panel (DCP) 
This excerpt shows that there can be quite a bit of "practical theory" presented 
during a field training. 
T : Announces the general content of the session , then presents a detailed overview. 
T : Describes PCS' interface, which is the output means for the DCP. He explains 
that A has to decide what he wants to appear on the PCS, and where. 
T : Poses questions about the buttons, and the possible commands that can be cre-
ated here; 
T : Explains the rules that need to be respected, operations preliminary to operating 
cameras. The he asks: 
T : «Where would you go to see the last system message?» 
A : presses the appropriate button on the PCS. 
T : «Excellent» 
T: explains the content of the evens log , where messages come from (ex. : mes-
sages transferred by the physical equipments, such as ASK, ACCEPTED, 
COMPLETED). 
T : suggests how to keep the log window always visible ; he also points out which 
information need always be visible on screen. 
T : lists the steps to follow, then points with his finger to the next step on the paper 
list nearby the right monitor (orien ting the astronaut's first steps in su ch a proce-
dure) 
T : asks A to find on the DCP what button would obtain some specifie information. 
T : presents and explains the MSS operations check-list. 
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Excerpt 3: 
We see here that the tutor may use silence as a mean of /etting the astronaut under-
stand what he proposed in incorrect. The tutor may also detect that the astronaut's 
answer is taking time to come, indicative of the need for a helping hand. ft also 
shows that sometimes, after an exercise, the tutors make jokes. 
T : «Now, 1 would like you to effectuate a rotation of the LEE» 
A : suggest a maneuver to accomplish this, but it is incorrect. T remains silent, not 
reacting to the answer. The astronaut understands he needs to reevaluate his 
answer. But he cannat offer any better way. 
T : Not receiving any new suggestion , T brings out a set of arrows representing the 
coordinate system, along with a mock-up of Canadarm2's Hand. A will be able to 
see in 30, in "real" how things look. This seems to enlighten him. 
T : After the maneuver is successful , T looks at one of the simulator's monitors show-
ing space and says , very seriously: «Now, for an extra credit, what is the name of the 
star at the center of the aim?» Then he starts laughing and says «lt's a joke! ». A 
starts laughing. 
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Excerpt 4: Hinting 
Often, the tutor will not come out with the correct answer; he will rather try to suggest 
that there is a mistake, or offer a hint to bring the astronaut to understand there is 
something missing. 
T: «Now, a straight Station Forward in ISSACS.» ISSACS is one of many coordinate 
systems used around the Space Station . 
A : «Easy. A simple X motion.» 
T : «Right. Now, what would it be in Internai coordinates?» 
A : suggests an incomplete answer. 
T : «Feel free to use the axes model.» (Visibly, A really needs to manipulate the 
physical model at this point). «Basically, you have to align the Y axis to 0 .» 
T : «Nicely done. Excellent.» 
ln summary, we can see that the tutors prefer to use hinting that offering the 
right answer straight out. They sometimes use silence as an implicit hint. Sometimes, 
just a short bit of theory is plugged at an appropriate moment. And they offer plenty 
of feedback, mostly as positive reinforcement. 
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. ~ 
APPENDIX E 
THE INTERACTIVE DIAGNOSIS STREAM- LOWER PART 
\ 
~ 
IR· l isriQI\t 
proximity 
Adwut ize nud for 
question composition 
(lR-3) «A~n't you 
dose to (conteXtl 
tructure in prorimity] 
THE INTERACTIVE DIAGNOSIS STREAM- MIDDLE PART 
/ 
Adv~iztn ... dfor 
stion composition (IR· 
of) «At wh~ distance do 
ou estim~e Canad~ ls 
from (conttJttstructure 
in proximity)?-
Here, Remedio~~ tion should activ.ate 
naturo~~tlv ·2 
w~ for user 
~swer to Q·lR·3 
Here, Remed1at1on should 
~tiv Me nat ur ally 
w 
spatial louhutlon 
Here, foMowinQ Di~s. 
Remediat;on should .c:tivate 
naturally 
187 
THE INTERACTIVE DIAGNOSIS STREAM- UPPER PART 
lnt.rKtiVt 
di~ 
lermin.oon 
~• thtlnterc:tiw• 
di~11: 
188 
REFERENCES 
1. Anderson, John R. (1993) Ru/es of the Mind. Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum. 
2. Anderson, John R., Dan Bothell, et al. (2004) "An integrated theory of the 
mi nd" ln Psychological Review, vol. 111, no . 4, pp. 1036-1060. 
3. Anderson, John R. and Kevin Gluck. (2001) "What role do cognitive architec-
tures play in intelligent tutoring systems?" ln Cognition & Instruction: Twenty-
five years of progress. D. K. S. M. Carver Erlbaum, pp. 227-262. 
4. Baader, F. & Nutt, W. (2003) Basic description logics. ln F. Baader, D. Cava-
nese, D. McGuinness, D. Nardi, & P. Patei-Schneider (Eds.), The description 
logic handbook: Theory, implementation and applications, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press . pp. 47-100. 
5. Baars, Bernard J. (1988) A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
6. Baars, Bernard J. (1997a) "ln the theater of consciousness: Global Work-
space Theory, A Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness." ln Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, vol. 4, no. 4, pp.292-309. 
7. Baars, Bernard J. (1997b) ln the theater of consciousness: The Workspace of 
the Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press . 
8. Baars, Bernard J. (2002) "The conscious access hypothesis: origins and re-
cent evidence" ln TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 47-52. 
9. Baars, Bernard J. and Stan Franklin (2003) "How conscious experience and 
working memory interact". ln TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences. vol. 7, pp.166-
172. 
10. Baars, Bernard J. , Uma Ramamurthy and Stan Franklin (ln Press (2006)) 
"How deliberate, spontaneous and unwanted memories emerge in a computa-
tional model of consciousness". ln lnvoluntary Conscious Memory. J. H. Mace 
(Ed .). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing . 
11 . Baars, Bernard J., Thomas Z. Ramsay and Steven Laureys (2003) "Brain, 
conscious experience and the observing self' ln TRENDS in Neurosciences, 
vol. 26 , no. 12, pp. 671-675. 
190 
12. Baddeley, A. D., and G. J. Hitch (1974) Working memory. ln The Psycho/ogy 
of Learning and Motivation, ed. G. A. Bower. New York: Academie Press. 
13. Bechtel , William (1995) "Consciousness: Perspectives from symbolic and 
connectionist Al" . ln Neuropsychologia, vol. 33, pp.1 075-1086. 
14. Block, Ned (1995) "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" . ln 
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 18. 
15. Block, Ned (2002) Sorne Concepts of Consciousness. ln Philosophy of Mind: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings (David Chalmers , Eds), Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
16. Block, Ned (2003) Consciousness, Philosophica/lssues about, nature publish-
ing group. 
17. Bratman, Michael E., D. Israel, et al. (1988) "Plans and Resource-Bounded 
Practical Reasoning." ln Computationallntelligence, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 349-355. 
18. Brown, A. L. (1987) "Metacognition , executive control , self-regulation , and 
other more mysterious mechanisms" . ln Metacognition, motivation, and under-
standing. F. E. Weinert and R. Kluwe (Ed .). Hilsdale (Jew Jersey): Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, pp. 65-116. 
19. Carbonell , Jaime G., Craig A. Knoblock, and Steven Minton (1990) "PRODIGY: 
An integrated architecture for planning and learning" . ln Architectures for Intel-
ligence (Kurt Vanlehn , ed .).Hillsdale , NJ : Erlbaum. 
20. Carpenter, Gail and Stephen Gross berg ( 1987) "A massively parallel architec-
ture for a self-organizing neural pattern recognition machine." ln Computer Vi-
sion, Graphies, and Image Processing, no. 37, pp. 54-115. 
21 . Carpenter, Gail and Stephen Grossberg (2003) "Adaptive resonance theory" . 
ln The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks, Second Edition (Mi-
chael A. Arbib , Eds). Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press, pp. 87-90. 
22. Cazenave, Tristan ( 1998) "Machine Self-Consciousness More Efficient Th an 
Human Self-Consciousness?" ln European Meeting on Cybernetics and Sys-
tems Research, Vienne. 
23. Chal mers, David J. ( 1995) "Facing up to the problem of consciousness." ln 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 200-219. 
24. Chuderski , Adam, Zbigniew Stettner, et al. (2006) "Modeling individual differ-
ences in working memory search task". ln Seventh International Conference 
on Cognitive Modeling, Trieste, ltaly, pp. 74-79 
191 
25. Cotterill, Rodney M.J. (2003) CyberChild : a simulation test : a simulation test-
bed for consciousness bed for consciousness studies. ln Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies, vol. 10, no 4-5, pp. 31-45 
26 . Crick, Francis and Christof Koch (1990) "Towards a neurobiological theory of 
consciousness". ln Seminars in the Neurosciences. Academie Press, vol. 2, 
pp. 263-275. 
27. Crick, Francis and Christof Koch (2003) "A framework for consciousness" ln 
Nature neuroscience, vol. 6, no. 2, pp.119-126. 
28. Damasio, Antonio R. ( 1990) "Synchronous activation in multiple cortical re-
gions: a mechanism for recall" ln Seminars in Neuroscience, vol. 2, pp.87-296. 
29. Davis, Darryl N. (2002) "Architectures for cognitive and a-life agents". ln Intelli-
gent Agent Software Engineering. V. Plekhanova and S. Wermter (Ed .) ldea 
Group Publishing . 
http:/ /www2.dcs. hull .ac. uk/N EA T /dnd/papers/IASE-Final . pdf 
30. Dehaene, Stanislas and Lionel Naccache (2001) "Towards a cognitive neuro-
science of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework" . ln 
Cognition. vol. 79, pp. 1-37. 
31 . Dennett, Daniel. (1991) Consciousness Explained. (1 st edition) New York: Little 
Brown & Co. 511 p. 
32. d'lnverno, M., D. Kinny, et al. (1997) "A Formai Specification of dMars". ln 
Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages(Ed.), pp.155-176. 
33. D'Mello, Sidney K., Uma Ramamurthy and Stan Franklin (2006) "Realizing 
Forgetting in a Modified Sparse Distributed Memory System". ln 28th Annual 
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada , pp. 1992-1997. 
34. du Boulay, B. and R. Luckin (2001) "Modelling Human Teaching Tactics and 
Strategies for Tutoring Systems." ln International Journal of Artificial Intelli-
gence in Education, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 235-256. 
35. Dubois, Daniel (2005) "Consciousness for an ITS: lt's a Naturel" . ln AI-
CBT'2005: Proceedings of the Workshop on Forma/ Al Techniques in Com-
puter-Based Training, Victoria, BC, Canada , May 8, 2005, pp. 7-17. 
36. Edelman, Gerald M. (1989) The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of 
Consciousness. New York: Basic Books 
37. Edelman, Gerald (1992) Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. 
New York: Basic Books, 280 p. 
--------
192 
38. Elinas, Pantelis, Jesse Hoey and James J. Little (2003) "HOMER: Human Ori-
ented MEssenger Robot" , ln Proceedings of AAAI Spring Symposium on Hu-
man Interaction with Autonomous Systems in Camp/ex Environments, Stanford 
CA, March 2003. 
39. Engel, Andreas K. and Wolf Singer (2001) "Temporal binding and the neural 
correlates of sensory awareness" ln TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 5, 
no. 1, pp. 16-25. 
40. Ericsson, K. Anders and W. Kintsch (1995) "Long-term working memory" ln 
Psychological Review, no. 102, pp. 211-245. 
41 . Evens, M. W., S. Brandie, et al. (2001). "CIRCSIM-Tutor: An Intelligent Tutor-
ing System Using Natural Language Dialogue." ln Twelfth Midwest Al and 
Cognitive Science Conference, MA/CS 2001 , Oxford , OH, pp. 16-23. 
42. Faghihi, Usef (2007) Adding new modes of learning in CTS, a "conscious " 
cognitive agent. Master Thesis. UQAM. 
43. Feldman Barrett, Lisa , Michele M. Tugade and Randall W. Engle (2004) "lndi-
vidual Differences in Working Memory Capacity and Duai-Processing Theories 
of the Mind" ln Psychologica/ Bulletin , vol. 130, no. 4, pp. 553-573. 
http://www2.bc.edu/-barretli/pubs/2004/WMC. PsychBull.pdf. Retrieved on No-
vember 22 , 2006 
44. Flavell, J. H. (1979) "Metacognition and cognitive monitoring" . ln American 
Psychologists. vol. 34, pp.906-911. 
45. Fournier-Viger, Philippe, Mehdi Najjar, et al. (2006) "From Black-Box learning 
Objects to Glass-Box Learning Objects". ln 8th International Conference, ITS 
2006, Jhongli , Taiwan, Springer, pp.258-267. 
46. Franklin , Stan (1995) Artificial Minds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
47. Franklin , Stan (2003a) "A computer-based madel of Crick and Koch's Frame-
work for Consciousness" ln Science&Consciousness Review, no. 1. 
48. Franklin , Stan (2003b) "IDA: A Conscious Artifact?" ln Journal of Conscious-
ness Studies, vol. 10, no. 4-5, pp. 47-66. 
49 . Franklin , Stan (2005) "A "Consciousness" Based Architecture for a Functioning 
Mind" . ln Visions of Mind. D. Davis (Ed .). Hershey, PA: IDEA Group, lnc. 
50. Franklin , Stan (2005b) "Cognitive Robots: Perceptual associative memory and 
learning". ln 14th Annuallnternational Workshop on Robot and Human Interac-
tive Communication (RO-MAN 2005) , Nashville, TN , pp.427-433. 
193 
51. Franklin, Stan, Bernard J. Baars, et al. (2005) "The Role of Consciousness in 
Memory". ln Brains, Minds and Media. vol. 1. 
52. Franklin, Stan and Art Graesser ( 1999) "A software agent madel of conscious-
ness". ln Consciousness and Cognition, no. 8, 285-301 
53. Franklin , Stan and Lee McCauley (2004) "Feelings and Emotions as Motiva-
tors and Learning Facilitators: Architectures for Modeling Emotions". ln AAAI 
Spring Symposia : Architectures for Modeling Emotions. 
54. Franklin, Stan and Uma Ramamurthy (2006) "Motivations, values and Emo-
tions: 3 sides of the same coin" . ln Sixth International Workshop on Epigenetic 
Robotics, Paris (France), Lund University Cognitive Studies, pp. 41-48. 
55. Gaha, Mohamed (2007) lmplementing modifications and extensions to CTS. 
Master Thesis (forthcoming). 
56 . Gamma, Claudia (2000) "The Reflection Assistant: lnvestigating the Effects of 
Reflective Activities in Problem Solving Environments". ln ED-MEDIA 2000, 
Montreal, pp. 316-322. 
57. Gray, W. D., M. J. Schoelles, et al. (2003 (in press)) "Meeting Newell 's Other 
Challenge: Cognitive Architectures as the Basis for Cognitive Engineering." ln 
Behavioral & Brain Sciences. On line. 
http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/cogworks/publications/116 BBS rsp-to-A&L v9.pdf. 
Retrieved on November 2, 2006. 
58. Georgeff, Michael, Barney Pell , et al. (1999) The Beliet-Desire-Intention Model 
of Agency. ln 5th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents V: Agent Theo-
ries, Architectures, and Languages (A TAL-98) , Paris: Springer-Verlag. 
59 . Georgeff, M. P. and F. F. lngrand (1989) "Decision-Making in an Embedded 
Reasoning System". ln Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial In-
telligence, Detroit, Michigan . 
60 . Graesser, A., P. Chipman, et al. (2005). "AutoTutor: An intelligent tutoring sys-
tem with mixed-initiative dialogue." ln IEEE Transactions in Education no 48, 
pp. 612-618. 
61 . Graesser, A. C., G. T. Jackson, et al. (2003) "Why/AutoTutor: A Test of Learn-
ing Gains from a Physics Tutor with Natural Language Dialog". ln 25th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
62. Graesser, A. C. , N. Persan , et al. (2005) "Learning while holding a conversa-
tion with a computer". ln Technology-based education: Bringing researchers 
and practitioners together. L. PytlikZillig, M. Bodvarsson and R. Bruning . 
Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, pp. 143-167. 
194 
63. Grossberg , Stephen (1976) "Adaptive pattern classification and universal re-
coding , 1: Parallel development and coding of neural feature detectors & Il : 
Feedback, expectation , olfaction, and illusions". ln Biological Cybernetics, 
no. 23, pp.121-134 & 187-202. 
64. Grossberg, Stephen (1999) "The Link between Brain Learning, Attention , and 
Consciousness". ln Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 8, pp. 1-44. 
65. Grossberg , Stephen (2005) Linking attention to learning, expectation , competi-
tion , and consciousness. ln Neurobiology of attention (L. ltti , G. Rees and J. 
Tsotso , Eds). San Diego, Elsevier, pp. 652-662. 
66. Harnad , Steven (2003) "Can a Machine Be Conscious? How?" ln Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, vol. 10, no. 4-5, pp. 69-75. 
67. Hexmoor, Henry H., Johan M. Lammens, et al. (1993) "An autonomous agent 
architecture for integrating "unconscious" and "conscious", reasoned behav-
iors". ln Computer Architectures for Machine Perception, IEEE Computer So-
ciety Press. , pp. 328-336 
68. Hofstadter, D. R. and M. Mitchell (1995). "The copycat project: A model of 
mental fluidity and analogy-making" . ln Advances in connectionist and neural 
computation theory, vol. 2: Logica/ connections, ed. K J Holyoak and J A O. 
Role of Editor eds Barnden:205-267. Norwood N.J. : Ablex. 
69. Hohmeyer, Patrick (2006) Développement d'une architecture d'agent conscient 
pour un système tutoriel intelligent. Master Thesis. Université du Québec à 
Montréal. 
70. Jackson, John V. (1987) "ldea For A Mind". ln S/GART Newsletter. vol. , pp.23-
26. 
71 . James, William (1892) "The Stream of Consciousness". ln Psycho/ogy (chap. 
Xl) . 
72. Jennings, N. R. and M. Wooldridge (1998) "Application of Intelligent Agents" . 
ln Agent Technology: Foundations, Applications, and Markets. N. R. Jennings 
and M. J. Wooldridge (Ed.). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag, pp. 3-28. 
73. Jiang, H. and J. M. Vidal (2006, in press) "From Rational to Emotional Agents". 
ln AAAI Workshop on Cognitive Modeling and Agent-based Social Simulation, 
Menlo Park, California, AAAI Press. 
74. Johnson-Laird , P.N. (1983) "A computational analysis of consciousness". ln 
Cognition and Brain Theory, no. 6, pp.499-508. 
195 
75. Johnson-Laird , P. N. (1988) "A computational analysis of consciousness" . ln 
Consciousness in Contemporary Science. A. E. Marcel and E. Bisiach (Ed.). 
Oxford: Clarendon. 
76. Johnston, V. S. (1999) "Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions". 
Reading , MA: Perseus Books. 
77 . Kabanza, Froduald , Roger Nkambou, Khaled Belghith and Leo Hartman 
(2005). "Path-Pianning for Autonomous Training on Robot Manipulators in 
Space." ln Proceedings of IJCAI'2005. 
78. Kanerva, Pentti (1988) Sparse Distributed Memory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
79. Kanerva, Pentti (1993) "Sparse Distributed Memory and related models". ln 
Associative Neural Memories: Theory and Implementations. M. H. Hassoun 
(Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 50-76. 
80 . Kanerva, Pentti (1997) "Fully distributed representation" . ln 1997 Real World 
Computing Symposium (RWC'97) , Tokyo: Real World Computing Parthership, 
pp. 358-365. 
81 . Katz, S., A. Lesgold , E. Hughes, O. Peters, G. Eggan, M. Gordin , and L. 
Green berg. ( 1998) "Sherlock 2: An intelligent tutoring system built on the 
LRDC framework" . ln Facilitating the Development and Use of Interactive 
Learning Environments. C. P. Bloom & R. B. Loftin (Eds.), Mahwah, NJ: Erl-
baum, pp . 227-258 
82. Langley, P., K. B. McKusick, J. A. Allen , W. F. lba, and K. Thompson (1991) "A 
design for the lcarus architecture" , ln SIGART Bulletin , no. 2, pp. 104-109. 
83. Lebiere, C., M. O. Byrne, et al. (2004) "An integrated theory of the mind." ln 
Psychological Review, vol. 111 , no. 4, pp. 1036-1060. 
84. Lesgold , A. M., S. P. Lajoie, et al. (1992). "Sherlock: A coached practice envi-
ronment for an electronics troubleshooting job". ln Sherlock: A coached prac-
tice environment for an electronics troubleshooting job. (J . Larking and R. 
Chabay, Eds.). Hillsdale, N. J., Lawrence Erlbaum Assac. 
85. Libet, Benjamin , C. A. Gleason, et al. (1983) "Time of Conscious Intention to 
Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)" ln Brain, 
vol. 106, no. , pp. 623-642. 
86 . Ma es, Pattie ( 1989) "How to Do the Right Thing" ln Connection Science Jour-
nal, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 291-323. 
196 
87 . Mayers, A. , B. Lefebvre, et al. (2001 ). "Miace: A Human Cognitive Architec-
ture." ln sigcue outlook, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 61-77. 
88. McCarthy, John (1959) "Programs with common sense". ln Proceedings of the 
Teddington Conference on the Mechanization of Thought Processes, On line. 
London : Her Majesty's Stationary Office, pp. 75-91 . http://www-
formal.stanford .edu/jmc/mcc59.html. Retrieved on September 30 , 2006. 
89. McCarthy, John. ( 1995) and (2002). "Ma king Robots Conscious of the ir Mental 
States" . [on line] 
1995: http:!/citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cache/papers/cs/3566/http:zSzzSzwww-
formal. stanford .ed uzSzjmczSzconsciousness. pdf/mccarthy95making . pdf 2002: 
http://www-formal .stanford.edu/jmc/consciousness.ps 
90 . Minsky, Marvin (1961) "Steps Towards Artificiallntelligence" . ln Proceedings of 
IRE, On line. vol. 49, no. 1, Jan. 1961 , pp. 8-30. 
http://web.media.mit.edu/-minsky/papers/steps.html. Retrieved on September 
30, 2006. 
91 . Minsky, Marvin ( 1965) "Matter, Mi nd and Models" . ln Proceedings of the Inter-
national Federation of Information Processing Congress, vol. 1, pp.45-49 
92 . Minsky, Marvin (1985) The society of mind. New York, NY: Simon & Schus-
ter/T ouchstone. 
93. Minsky, M. (1998) "Consciousness is a Big Suitcase: A Talk with Marvin Min-
sky." ln Edge, February 1998. On line. 
http://www.edge.org/3rd culture/minsky/minsky p2.html. Retrieved on No-
vember 8, 2006. 
94. Nagel, Thomas (1974) "What is it like to be a bat?" ln The Philosophical Re-
view. vol. 83, pp.4 35-450. 
95. NASA (2000) "International Space Station Evolution Data Book: Volume 1. 
Baseline Design: Revision A" . FDC/NYMA, pp.222. 
96 . Negatu, Aregahegn S. and Stan Franklin (2002) "An Action Selection Mecha-
nism for "Conscious" Software Agents". ln Cognitive Science Quarter/y. vol. 2, 
pp. 363-386. 
97. Newell , A. (1990) Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
98. Nkambou, Roger, Khaled Belghith and Froduald Kabanza (2006) "An Ap-
proach to Intelligent Training on a Robotic Simulator using an lnnovative Path-
Pianner". ln 8th International Conference, /TS 2006, Jhongli , Taiwan, Springer-
Verlag, pp. 645-654. 
197 
99. Paillard , Jacques ( 1999) "L'approche neurobiologique des faits de conscience : 
vers une science de l'esprit" , ln Psychologie française , no 44-3, pp. 245-256. 
100. Picard, Rosalind W. (2000) "Towards computers that recognize and respond to 
user emotion" ln IBM Systems Journal, vol. 39, no. 3 & 4. 
101 . Piaget, Jean (1970) L'épistémologie génétique. Paris : Presses universitaires 
de France. Coll. Que sais-je?, no 1399, 127 p. 
102. Ramamurthy, Uma, Sidney K. D'Mello and Stan Franklin (2006) "LI DA: A 
Working Madel of Cognition". ln 7th International Conference on Cognitive 
Modeling , Trieste, ltaly, Edizioni Goliardiche, pp. 244-249. 
103. Revoy, Nicolas and Philippe Chambon (2006) "La science aux portes de la 
conscience". ln Science & vie, no. 1 062, pp. 56-71 . 
104. Searle , John ( 1980) "Minds, Brains, and Programs." ln Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, no 3, pp. 417-424. 
105. Selfridge, Oliver G. (1959) "Pandemonium: A paradigm for learning". ln Sym-
posium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes, H. M. Stationary Office, 
pp. 511-529 . 
106. Shaw, E., W. L. Johnson, et al. (1999) "Pedagogical Agents on the Web. " ln 
Third International Conference on Autonomous Agents. 
107. Sloman, A. (1999) "What sort of architecture is required for a human-like 
agent?" ln Foundations of Rational Agency (Michael Woolridge and Anand 
Rao, Eds), Kluwer Academie Publishers, Portland, Oregon. 
108. Sloman, Aaron and Ron Chris ley (2003) "Virtual machines and conscious-
ness." ln Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol.1 0, nos ( 4-5), pp. 133-172. 
109. "Stottler Henke to enhance intelligent tutoring system for U.S. Navy". ln Military 
& Aerospace Electronics Magazine. On line. PennWell Corporation. 
http:/ /mae. pen nnet.com/ Articles/ Article Display. cfm? ARTICLE 1 D=252989&p= 
32 . Retrieved September 30 , 2006. 
11 O. Sun, Ron ( 1997) "Learning, action, and consciousness: a hybrid approach to-
wards modeling consciousness" ln Neural Networks, special issue on con-
sciousness. vol. 10, no 7, pp. 1317-1331. 
111 . Taylor, John G. (2000) "The Enchanting Subject Of Consciousness (Or ls lt A 
Black Hale?): Review of Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks ln Brains and 
Computers By Rodney Cotterill" . On line. 
<http://psyche.cs.monash.edu .au/v6/psyche-6-02-taylor.html>. Retrieved on 
September 30 , 2006. 
198 
112. Taatgen, N.A. (submitted). Consciousness in ACT-R. Submitted to the OUP 
companion to Consciousness. On line. 
http:/ /www .ai . rug . nl/-niels/publications/ ACT -R-consciousness. pdf. Retrieved 
on November 2, 2006. 
113. Tononi, G. and Gerald M. Edelman (1998) "Consciousness and complexity" ln 
Sciences, vol. 282, pp. 1846-1851 . 
114. VanLehn , K. and W. Bali. (1991) "Goal Reconstruction: How Teton Blends 
Situated Action and Planned Action" , ln Architectures for Intelligence. (K. 
VanLehn Ed.). Hillsdale, NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 147-189 
115. VanLehn, K., C. Lynch, et al. (2005). "The Andes physics tutoring system: Five 
years of evaluations." ln Artificial Intelligence in Education, Amsterdam, lOS. 
116. Veloso, M., J. Carbonell, A. Perez, D. Borrajo, E. Fink, and J. Blythe, J. (1995) 
"lntegrating planning and learning". ln Journal of Experimental and Theoretical 
Artificia/lntelligence, vol.? , no1. 
117. Voss, Peter (2004) "Essentials of General Intelligence: The direct path to AGI". 
ln Real Al: New Approaches to Artificial Genera/Intelligence. Ben Goertzel and 
Cassio Pennachin (Ed .). On line. 
http://www.adaptiveai.com/research/index.htm#different approach . Retrieved 
on November 11, 2006. 
118. Yam, Phil (1998) "Intelligence Considered: What does it mean to have brain-
power? : A search for a definition of intelligence" . ln Scientific American Quar-
ter/y. (Winter). 
